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Abstract
Assessing Information Security Management in Malaysian Academic Libraries
This research aimed to study the perceived threats of information security, their
frequency of occurrence and the perceived main source of information security threats
in Malaysian academic libraries. Utilising the relevant literature, a possible list of
information security threats were listed and investigated. In addition, the researcher also
studied the levels of implementation of information security measures in these academic
libraries. The information security measures were grouped into five (5) components that
represent the proposed library information security assessment model (LISAM). The
five (5) components included the technological measures, information security policies,
security procedures, security methods and security awareness creation activities. The
researcher also studied the differences between the academic libraries in applying
information security measures based on the type of university, number of staff,  years in
ICT adoption, yearly information security budget, availability of information system
(IS) security staff and availability of wireless connection. Data used was based on
structured questionnaires collected from a total of 39 individuals who were responsible
for the information systems (IS) or information technology (IT) in academic libraries in
Malaysia. The pilot test and the actual data collection indicated all the five components
in the instruments are reliable with cronbach alpha correlation coefficients above α =
0.60. Findings revealed that hardware security threats (70.0%), human-related threats
(66.0%) and environmental threats (51.0%) were perceived as the most common
information security threats in Malaysian academic libraries. However, data security
threat was perceived as the least threatening to these academic libraries. There were
slightly high frequencies of occurrence of hardware maintenance errors, use of
unauthorised hardware and malicious code attacks in these academic libraries. Parallel
with the existing research findings, hardware and software failures (56.4%) as well as
human-related threats (41.0%) were perceived as the main root causes of information
security incidents in these academic libraries. Most of technological measures for
hardware, software, workstation, network, server, data and environmental security have
been implemented and reviewed on regular basis in these academic libraries. This study
found significant differences among academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
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technological measures due to yearly information system’s security budget and
availability of information systems (IS) security staff. However, most of information
security procedures, information security administrative tools and information security
awareness creation were rated at Level 2 (Only some part of measures have been
implemented), these findings were discouraging as rating of Level 4 (Implemented and
reviewed on regular basis) and Level 5 (Fully implemented and recognised as good
example for other libraries) would be better reflection of a well implemented
organisational measures in libraries. This study found significant differences among
academic libraries in Malaysia in applying the organisational measures due to number
of staff, yearly information system security budget and availability of information
system (IS) security staff. With regard to the overall security status of information
security management in Malaysian academic libraries based on the proposed
information security assessment tool for libraries, findings revealed that half of those
academic libraries (55.3%) surveyed have good practice of technological security
measures but require improvement on organisational measures. This may be due to the
over-emphasis on technology as the sole solution to information security problems in
these academic libraries. Therefore, it is necessary to put organisational measures in
place as relying on technology alone will not solve the information security problems
effectively.
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Abstrak
Menilai Pengurusan Keselamatan Maklumat di Perpustakaan-Perpustakaan
Akademik di Malaysia
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji ancaman-ancaman keselamatan maklumat,
kekerapan kejadian dan sumber-sumber utama yang dianggap mengancam keselamatan
maklumat di perpustakaan-perpustakaan akademik di Malaysia. Berdasarkan ulasan
kesusasteraan, senarai kemungkinan ancaman keselamatan maklumat di perpustakaan
telah disenaraikan dan diselidiki. Di samping itu, penyelidik juga mengkaji tahap-tahap
pelaksanaan pengawalan keselamatan maklumat di perpustakaan-perpustakaan
akademik ini. Untuk mencapai matlamat ini, penyelidik mencadangkan model penilaian
keselamatan maklumat di perpustakaan (LISAM) yang mempunyai lima (5) komponen
penilaian. Lima (5) komponen tersebut meliputi langkah-langkah teknologi, dasar-dasar
keselamatan maklumat, prosedur keselamatan, kaedah keselamatan dan aktiviti
membentuk kesedaran keselamatan maklumat. Penyelidik juga mengkaji perbezaan di
antara perpustakaan akademik dalam menggunapakai langkah-langkah keselamatan
maklumat berdasarkan jenis universiti, bilangan kakitangan, tempoh dalam penggunaan
ICT, bajet tahunan untuk keselamatan maklumat, kewujudan kakitangan untuk menjaga
keselamatan sistem maklumat dan ketersediaan akses Internet tanpa wayar. Data dalam
kajian ini berdasarkan kepada soal selidik berstruktur yang telah diperolehi daripada 39
individu yang bertanggungjawab mengenai sistem maklumat (IS) atau teknologi
maklumat (IT) di perpustakaan akademik di Malaysia. Keputusan kajian rintis dan
kajian sebenar menunjukkan kebolehpercayaan kelima-lima komponen dalam
instrumen mempunyai nilai cronbach alpha correlation coefficients lebih daripada
α=0.60. Hasil penemuan mendedahkan bahawa ancaman perkakasan (70.0%), ancaman
manusia (66.0%) dan ancaman alam sekitar (51.0%) telah dianggap sebagai ancaman
keselamatan maklumat yang lazim berlaku di perpustakaan akademik di Malaysia.
Walau bagaimanapun, ancaman keselamatan terhadap data telah dilihat sebagai kurang
merbahaya bagi perpustakaan-perpustakaan akademik ini. Kesilapan penyelenggaraan
perkakasan,  penggunaan perkakasan yang tidak dibenarkan dan serangan kod berniat
jahat berlaku agak tinggi di perpustakaan-perpustakaan ini. Selari dengan penemuan
penyelidikan yang sedia ada, kegagalan perkakasan dan perisian (56,4%) serta ancaman
berkaitan dengan manusia (41.0%) telah dianggap sebagai punca utama berlakunya
insiden keselamatan maklumat di perpustakaan-perpustakaan akademik ini. Secara
keseluruhan, kebanyakkan langkah-langkah teknologi untuk melindungi perkakasan,
perisian, stesen kerja, rangkaian, server, data dan keselamatan alam sekitar telah
dilaksanakan dan disemak secara tetap di perpustakaan-perpustakaan akademik ini.
Kajian ini mendapati perbezaan yang signifikan di kalangan perpustakaan akademik di
Malaysia dalam menggunapakai langkah-langkah teknologi yang disebabkan oleh bajet
tahunan untuk keselamatan maklumat dan kewujudan kakitangan untuk menjaga
keselamatan sistem maklumat. Walau bagaimanapun, kebanyakan prosedur
keselamatan maklumat, kaedah keselamatan maklumat dan aktiviti mewujudkan
vkesedaran keselamatan maklumat hanya dinilai di Aras 2 (Hanya sebahagian daripada
langkah-langkah telah dilaksanakan), penemuan ini tidak memuaskan kerana penarafan
Aras 4 (Dilaksanakan dan dikaji semula secara tetap) dan Tahap 5 (Dilaksanakan secara
sempurna dan diiktiraf sebagai contoh yang baik kepada perpustakaan lain) adalah
gambaran perlaksanaan langkah-langkah keselamatan maklumat yang lebih baik di
sesebuah perpustakaan. Kajian ini mendapati perbezaan yang signifikan di kalangan
perpustakaan akademik di Malaysia dalam menggunapakai langkah-langkah organisasi
yang disebabkan oleh bilangan kakitangan, bajet tahunan untuk sistem keselamatan
maklumat dan kewujudan kakitangan untuk menjaga keselamatan sistem maklumat.
Berdasarkan alat penilaian keselamatan maklumat untuk perpustakaan yang
dicadangkan, penemuan mendedahkan bahawa separuh (55.3%) daripada perpustakaan-
perpustakaan akademik  yang dikaji di Malaysia, mempunyai amalan langkah-langkah
keselamatan teknologi yang baik tetapi memerlukan penambahbaikan bagi langkah-
langkah organisasi. Ini mungkin disebabkan oleh penekanan yang berlebihan kepada
teknologi sebagai langkah penyelesaian tunggal bagi masalah-masalah keselamatan
maklumat di perpustakaan-perpustakaan akademik ini. Maka, adalah perlu untuk
melaksanakan langkah-langkah organisasi di perpustakaan-perpustakaan ini kerana
pergantungan kepada teknologi sahaja tidak akan dapat menyelesaikan masalah-
masalah keselamatan maklumat secara berkesan.
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1Chapter One
________________________________________________
Introduction
1.0 An Overview
Information security (ISec) is the means and ways of protecting data from unauthorised
access, change, misuse, loss and ensures its availability whenever required. At the
beginning, ISec was focused mainly on technical issues and the responsibility was left
to technical experts (Solms, 2000). This view has changed as there is growing
management realisation on the importance of ISec, thus, aspects like policies,
procedures and top management involvement are incorporated in managing ISec
(Solms, 2000). Subsequently, it was felt there was a need for some form of
standardisation, best practices, certification, ISec culture, measurement and monitoring
of ISec in an organisation. Finally, views encompass the development of ISec
governance as an integral part of corporate governance that consists of the stakeholders’
commitment, proper organisational structures for enforcing good ISec, user awareness
as well as commitment towards good ISec, the necessary policies, procedures,
processes, technologies and compliance enforcement mechanisms (Solms, 2006).
ISec management in the context of library management describes controls that a library
needs to implement in order to protect its information assets from all potential threats to
ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its information resources. All
libraries have information assets that need to be protected. The endless volumes of a
library’s main resources, services and personal patrons’ records such as their names,
addresses, e-mail addresses, passwords, loan records and website logs reside in the
library’s IS and most of these resources can be accessed remotely via the library
website. As indicated by Mohammed Imtiaz (2001) “library services need to reach to
2the readers with the use of the technology to provide online access to globally generated
information and to provide uninterrupted worldwide access to the library resources
searchable from anywhere, anytime, by anyone”. A library’s increased reliance on the
Internet for generating, collecting, organising, presenting and disseminating information
and services has exposed the library to various threats. Failure to appropriately manage
ISec can potentially expose the library to loss of time, money, service delivery and
public trust. As highlighted by Zimerman (2010), library computers are physically
vulnerable to attacks of malware agents which include Trojans, viruses, worms, adware,
spyware, pornware, keystroke loggers, password stealers as well as to theft, damage and
destruction. Hackers, viruses, worms and Trojan horses are referred as external threats
which libraries should be able to handle (Al-Suqri and Afzal, 2007). Thus, availability,
integrity and preservation of data are the core roles of libraries in this digital
environment (Brainstorming Report, 2001).
The research described in this thesis is concerned with information security
management (ISM) in Malaysian libraries. Many studies have concentrated on the
issues of how to protect information system (IS) from cyber threats; mostly from the
technical perspective. Some other researchers have directed attention not only to
technological but also to organisational dimensions (Calder and Watkins, 2003; Chan et
al., 2005; Ma and Pearson, 2005; Mercuri, 2004 and Vaast, 2007). This research,
however, was motivated to assess types and statuses of technological and organisational
measures that are being adopted by academic libraries in Malaysia. Some attempts have
been made to understand the types of computer threats targeted on health and industries,
public offices and workplaces in Malaysia. However, the possible types of threats that
might breach library ISec remain unclear as very few empirical studies related to ISec
threats have been conducted specifically in a library setting. Therefore,
3this research aimed to study the perceived threats of ISec, their frequency of occurrence
and the perceived main source of ISec threats in Malaysian academic libraries. Through
the sample obtained from key players of ISec in Malaysian academic libraries, results of
the descriptive analysis also revealed the status of implementation of technological and
organisational measures in these libraries as well as the differences between these
libraries in implementing technical and organisational measures due to type of
universities, years in ICT implementation, yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security
staff and availability of wireless connection. The final result also provides empirical
proof on the most common types of hardware, software, workstation, data, hardware,
software, data, network, physical and human-related threats experienced by Malaysian
academic libraries.
1.1 The Problems
1.1.1 Information Security Issues in Libraries
The first important step in ISec planning is to understand which assets the library needs
to protect and why the protection is necessary. This requires an awareness of the types
of threats and vulnerabilities confronting a library’s valuable assets. Security attacks
such as hacking, denial of services, worms and viruses often compromise the library IS
security (Breeding, 2006). In most cases, the threat's target is the information itself
rather than the system that transmits it. However, necessary precautions are needed to
protect the overall elements of the library IS including the hardware, software, physical
environment, documentation and people related to an IS from any potential of threats.
And securing any of those elements in a library must be achieved without any
compromise to the public services, user privacy and legal access (Eisenberg and
Lawthers, 2005). The possible consequences or impacts might be in terms of loss of
confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of the information. For instance, the security
weaknesses in any library systems can lead to unauthorised accessed of confidential
4information (such as the patrons’ personal information and circulation record) or loss of
integrity of the data stored. These in turn can have negative effect on the trust of
publishers or other content providers, can cause embarrassment or even economic loss
to the library, and can even lead to other serious problems if urgently needed
information is unavailable (Fox and ElSherbiny, 2011).
Libraries, as a broker between the users and the universe of information resources, serve
a diverse clientele and there is increasing pressure for libraries to co-operate in
providing access to services to members of other libraries or universities (Ahmed,
2000). Thus, libraries must have effective authentication mechanisms to assure the
privacy and confidentiality of information during its collection, storage, processing and
dissemination only to those authorised, such as library staff and registered members and
to prevent accidental disclosure of sensitive information. There are several security
problems often not addressed in libraries related to the confidentiality of information
and these include (Newby, 2002 and Cain 2003): 1) privacy offered for data that may be
collected from patrons apart from circulation records can be questionable; and 2) risks
of penetration of library systems from outside parties who may access circulation or
other data from outside the library via an Internet connection and an unattended modem
or from staff who abuse their access rights.  The impacts of unauthorised, unanticipated
or unintentional disclosure of confidential information can range from severe to serious
consequences and these include: 1) the jeopardising of library security to disclosure of
Privacy Act data; 2) loss of public confidence, embarrassment or legal action against the
library; and 3) loss of collection or revenue due to insecure computing environment
(Stoneburner, Goguen and Feringa, 2002; and Cain, 2003).
5Now days, most library resources and services can be accessible at any time and from
anywhere. Providing access to those valuable library resources via the library website
may expose the library to a greater risk as they can be accessible to people outside the
library as well as those within via the library server (Eisenberg and Lawthers, 2005).
Libraries must decide how to ensure that the information stored, processed, transited or
accessed via the library systems are protected against viruses and  worms to guarantee
that information and services are not corrupted, degraded or undergone unauthorised
modification because the intruders can be anybody and from anywhere in the world. It
was once reported that a hacker had defaced the National Library of Australia’s website,
leaving a cryptic message on parts of its site. It was believed that the defaced page was
posted on a Windows NT platform (McAuliffe, 2000). The presence of contaminated,
corrupted and missing data could result in violation of data, fraud and successful attack
against system availability and confidentiality’s which may reduces the assurance or
integrity of a library system (Stoneburner, Goguen and Feringa, 2002). These scenarios
have been noted by Breeding (2006) as worrying remarks such as ‘libraries are often
perceived as “an easy mark” and become a jumping-off point for hackers to other
networks or computers in a library’.
It is important that a library must use a reliable network system, provide adequate work
stations and flexible access hours from internal or remote areas. Equally important,  a
library also need to ensure that the data and information are secured for authorised
users, protecting them from denial of services (DoS), viruses, worms, and lost of IS
capabilities due to the natural disasters or human errors (Eisenberg and Lawthers,
2005). If the critical library IS such as online catalogues, online databases and websites
are unavailable to its end-users, the impacts are many and might include: 1) affecting
the library’s mission as an information provider; 2) losing revenue due to the loss of
6system functionality and operational effectiveness of a library IS; and 3) losing
productive time, thus impeding the library and its end-users’ performance. Obviously,
the library ISM must at least ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information processed by an IS and of the IS itself as they are essential to the success of
a library administrative activities and services.
1.1.2 Perceptions on Information Security Management from Literature
In the past, literature on ISec is seemingly concentrated on the technical aspects as
means in protecting information (such as use of encryption, access control, intrusion
detection and firewalls) but overlooking the human component (Daniels and Spafford,
1999). As most researches tended to focus on the technical side, management attention
to ISec has been low compared to other ISec issues (Olnes, 1994 and Hong et al., 2003).
This is because, organisations tend to believe that for every security problem there is a
technological solution. They therefore believe that technical tools will solve all their
ISec problems.
This situation has somewhat changed. More recently, researchers have suggested that
organisations should adopt a mixed approach encompassing procedural (such as
security policies, acceptable usage guidelines, security awareness programmes) as well
as technical countermeasures (D’Arcy and Hovav, 2004). This is because ISec is seen
holistically, which involves two equally important components, namely the physical
security and the non-technological security. Loch and Carr (1991) reported that
management’s concern with IS security ranks among the ten most important topics in
information management. The shift towards people rather than technology alone is due
to the fact that all technical security controls are purchased, implemented, managed and
used by humans (Hinson, 2003). People are seen as both perpetrators and victims of
7security breaches or accidents as they use and manage IS on a day-to-day basis (James,
1996). Many recent studies highlighted people or human failures as the greatest threats
of information security, not the technical vulnerabilities (AlAboodi, 2006; Yeh and
Chang, 2007; Ernst and Young, 2008). As indicated by Hinson (2003) simple
configuration mistakes can leave firewalls vulnerable and systems completely
unprotected, thus, human error is far more likely to cause serious security breaches than
technical vulnerabilities. This is the reason, why many organisations have invested
millions in securing their IT infrastructure in various forms of physical, personnel and
administrative defenses to reduce the frequency and severity of computer security-
related losses (Guttman and Roback, 1995). Summing up, ISec is both a human and a
technological problem. This suggests that building a secure library’s ISec is becoming
more complicated and IS security can be achieved by applying technical, management
and procedural means (AlAboodi, 2006).
1.1.3 Gaps in the Literature
Despite the important investments in technological and non-technological components
for ISec in any organisation, not much is known on the actual scenario of IS security,
especially in libraries. The few Malaysian-related studies covered mainly information
system security in healthcare, IT organisations and government sectors (Al-Salihy, Ann
and Sures, 2002; Suhazimah, 2007; Samy, Rabiah and Zuraini, 2009). Literature also
reports that different industries tend to have different requirements for their ISec needs
(Jung, Han and Lee, 2001; Yeh and Chang, 2007). Similarly, several researchers found
that financial organisations undertake more security efforts and have stronger deterrent
strategies than other industries (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan et al., 2003; Davamanirajan,
Kauffman, Kriebel et al., 2006).
8In general, research that focuses on library aspects of control measures for ISec is
sparse. Because of the paucity of the work in this area, there is little general guidance
for libraries on these matters. As highlighted by Newby (2002), IS security is often
under-appreciated in libraries and this is surprising as information is the library’s main
business. Therefore, this research is designed to explore the current status of security
breach incidents that can potentially jeopardised the library IS security and justify
whether or not academic libraries have taken appropriate steps via technical,
management or procedural means to safeguard their own IS security.
1.2 The Motivation
Despite acknowledging the important value of information in a library and the vital role
played by IS to process the information, empirical research in ISec related to libraries is
relatively new and rare. As a result, the motivation of this empirical study is to extend
knowledge of ISec in literature by specifically focusing on the types of ISec breaches
and the current security controls used in Malaysian academic libraries. This study will
be a significant endeavor for the enhancement of ISec strategies used by academic
libraries and other libraries in protecting their information and IS. The results of this
study may help library management identify the strengths, weaknesses and priorities in
managing its ISec so that relevant actions can be applied in a more efficient and
effective manner.
This study is also aims to find out and contribute to the existing literature on academic
library implementations of technical and organisational countermeasures. Types of
technical and organisational countermeasures are listed and examined. Based on
findings from this study, the researcher proposes an assessment tool for assessing the
status of implementation of ISec measures in Malaysian academic libraries. This study
9will be a significant in promoting good ISec practices in libraries and encouraging the
cultivation of good security culture among library practitioners.
Study on ISec threats especially in libraries is still very rare and the purpose of this
research is to gain a better insight on the current status of ISec threats in Malaysian
academic libraries. This research holds significant value in terms of providing a
possible list of ISec threat categories in academic libraries and identifying the common
threats related to hardware, software, data, network and human-related threats in
academic library domains.
1.3 Scope of the Study
The scope of the study is to assess ISec management, specifically on the types and
levels of implementation of ISec measure deployed in Malaysian academic libraries.
The assessment is focused on the level of implementation of technical and
organisational countermeasures. This study also explores the various types of ISec
threats in Malaysian academic libraries. The possible type of ISec threats are examined,
particularly in terms of common hardware, software, data, network, physical and
human-related threats experienced by Malaysian academic libraries in the past six
months (between June 2009 until December 2009). In order to guide the reader, the
researcher positions two guidance points throughout this thesis. Firstly, the research
objective is set out to provide the central direction of the study. The second point is the
posing of questions and hypotheses that this study seeks to answer.
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1.3.1 Research Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this research is to conduct an information system (IS) security
assessment in Malaysian academic libraries by understanding the current IS security
threats and its security practices as well as to propose a model for ISec in the academic
libraries. Therefore, this study aims to achieve the following objectives:
1) To explore the general information technology (IT) infrastructures in Malaysian
academic libraries in terms of number of personal computer (PC) allocations,
availability of wireless connection, type of operating system used, years of
information and communications technology (ICT) adoption, percentage of IS
security budget and availability of IS security staff.
2) To explore the most common perceived ISec threats and the frequency of their
occurrences (in term of hardware, software, data, network, physical and other IS
security threats) discovered by these libraries during a period of six months;
3) To find out the most common perceived source of ISec threats in Malaysian
academic libraries;
4) To ascertain the extent of technological measures deployed by Malaysian
academic libraries. This would include identifying the level of implementation
of  hardware, software, workstation, network, server, data and physical security
measures in these libraries;
5) To investigate the differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in
applying the technical measures in terms of type of university, years in ICT
implementation, yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and
availability of wireless connection.
6) To ascertain the extent of organisational measures deployed by Malaysian
academic libraries. This would include identifying the level of implementation
of security policy, procedures and controls, tools and methods and awareness
activities in these libraries.
7) To investigate the differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in
applying organisational measures in terms of type of universities, years in ICT
implementation, yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and
availability of wireless connection; and
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8) To propose a model and an assessment tool to assess the implementation status
of ISec in Malaysian academic libraries.
1.3.2 Research Questions
In order to meet the purpose and objectives of the study, the following research
questions are asked:
Research Question 1:
What is the general background of information technology (IT) infrastructures in
Malaysian academic libraries in terms of number of PC allocations, availability of
wireless connection, type of operating system used, years of ICT adoption, percentage
of IS security budget and availability of IS security staff?
Research Question 2:
What are the most common perceived IS security threats and the frequency of their
occurrence in Malaysian academic libraries in terms of hardware, software, data,
network, physical and human- related threats?
Research Question 3:
What is the most common perceived source of IS security threats in Malaysian
academic libraries?
Research Question 4:
What is the level of implementation of technological security measures (in terms of
hardware security, software security, workstation security, network security, server
security, data security and physical security measures) in Malaysian academic libraries?
Research Question 5:
Are there significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measures based on type of university, number of staff, years in ICT
implementation, yearly IS security budget, availability of IS security staff and
availability of wireless connection?
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Research Question 6:
What is the level of implementation of organisational security measures (in terms of
security policy, procedures and controls, tools and methods and awareness activities) in
Malaysian academic libraries?
Research Question 7:
Are there significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying the
organisational measures based on type of university, number of staff,  years in ICT
adoption, yearly Isec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection?
Research Question 8:
What is the overall implementation status of technological security measures and
organisational security measures in Malaysian academic libraries based on the proposed
assessment tool?
1.3.3 Hypotheses
1.3.3.1 Differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying technical
measures based on the type of university, number of staff,  years in ICT adoption,
yearly ISecbudget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection are suspect. Hence, it is therefore hypothesised that;
Hypothesis 1
There are no significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technical measures based on type of university, years in ICT implementation, yearly
ISecbudget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless connection.
1.3.3.2 Differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures based on the type of university, number of staff,  years in ICT
adoption, yearly Isec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection are suspect. Hence, it is therefore hypothesised that;
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Hypothesis 2
There are no significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures based on the type of university, years in ICT implementation,
yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection.
1.4 Assumptions
The assumptions for this study are that the academic libraries have larger collections,
larger number of staff and patrons, receive more funds and also have more diverse of
services when compared to other types of libraries. The academic libraries selected as
samples in this study were based on the assumptions that they have automated library
systems, provide Internet and online services to the patrons.
This research was limited to a specific individual within an academic library. This
would increase the accuracy and quality of response because the individual was chosen
due to the nature of his role and responsibilities that are in the relevant position to
provide the desired information on ISec threats and measures. The majority (90%) of
respondents were from the management division, which include the librarians or library
executives, heads of automation units, IT officers or IS officers, senior librarians,
automation librarians and chief librarians or deputy chief librarians. Thus, it is likely
that they were all sensitive to ISec concerns. This study is descriptive in nature and
findings from this research may not be generalised to all libraries and other industries in
Malaysia or in other geographic areas.
14
1.5 Definition of Terms
Definitions of key terminologies used throughout this thesis are derived from
documents and handbooks.
1.5.1 Information Security (ISec)
Information security is referred as ‘a combined set of measures at the physical,
personnel, administrative, computer and information system levels’ (INTOSAI, 1995).
1.5.2 Information Security Management (ISM)
Information security management describes controls that an organisation needs to
implement in order to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its
information resources.
1.5.3 Information System (IS)
In this study, the term information system (IS) defined as ‘people, technologies and
machines used to capture or generate, collect, record, store, retrieve, process, display
and transfer or communicate information to multiple users at appropriate levels of an
organisation to accomplish the specific set of functions’ (Federation of American
Scientists, 1998). IS in library refers to online databases, web-based resources, digital
library collections and library resources (Kochtanek and Matthews, 2002). Library
resources may include bibliographic records and patrons’ records. Library uses IS for
various reasons including managing the library administration (e.g. managing patron
records and bibliographic records), processing of library materials, developing online
resources, accessing online resources, developing offline resources, accessing offline
resources and providing service to patrons (Akintunde,2004). Therefore, IS are crucial
for libraries that were highly information-intensive or relied heavily on IS.
15
1.5.4 Information System (IS) Security
In this study, the term information system security is referred as ‘the protection of IS
against unauthorised access to or modification of information, whether in storage,
processing, or transit, and against the denial-of service to authorised users or the
provision of service to unauthorised users, including those measures necessary to detect,
document and counter such threats’ (INFOSEC, 1992).
1.5.5 Threats
In this study, threat is describe as any circumstance or event with the potential to
adversely impact an IS through unauthorised access, destruction, disclosure,
modification of data and /or denial of service (NSTISSC, 2000).
1.5.6 Threat source
Threat source or threat agent specifies the intent and method targeted at the intentional
exploitation of vulnerability or a situation and method that may accidentally trigger
vulnerability (NIST IR 7298, 2006).
1.5.7 Security practice
Information system security practices depend on effective ISec solutions to minimise
vulnerabilities associated with a variety of threats, where the broader sharing of such
practices will enhance the overall security of the organisation.
1.5.8 Security safeguards or controls
Protective measures and controls prescribed to meet the security requirements specified
for an IS. Safeguards may include security features, management constraints, personnel
security, and security of physical structures, areas and devices (NSTISSC, 2000). In this
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study the safeguards or countermeasures specifies the organisational and technical
controls prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of the system and its information (NIST IR 7298, 2006).
1.5.9 Organisational measures
The organisational measures include the security policy; procedures and control; non-
technological tools and methods; and creation of security awareness (Hagen,
Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008).
1.5.10 Technological measures
The technical mechanisms or controls refer to mechanisms use to protect the computer
hardware, computer software, workstation, network, server, data and physical facilities.
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis is organised into six chapters. This chapter provides the research background,
the problem statement, significance of the study, the scope of the study, research
questions, research objectives, research hypotheses and the definitions of key terms.
Chapter Two elaborates a review of literature that highlights the previous studies related
to academic libraries, library needs for IS and ISec, types of ISec threats, sources of
ISec threats, ISec measures, security assessment models, criteria and packages, studies
on ISec frameworks and empirical studies on ISec. The discussion is comprised of the
setting-up of concept, variables, terminology used and findings.
Chapter Three outlines the research design and methodology used in answering the
research questions and testing the hypotheses, the research approach, sampling design,
questionnaire development, data collection and methods of data analyses. Chapter Four
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reports the descriptive statistical profiles of perceived ISec threats, their frequency of
occurrences as well as the origin of these security incidents experienced by the
participating academic libraries. Chapter Five presents the level of implementation of
technological measures, organisational measures, the assessment tool, the overall
implementation status and results of hypotheses testing. Chapter Six provides the
discussions on the results, limitations, implications, future research directions and
conclusion.
1.7 Summary of the Chapter
This chapter mainly provides the background of the subject and states the problem and
issues leading this study. A brief review of literature about the problem was covered in
order to highlight the deficiencies in current literature and identify the gaps to be
addressed by this study. Two gaps were identified. One, limited empirical studies on
ISec in libraries were the major motivation of this study. Two, the present challenges
faced by Malaysian academic libraries in terms of security threats associated with IS
also led to the interest to assess the technical and organisational approaches adopted by
these libraries. The study used academic libraries as the object of the study. This study
was designed based on the Organisational Information Security Staircase Model
(Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008) and proposed additional measures for each
step to assess the implementation of technological and organisational ISec measures in
the library.
Basically, this study explored the types of Isec threats faced by Malaysian academic
libraries as well as assessed the level of implementation of technological and
organisational measures deployed by these libraries to ensure the security of their IS. In
18
addition the study also examined the differences in applying the technical and
organisational measures due to the selected academic libraries’ demographic profiles.
This chapter also put forward the structure of the whole thesis which features six
chapters. The subsequent chapter presents a literature review for the pupose of relating
to other ISec related studies and paving the way towards filling in the knowledge gaps
and establishing the research framework.
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Chapter Two ___________________________________
Literature Review
2.0 Introduction
The review of information security (ISec) literature relevant to this study involved two
categories; conceptual papers and research studies. The review in this chapter is derived
from documentations and literature from the ISec or ISec practitioners and the scientific
community. The subsequent review is an attempt to gain some insights on the threats
related to ISec in any organisations and their ISec approaches in order to highlight some
gaps in the knowledge. The threats and the types of security countermeasures identified
will also be used by the researcher to construct the items for the questionnaire and the
assessment instrument.
The literature from the scientific community originated from four branches of
knowledge domains, which are the information system or management information
system, software engineering, computer science and mathematics (Siponen, 2001).
However, engineering knowledge such as the system dynamic is also known to
contribute to the progress of ISec (Saunders, 2001). From these five branches of
knowledge domain, the practitioners and scientific community alike have produced
standards, methodologies, models and theories that are relevant to ISec mainly through
five different ISec disciplines. They are the information system (IS) security, computer
security, database security, cryptology and management system (Suhazimah, 2007).
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A comprehensive literature review reveals that this research is the first of its kind in
Malaysia which focuses specifically in the library settings. Even though some attempts
have been made to understand the types of computer threats targeted on health
industries, banking industries, public governments and in public workplaces. It is
unfortunate that there is still (to the authors’ knowledge) no research that pays attention
to the ISec landscape in the library areas. Realising the lack of research in these areas
and with the intention to close the gap between findings from other areas and the library
areas, the researcher will conduct an exploratory study enabling the development of a
comprehensive view regarding the current status of the ISec threats in Malaysian
academic libraries. Furthermore, this research also highlights the types and the status of
ISec countermeasures that are being adopted by these libraries.
2.1 Defined Information, Security, Information Security (ISec),
Information Security Management (ISM) and Information Systems
(IS) Security
2.1.1 Information
Information includes both in electronic and physical forms such as paper, electronic,
video, audio, voice or knowledge.
2.1.2 Security
A number of computing researchers and practitioners have attempted to define security
in various ways. Here are some definitions that researcher thinks are generic enough to
stand the test of time. Security based on computer system security perspective is a
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branch of technology known as ISec as applied to computers and networks. It refers to
the collective ways and processes by which information, property and services are
protected from theft, corruption or natural disaster, while allowing them to remain
accessible and productive to its intended users (Wikipedia, 2010). The essence of
Volonino and Robinson’s (2004) work defines security in the context of IT and
electronic commerce as ‘the policies, practices and technology that must be place for an
organisation to ensure the safety of all online activities, transmissions and storage via its
network’. In this study, security is generally referred as any technological and
managerial procedures applied to a library to ensure the availability, integrity and
confidentiality of information managed by the library IS.
2.1.3 Information Security (ISec)
There are various definitions of ISec in the literature. United States Code (2008) defines
ISec as protecting information and IS from unauthorised access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification or destruction in order to provide:
a. integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity;
b. confidentiality, which means preserving unauthorised restrictions on access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information; and
c. availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of
information.
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Other definitions are linked to the roles of ISec for an organisation which include the
following functions (Whiteman and Mattord, 2009):
a. Protect the organisation’s ability to function,
b. Enables the safe operation of applications implemented on the
organization’s IT systems,
c. Protects the data the organisation collects and uses, and
d. Safeguards the technology assets in use at the organisation.
In this study, ISec is referred as ‘a combined set of measures at the physical, personnel,
administrative, computer and information system levels’ (INTOSAI, 1995). This
definition highlights that ISec is a good management control and shortcomings at any
level can threaten the security at other level as shown in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1: Complementary Layers of Information Security (INTOSAI, 1995)
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
Physical
Personnel
Administrative
Hardware/Software
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Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff (2009) elaborate in great details the ISec changes started from
the era of mainframe computers up to the current state of the complex Internet
technology. Based on their article, researcher attempt to summarise the major trends and
issues of ISec within the various era and the summary is presented in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Information Security (ISec) Trends and Issues
Era Trends and Issues
 When human beings
started learning how to
write.
 When information began
to be transmitted, stored
and processed.
 1840s: Invention of
telegraph
 1841: Invention of
telephone
 Used of a secret code to protect conﬁdentiality
of messages sent from a person to another
person.
 Used of an encryption code to safeguard the
secrecy of the transmitted telegrams.
 Legislation prohibiting wiretapping via
telephone.
 Concerned on protecting the secrecy or
conﬁdentiality of transmitted data and
information.
 1940s-1950s: existence
of the 1st generation
computers.
 Existence of the of
mainframe computers.
 Only the privileged computer operator (one user
one computer) was permitted to use the
mainframe computers.
 Concerned on protecting the physical computers
and the storage media from being stolen or
damaged by outsiders.
 The late 1960s-the early
1970s: the beginning of
dumb terminals.
 Enabled users (multiple users – one computer)
to access and use remote data.
 Concerned on protecting the data from
unautorised users or outsiders by using security
ofﬁcers, identiﬁcation and authentication
process.
 No security policies in place to enforce the use
of strong passwords and to prevent password
cracking or password sharing.
 Guest and anonymous logins were allowed
without thorough identiﬁcation and
authentication process but access restricted to
only limited resources within the network.
 The era of mini
computers.
 The beginning of
networks, time-sharing
and multi-user systems.
 The early 1970s:
Existence of public key
cryptography.
 The late 1970s-early
1980s: Existence of
digital signatures.
 Used of access controls to prevent users from
interfering with one another’s workspace.
 digital signatures from around the late
 Concerned for data integrity
(Source: Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff, 2009)
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Table 2.1: Continued.
 1980s -–introduction of personal
computers
 The late 1980s- introduction of
anti-virus software.
 Companies began to automate their
operations.
 The rise of computer viruses which
spread through the use of diskettes.
 The USA government issued the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984
to prosecute and establish penalties for
creators and authors of computer
viruses.
 The USA government issued the
Computer Security Act of 1987 to deal
with trainings for security personnel
who involved in the processing of
sensitive information.
 The 1990s – innovation of open
systems and mobile
computing.
 End of the 1990s- introduction
of ﬁltering ﬁrewalls.
 More personal computers connected to
the Internet.
 The rise of computer viruses, worms
and script kiddies attacks.
 The introduction of distributed denial of
services and malicious codes attached to
emails and web pages.
 The 21st century- era of
pervasive computing (IT
infrastructure became pervasive
because everything had gone
electronic).
 Innovation of computer- like-
devices (e.g. Personal Digital
Assistants, Smart phones,
Laptops, Tables PCs, etc.)
 The emerging of mobile
computing (Bluetooth and Wi-
Fi)
 Attackers become more sophisticated
and started hacking for ﬁnancial gains.
 The rise of online payment systems and
the usage of credit cards.
 The rise of ISec threats like identity
theft, social engineering, phishing and
etc.
 Concerned for non-repudiation issues.
 The evolution of spam and phishing to
SMS (short message service) and MMS
(multimedia message service)
technology in mobile phones.
(Source: Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff, 2009)
From the summary it can be concluded that, as the technology evolved and became
more advanced, the security landscape also changed and became more complex. Thus,
ISec will remain a challenge for all types of organisation including libraries.
2.1.4 Information Systems (IS) Security
The main components of information system (IS) are software, hardware, data (or
databases), people (or human resources), procedures and networks (or
telecommunication systems) (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2009; Whiteman and Mattord,
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2009). Thus, IS can be referred as the entire infrastructure, organisation, personnel and
components for the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination,
and disposition of information (National Security Telecommunications and IS Security
Committee, 2000). In this study, IS security refers to any activities that relates to ‘the
protection of IS against unauthorised access to or modification of information, whether
in storage, processing, or transit, and against the denial-of service to unauthorised users
or the provision of service to unauthorised users, including those measures necessary to
detect, document and counter such threats’ (National IS Security, 1992).
2.1.5 Information Security Management (ISM)
Information security management (ISM) in the context of library management describes
controls that a library needs to implement to protect its information assets from all
potential threats to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its
information resources.
2.2 Academic Libraries
In Malaysia, every university has its own library and this library comes under the
jurisdiction of the respective universities (Badilah, Shahar and Chew, 1996). As
compared to other types of libraries such as school libraries, special and public libraries,
academic libraries in Malaysia have larger collections, larger number of staff and
patrons, received more fund and were pioneers in the use of the Internet and web sites
(Lee and Tthe 2000). The population of academic libraries at the public universities,
private universities and college universities in Malaysia is explained in details in
Chapter 3. These academic libraries also have a variety of services when compared to
other types of libraries. Especially in today’s networked online environment, these
libraries exploited all forms of technologies and found new means to provide feasible
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form of collections, services and access to library materials (Foo, et al., 2002). As
indicated by Rajendran and Rathinasabapathy (2007), academic libraries held
collections in the form of physical, electronic and digital to fulfill the knowledge
requirements of students, faculty members, research scholars and scientists of the
academic institutions. Access to these digital collections should be given through
computer networks, local area networks, wide area networks or the Internet. Clifford
(2000) highlighted how the advances of IT has profoundly changed and transformed all
aspects of higher education, scholarship as well as academic libraries. The summary of
the changes that IT played within the various automation phases in academic libraries is
displayed in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Changes in Academic Libraries due to IT developments
Automation Phases Era Changes
The First Automation
Age: Computerising
Library Operations
late 1960s or
early 1970s
 Automated library processes by locally developed or
commercial systems.
 Automated circulation system by using minicomputers
(stand alone system).
 Bar-coded books.
 Computer-based ordering systems.
 The conversion of automated circulation system from the
first system to the second system.
early 1980s  Development of shared copy-cataloging systems within
the library community by using computers and computer
networking.
 Retrospective conversion programs for older books and
materials.
The Second
Automation Age: The
Rise of Public
Access
1980s-early
1990s
 The library system became reliant on campus networking
strategies.
 Central databases of collective holdings of the major
research libraries.
 Machine-readable bibliographic records by individual
libraries.
 Online public access library catalog as a replacement for
the card catalogs.
 The growth of library consortia or a group of libraries
that wanted to work together.
 Development of union catalogs by consortia to promote
virtual resource sharing.
 The availability of online catalogs, electronic mails as
well as abstracting and indexing databases.
 The development of computer-assisted interlibrary loan
systems that built on the shared national union catalog
databases.
(Source: Clifford, 2000)
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Table 2.2: Continued.
The Third
Automation Age:
Print Content Goes
Electronic
late 1980s
and early
1990s
 The emergence of the Web services.
 The library system is critically dependent on both
local-area and wide-area networks.
 Easier and faster electronic content delivery (e.g. in
bitmaps, Adobe PDF, ASCII text and later HTML
formats).
 Publishers and aggregators began to offer one-stop”
databases to libraries.
 Proliferation of online journals.
 Web-based search engines became very popular
among library patrons compared to online library
catalogs.
 Libraries started to digitise specialised materials
(e.g. manuscripts, photographs, maps and other
unique works) and made them publicly available on
the Web.
(Source: Clifford, 2000)
2.3 Library Needs for Information Systems and Information Security
Library Information System (LIS) encompasses both mature and new developments,
including Integrated Library Systems (ILS), online databases, web-based resources,
digital library collections and resources (Kochtanek and Matthews, 2002). There are
various factors why libraries need IS.
Firstly, the explosive growth of the Internet and its demands for connectivity require the
additional external connections which has lead to the creation of a large number of
remote users (Pipkin, 2000). These users include employees who need remote access
and direct network connections to remote office. Therefore more libraries utilise the IS
to assist them in providing digitally delivered services and collections to local and
remote patrons. Secondly, to manage a library as an information centre requires a
system which can process all forms of information materials in order to provide the
right and accurate information to the right patron at the right time. Akintunde (2004),
indicated that the library uses information and technology communication (ICT) in
several ways including for managing the library administration; processing of library
materials; developing and accessing online resources; developing and accessing offline
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resources; as well as providing service to patrons. Therefore, IS are crucial for libraries
that were highly information-intensive or relied heavily on IS.
However, the increased connectivity of IS to the outside world via the Internet has
changed the risks associated especially when they are connected without proper security
measures. Jung et al. (2001) observed that the threats associated with the Internet varied
among industries according to the needs of the organisation for information availability,
confidentiality and integrity. For instance, the libraries need to be concerned with issues
related to reliability, durability and accessibility when they are relying heavily on digital
content, partnering in distance education, creating in-house databases and addressing
technical challenges (Cline, 2000). As highlighted by Bruhn, Gettes and West (2003),
key components of a security plan consists of a well managed access to services that
protect online resources and user privacy while enabling ease of use. This is because IS
and networks are often inherently insecure since they are designed with functionality
not security as its primary goal (Gawde, 2004).
Breeding (2003), argued that the only way to guarantee the security of a computer is to
keep it unplugged from any network, but this is not a practical option as libraries main
role involves providing access to information. Even without a direct Internet
connection, libraries are still exposed to risks because of the widespread use of laptops
and portable storage devices (such as USB drives) by the library staff and patrons.
When these devices are plugged into inadequately protected library computers, the data
on these unprotected computers can be easily stolen, damaged or changed by the
attackers (Ryoo, Girard and Charlotte, 2009).
Other reasons are related to the increasing complexity of security when technology and
computer systems are more prone to have security holes. For instance, prior to 1988,
criminal activity was mainly centered on unauthorised access to computer systems and
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network owned by the telephone companies which provided dial-up access for
unauthorised users (Conklin, et al, 2005). In today’s highly network world, threats
become more widespread and increasingly sophisticated. As a result, libraries are
becoming more vulnerable than they were before (Pipkin, 2000). Table 2.3 illustrates
the changes in computer systems over time.
Table 2.3: Changes in Computer Systems
Era System Risks Controls
1960s-
1970s
Teleprocessing, single
central processor with
local or remote
terminals
 Internal fraud
 Tapping of remote
 Disaster, manmade or
natural
 Hiring practices
 Encryption
 Fire and flood protection
 Off-site data storage
1970s-
1980s
Distributed, multiple
computers
interconnected
Same as above, plus…
 External access
 File and program
corruption
 Data theft
Same as above, plus…
 Programs and files of record
 Audit trails and mirror
images
 Access and incursion logs
1980s-
1990s
Integrated IS, multiple
computers with a
common operating
system and database
access
Same as above, plus…
 Illegal database access
 Incompatibilities
 Version differences
 Database
inconsistencies
Same as above, plus…
 Access controls
 User authentication
 Software and configuration
control
1990s-
2000s
Client/server
computing, multiple
computers with local or
remote network
connections
Same as above, plus…
 Hacking
 Vandalism
 Virus
 Denial of service
 Data change
Same as above, plus…
 Antivirus software
 Access control
 Firewalls
 Public key infrastructure
2000s-
2010s
A worldwide system of
computer networks
(Cloud computing
applications) with
Virtual Machines
(VMs) which users are
able to access
applications and data
from a ``Cloud''
anywhere in the world
on demand.
Same as above, plus…
 Malware and malicious
attacks
 Spam and phishing
 Data leakage
 Identity thefts
 Web insecurity
Same as above, plus…
 Endpoint security
(Combination of antivirus
software, antimalware
software and a virtual
system)
 Two-factor authentication
 Advanced biometric scanner
 Wireless Device Control
 Data Recovery Capability
 Internet filtering
(Source: Pardoe and Snyder, 2005)
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The libraries need for ISec is paralleled with the increased of awareness of the relevance
and importance of ISec in an organisation. Loch, Carr and Warkentin (1992) have
reported that management’s concern with ISec has changed over recent years. They
also revealed that the ISec remained high on the list of key issues faced by an
organisation although the management believed either that security was less an issue or
they had implemented greater control. Besides the above reasons, libraries also need
adequate ISec measures in order to protect and minimise the likely consequences of the
potential damages due to ISec risks. Williams (2001); Farahmand, F. et al. (2003);
Bakari et. al., (2005); and Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff, (2009) have listed various potential
damages related to ISec risks such as:
a. Loss of data and library services due to accidental or malicious deletion or
alteration of data residing on library network servers;
b. Loss of time reconfiguring workstation settings, recovering from the users’
mischief and responding to system resulting from unauthorised use of systems;
c. Loss of funding and need extra costs due to maintain computerised library
systems and library networked services;
d. Loss of reputation, credibility, confidence or potential for embarrassment by
staff and patrons from the effects of web pages defaced, examination leakages,
tampering with examination records or library records;
e. Infringement of privacy or copyrights; and
f. Loss of ability to meet the requirements of regulators.
Unlike almost any other profession, librarians are expected to fulfill their patrons’
informational needs without question or bias. This laudable goal makes librarians
vulnerable to ISec threats such as social-engineering attacks because the reference
inquiries made by a patron about the IS resources available at a library may be used for
nefarious purposes (Thompson, 2006). Libraries desperately need to protect their ISec
due to limitation of librarians or staff to monitor security as they are often challenged
with demands to increase their productivity and improve customer service (Yong,
2008). As reported by Breeding (2003), libraries often do not have full-time systems
administrators and security specialists to take charge of IS security. This situation is
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worsening when libraries deploy Windows servers without an adequate level of
technical administration by competent systems administrator, as these operating systems
are more prone to the latest virus and worm attacks (Breeding, 2003). Furthermore,
insufficient funding and budget for improving the IS security adding more worries to
the libraries’ management. This is because much of the value of a library main business
or services is concentrated in the value of its IS.
2.4. Types of Information Security Threats
An essential step in security planning is to understand what the organisation needs to
protect, before it plans relevant security measures to defend against those threats. That
requires an awareness of the possible threats, vulnerabilities and security issues
confronting an organisation’s hardware, applications, data, computer systems and
networks.
In general, security threats refer to any security incidents that can directly or indirectly
lead to system vulnerabilities (Baskerville, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Loch et al., 1992).
Threats become more specific when discussed in the context of vulnerabilities and
attacks (Slade, 2006). Vulnerability refers to weaknesses in hardware, software or
people that expose a computer or user to an exploit or a threat (Volonino and Robinson,
2004). Vulnerabilities can be located in hardware, software, infrastructure and processes
(Pipkin, 2000). A threat itself does not harm a system, but a successful attack does. An
attack is an act that tries to bypass security controls and also known as a realisation of a
threat (Slade, 2006). Specifically, an information system (IS) threat refers to a danger
posed by an IS vulnerability which can actually lead to undesirable consequences
(Neumann, 1995 in Im and Baskerville, 2005). For instance, natural disasters and
human errors create vulnerabilities that can be exploited and lead to security problems.
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In the early days of computing, security breaches mainly included viruses and worms
that would ﬂash a message or advertisement on the screen without causing any serious
damage to the information or systems being used (Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff, 2009).
Nowadays, attacks are becoming more complex and sophisticated as technologies
changed. Following Maiwald's (2004) explanations, Table 2.4 specifies how ISec
services are used in an organisation including a library depend upon proper security
planning to combat the attacks shown in table below.
Table 2.4: Information Security Services vs. Attacks
Attack Security Service
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Accountability
Access x x
Modification x x
Denial of service x
Repudiation x x
(Source: Maiwald, 2004)
Researchers and authors presented variety of approaches to identify various kinds of
security threats. For instance, Loch et al. (1992) carried out a survey to explore the
perception of Management IS (MIS) executives regarding the security threats in
microcomputer, mainframe computer and network environments. They developed a list
of twelve security threats and empirically examined them. The results indicated that
natural disasters, employee accidental actions (such as entry of bad data and destruction
of data), inadequate control over media and unauthorised access to the accounting IS by
hackers had been ranked among the top security threats. Davis (1996) replicated Loch et
al.’s study to discover the current status of the security issue in practice among
information system auditors. The results revealed that employees’ accidental entry of
“bad” data, the accidental destruction of data and the introduction of computer viruses
were considered as the three top threats in a microcomputer environment. In contrast,
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technology advances faster than control practice were said to be the most important
threats in network computer environment.
Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) explored how companies moving from a mainframe to a
client or server environment evaluated and took security measures to protect against
potential security threats. They found several significant security threats such as: a)
accidental destruction of data by employees; b) accidental entry of erroneous data by
employees; c) intentional destruction of data by employees; d) intentional entry of
erroneous data by employees; e) loss due to inadequate backups or log files; and f)
natural disaster (fire, flood, loss of power, etc).
Pipkin (2000) identified several forms of threats including human errors, system
failures, natural disaster and malicious acts. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) (2002) has categorised the threat resource for the CMS information
systems (IS) into four main groups including; 1) environmental or physical threats; 2)
human threats; 3) natural threats; and 4) technical threats. Based on the occurrence and
significance in the current CMS environment, they also have divided the threats
affecting major applications and other systems into human and technical threats.
Whereas, the general support systems are subject to environmental or physical, human,
natural and technical threats. Table 2.5 lists the comprehensive index of threats that
might occur and the likely effect they could produce to the system confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Carelessness, user abuse, theft, sabotage, vandalism or
physical intrusions are identified as the major human threats which can jeopardise
confidentiality, integrity and availability of IS. Whereas, the major technical threats to
information systems’ confidentiality, integrity and availability include technical
intrusion, unauthorised access to system resources, insertion of malicious code,
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database modification, system corruption, system errors, installation errors and
misrepresentation of identity.
Table 2.5: Index of Threats to Major Applications, Other Systems and the General
Support Systems
a) Threats to Major Applications and Other Systems
Threat
Category
Threat Threat effect
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Human Inadvertent Acts or Carelessness √ √ √
User Abuse or Fraud √ √ √
Impersonation √
Theft, Sabotage, Vandalism or Physical
Intrusions
√ √
Espionage √
Shoulder Surfing √
Data Entry Errors or Omissions √
Technical Misrepresentation of Identity √
Intrusion or Unauthorised Access to System
Resources
√ √ √
System and Application Errors, Failures and
Intrusions not Properly Audited and Logged
√ √
Data/System Contamination √
Eavesdropping √
Insertion of Malicious Code, Software or
Database Modification
√ √ √
Takeover of Authorised Session √
b) Threats to General Support Systems
Environmental Environmental Conditions √ √
Electromagnetic Interference √ √
Hazardous Material Accident √
Physical Cable Cuts √
Power Fluctuation √
Natural Natural Disaster √
Secondary Disaster √
Human Improper Disposal of Sensitive Media √
Shoulder Surfing √
Inadvertent Acts or Carelessness √ √ √
Omissions √ √ √
Scavenging √
Theft, Sabotage, Vandalism or Physical
Intrusions
√ √ √
User Abuse √ √ √
Espionage √ √
Terrorism √ √
Arson √
Procedural Violation √
Riot/Civil Disorder √
(Source: adapted from CMS Information Systems Threat Identification Resource, 2002)
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Table 2.5: Continued.
b) Threats to General Support Systems
Technical Data/System Contamination √ √ √
Compromising Emanations √
Corruption by System, System Errors or
Failures
√ √ √
Eavesdropping √
Misuse of Known Software Weaknesses √ √ √
Insertion of Malicious Code, Software or
Database Modification
√ √ √
Installation Errors √ √ √
Intrusion or Unauthorised Access to System
Resources
√ √ √
Misrepresentation of Identity/Impersonation √ √ √
Hardware / Equipment Failure √ √
Saturation of Communications or Resources √ √
Tampering √ √
Jamming (telecomm) √
(Source: adapted from CMS Information Systems Threat Identification Resource, 2002)
Gawde (2004) revealed the danger of using applications such as real-time streaming
media players, instant messaging (IM) clients and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks over the
Internet by employees to perform online chatting, playing interactive games and surfing
non business related sites such as pornography, entertainment and even web based
personal email. These activities contribute to productivity drainer as well as lost of
confidential information through instant messaging or emails.
Conklin, et al. (2005) outlined three possible ways to break down the various types of
threats. Firstly, to categorise based on the internal or external sources of threats in an
organisation. Secondly, to categorise based on the various level of sophistication of
attacks, from those by “script kiddies” to “elite hackers”. Thirdly, to examine the level
of organisation of the various threats, from unstructured threats to highly structured
threats.
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Bishop (2005) described Shirey’s threat classification scheme which divides threats into
four broad groups: 1) disclosure (unauthorised access to information); 2) deception
(acceptance of false data); 3) disruption (interruption or prevention of correct
operation); and 4) usurpation (unauthorised control of some part of a system).
Ahmad (2005) carried out an empirical survey to investigate the significant perceived
computerised accounting IS security threats (CAIS) in Saudi environments. Four
hundred questionnaires were randomly distributed to different types of Saudi
organisations including manufacturing companies, banks, insurance companies, retail
merchandising, oil and gas companies, services companies, health care and government
units. The respondents were asked to indicate the frequency of occurrence of each
security threat based on five available choices (less than once a year, once a year to
monthly, once a month to weekly, one a week to daily and more than once a day or
more frequently). The findings revealed that a) accidental and intentional entry of bad
data; b) accidental destruction of data by employees; c) employees’ sharing of
passwords; d) introduction of computer viruses to CAIS; e) suppression and destruction
of output; f) unauthorised document visibility; and g) directing prints and distributed
information to unauthorised users are the most significant perceived security threats to
CAIS in Saudi organisations.
Farahmand et al. (2005) designed a comprehensive model for threat classification and
control measures to a network system from three points of view, namely the threat
agent, threat technique and security measure (Figure 2.2). They conducted case studies
and interviewed six ISec experts dealing with security issues. They identified threats to
IS of organisations such as theft of proprietary or disclosure of information, virus or
worm attacks and denial of service attacks.
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Figure 2.2: Combination of agents, techniques, and security measures to a network
system (Source: Farahmand et al., 2005).
Similarly, Im and Baskerville (2005) also believed that intentional security threats such
as hacking, computer viruses and computer theft are becoming a more severe problem
in relation to other security vulnerabilities. In contrast, Olayemi (2005) classified threats
to computer and network security into four groups: (a) Physical threats, (b) Accidental
error, (c) Unauthorised access and (d) Malicious misuse.
Kimwele, Mwangi and Kimani (2005) reported that 76.2% of respondents had suffered
ISec breaches in Kenyan small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The breaches
experienced by them included: a) Inadvertent breach (e.g. user accidentally deleted files
or changed computer configuration); b) Deliberate attack (e.g. hacker or disgruntled
staff gained access, deleting or stealing data); c) Asset theft (e.g. software application
misplaced causing re-installation delay); d) Equipment failure (e.g. hard drive crashed
causing loss of data and business disruption); e) Back up failure (e.g. system restore
failure due to corrupt or inadequate backups); f) Data theft (e.g. espionage which
resulted in data loss and possible legal exposure); g) Site disaster (e.g. fire or flood
causing damage to systems and business disruption); h) Copyright infringement (e.g.
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staff loading pirated software); and i) Compliance (e.g. passing on confidential
information).
Unisys (2007) provided insights on the security index among Malaysian community
towards different types of security issues. Based on a nationally representative sample
of 903 respondents in Peninsular Malaysia aged 18 to 64, the results revealed that 52%
of Malaysians or 5.9 million people were very or extremely concerned about computer
security in relation to viruses and unsolicited emails. The survey also found that
majority of Malaysians (77%) or 8.7 million people were very or extremely concerned
about unauthorised access to or misuse of their personal information.
CLUSIF (2008) conducted an in-depth evaluation of Internet users’ perception on
computer threats and risks in France. Findings revealed that the dominant fears among
Internet users were viral infections (86%), spyware (80%), intrusion (71%), spam
(67%), phishing (67%), identity theft (65%), WiFi hacking (54%) and equipment
breakdown (46%).
Trend Micro White Paper (2009) highlighted the disadvantages of Web 2.0 technologies
in providing an additional threat vector to organisations. Web 2.0-based sites, such as
Facebook.com, act as a platform for third-party developers to create powerful, scripted
applications that can access user account details and execute within a browser window.
Nachtigal (2009) categorised attack categories based on the most widely discussed
classes of attack, motives of attackers, attack techniques and consequences of attacks
(Table 2.6). She also indicated that attacks are typically not associated with just one
threat category but may implement multiple threats.
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Table 2.6: Summary of List of Attack Categories
Attack Categories
a) Classes of attack
b) Motives and
objectives of the
attackers
c) Attack
techniques d) Consequences ofattacks
 Malware
(Viruses, worms,
Trojans and
Spyware
 Harassment  Buffer overflow  Software
corruption/modif
ication;
 Denial of service
 (DoS or DDoS)
 Cyber
terrorism
 SQL injection  Hardware
malfunction;
 Social
engineering
 Political or
industrial net
espionage
 Spamming  Data
corruption/modif
ication/exposure/
 theft;
 Insider attacks  Packet sniffing  Identity theft;
 Impersonation
attacks
 Spoofing/masqu
erade
 Intellectual
property theft;
 Hacking  Abuse of
cookies
 Financial loss;
 Exploitation of
implementation
errors
 Routing table
poisoning
 Damage to
reputation;
 Phishing  National-level
infrastructure
disaster.
 SMiShing
 vishing;
 DNS (Domain
Name System)
(Source: Nachtigal, 2009)
Samy, Rabiah and  Zuraini (2009) examined the various types of threats that exist in IS
in one of government supported hospital in Malaysia. Based on data collected from
three different departments using in depth structured interviews, they identified 22 types
of threats according to major threat categories based on ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO
27799:2008). They also revealed that power failure, acts of human error, technological
obsolescence, hardware failures and software failures as the most critical threats for the
Total Hospital Information System (THIS). This research holds significant value in
terms of providing a comprehensive list of potential threat categories in IS and
subsequently taking the results of this step as input for the risk mitigation strategy (see
Table  2.7).
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Table 2.7: Threats to a Total Hospital Information System (THIS)
No.
Potential Categories of
Threat in THIS Description
1. Power failure/loss  Server down due to power failure
 Air-conditioning failure of the server
 Interruption by service provider (e.g. electrical
department and Internet service provider)
2. Network Infrastructure
failures or errors
 Connection failure
 Unsecured wireless network
 Network software failure
 Network congestion
 Switch port problems
 Routers or switches hang
3. Technological
Obsolescence
 Outdated hardware
 Outdated application software
 Outdated system software
 Obsolete network equipment
4. Hardware failures or errors  Insufficient storage space
 Hardware maintenance error
5. Software failures or errors  Application software failure
 Software maintenance error
6. Deviations in quality of
service
 Minimum technology of transfer (TOT) from
contractors and technology vendors
7. Operational issues  Lack of training for staff
 System documentation not systematically
managed
 Inadequate knowledge/skill by staff
8. Malware attacks
(Malicious
virus, Worm, Trojan
horses,
Spyware and Adware)
 Embedding of malicious code due to the usage
of wireless and mobile technologies
 Introduction of damaging or disruptive software
9. Communications
interception
 Spoofing/impersonation due to unsecured
network
10. Masquerading  Insiders
 Service providers
 Outsiders
11. Unauthorised use of a
health
information application
 Outsiders
 Insiders
12. Repudiation  Repudiation by staff
13. Communications
infiltration
 Hackers due to unsecured network
14. Social Engineering attacks  Gaining access to confidential information
through social interaction by outsiders
15. Technical failure  Technical failure of the host or storage facility
16. Deliberate acts of Theft
(including theft of
equipment or data)
 Deliberate acts of theft by outsiders
 Deliberate acts of theft by insiders
17. Misuse of system resources  Misuse of confidential information (patients
data) by staff
 Misuse Internet access by staff
(Source: Samy, Rabiah and  Zuraini, 2009)
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Table 2.7: Continued.
18. Acts of human error or
failure
 Entry of erroneous data by staff
 Accidental deletion or modification of data by
staff
 Accidental misrouting by staff
 Confidential information being sent to the
wrong recipient
 Storage of data/ classified information in
unprotected areas by staff
19. Staff shortage  Technical and non-technical staff
20. Willful damages  Outsiders
 Insiders
21. Environmental support
failure/natural disasters
 Fire at the server
 Water damaged at the server
 Lightning attacks
 Earthquake
22. Terrorism  Terrorist attacks
(Source: Samy, Rabiah and  Zuraini, 2009)
As numbers and types of IS threats are constantly growing, therefore it is not possible to
present a complete list of threats. However, the researcher believes that those available
taxonomies and classifications of threats, although have addressed the most important
threats for general security or specifically to computer and network security threats,
either do not cover all of them in the current library perspectives. Therefore, based on
the relevant literature above researcher will attempt to assess the current IS security
threats in libraries and present a potential category of the general IS security threats in a
library setting.
(a) Hardware Security Threats
Hardware, form as a physical component in an information system is also prone to
security attacks. Previous study results (Ke, 1997; Lin and Huang, 1999; and Shen,
1999) revealed several factors that jeopardise hardware security including: a) Natural
disasters such as earthquakes, fires, floods and thunder strokes; b) Changes in
temperature or humidity; c) Accidents, such as stealing and vandalism; d) Malicious
intrusion and destruction; and e) Defects of the hardware itself, such as bugs or errors
generated from routers or firewalls; f) Faults in the manufacture of the equipment;
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g) Air-conditioning failure; and h) Loss of essential services such as
telecommunications or power.  Other hardware security threats include electromagnetic
interference, failure of communication equipments and services, hardware equipments
failure, installation of unauthorised hardware, maintenance errors, physical sabotage or
intentional destruction of computing equipments, theft, physical sabotage and
vandalism of ICT hardware equipments.
Farahmand, et al. (2003) indicated that hardware attacks can be mounted against
hardware for the purpose of using the hardware as a means of denying use of the
system. These may include a physical attack against the equipment, a bug implanted
within the hardware or an attack against the supporting utilities. Computer hardware
infected with malware (i.e. computer viruses, worms and Trojan horses) may suffer
some sort of damage such as making it impossible to boot the computer, repeated error
messages, hardware malfunctions and lowered the computing speed.
(b) Software Security Threats
In terms of jeopardising software security, the threats can be divided into operating
systems and related applications. Security threats associate with operating systems
might include the security loopholes due to improper design and improper management.
Whereas, software security threats related with applications include stealing or copying
software from the Internet which might contain viruses (Shen, 1999). Computer
software infected with malware (i.e. computer viruses, worms and Trojan horses) may
suffer some sort of damage such as periodically automatic reboots, program crashes or
malfunctions, repeated error messages and poorer system performance or unusual
behavior.
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Other software security threats include corruption by system, system failure,
maintenance errors, cyber-terrorism, software piracy, unauthorised access, unauthorised
changes to software settings, adware, spyware, hacking, password sniffing, weak
passwords and abuse of computer access control. Farahmand, et al. (2003) reported that
software attacks can range from discreet alterations to less discreet changes. They
indicated that for the discreet alterations, attacks are subtly imposed for the purpose of
compromising the system. In contrast, for the less discreet changes, attacks are intended
to destruct of data or other important systems features. There are several software
security threats that could jeopardise software security such as follows:
i. Abuse of computer access control refers to employees or patrons abusing their
access controls rights and privileges for personal reasons or to obtain more data
than needed for their jobs;
ii. Adware and Spyware is a type of malware that can be installed on computers to
collect information about users without their knowledge. Specifically, adware is
used as a marketing tool to monitor people's behaviour on the Internet, to
determine which products they are interested in. Whereas, the functions of
spyware extend well beyond simple monitoring. Spyware programs can change
computer settings, resulting in slow connection speeds and loss of Internet
connection or functionality of other programs;
iii. Corruption by system, system errors, or failure of system software.  According
to Laprie et al. (1992) “a system failure occurs when the delivered service no
longer complies with the specifications''. Whereas, an error is defined by Laprie
et al. (1992) as that part of the system which is liable to lead to subsequent
failure, and an error affecting the service is an indication that a failure occurs or
has occurred. If the system comprises of multiple components, errors can lead to
a component failure. As various components in the system interact, failure of
one component might introduce one or more faults in another;
iv. Hacking refers to unauthorised attempts to bypass the security mechanisms of an
information system or network either skilled or unskilled persons.
v. Intrusion refers to unauthorised access to system resources such as public access
workstations to obtain unauthorised access to resources and can cause damage
or loss of data;
vi. Installation or use of unauthorised programmes or software can cause security
threat as it associated with the risk of introducing viruses and other unwanted
risks into the public-access and administrative library computers. Malicious
software can be accidentally or intentionally installed on computers from
portable drives, email accounts and web browsing. Allowing these programs to
run on workstations presents a serious challenge to the IT administrator’s as
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vii. Internet threats such as malicious code, Trojans and spyware could make
desktop vulnerable to leakage of important corporate information (Gawde,
2004);
viii. A password is also vulnerable to sniffing or stealing every time it sent across a
network such as when users are using remote access to access computers,
printers, databases, emails or Internet banking;
ix. The integrity, reliability, confidentiality and availability of the information
processed by programme or software could be threatened if errors are made
during the programme or software development, maintenance or installation
process. For instance, Microsoft has released software which made systems
vulnerable to security breaches such as Hotmail, Microsoft Outlook and Outlook
Express software. Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express software had a bug
that could allow malicious code to run on a computer without the knowledge of
the user and allow the hacker to use the user’s access rights to reformat the disk
drive, change data or communicate with other external sites;
x. The use of pirated or unauthorised software on the library network is illegal and
places the library in danger of legal action by the software supplier. Thus,
ensuring that the software on library computer systems is fully licensed is a
responsibility of the IT personnel as f libraries are found to be in non-
compliance, the consequences can be quite expensive;
xi. Unauthorised changes to software settings or to program code can be used to
commit fraud, destroy data or compromise the integrity of a computer system.
This would involve a manipulation of settings in the browser such as to delete
history files, change security settings or enable private browsing. In order to
prevent users from accidentally changing their system settings, a clear
separation of functions between software programming staff and operational IT
staff who implement all authorised changes should be made clear;
xii. Use of library Internet for illegal or illicit communications or activities such
(e.g. porn surfing, e-mail harassment or porn surfing)
xiii. Cyber-terrorism refers to unlawful attacks and threats of attack against
computers, networks and the information stored on cyberspace which can cause
fear and violence against persons or property (Denning, 2000).
(c) Network Security Threats
Yeh and Chang (2007) reported that networks were rated as contributing the most
severe among IS security threats but had the lowest level of protection among
Taiwanese enterprises. Williams (2001) listed the most common network security
threats in small libraries such as; a) Cracking of passwords; b) Damage to equipment or
data due to lightning strike, surges or inadequate power; c) Internet based attacks of
internal network resources; d) Local patron tampering workstation desktop and
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hardware settings; e) Unauthorised access to workstation file systems, including
installation of personal software; f) Unauthorised access to server file systems; g)
Tampering local network infrastructure including network devices, network wiring, etc.;
h) Defacement of library web pages if hosted on library-based web server; i) Theft of
equipment; and j) Inadequate funding to operate, maintain and replace network
equipment. Other network security threats that could threaten the network security
include such as follows:
i.Denial of service attacks (DoS) prevents legitimate users from making use of a
service and it can be very hard to prevent. The DoS attack may typically leads to
service downtime and legitimate users losing confidence in the service or
organisation;
ii.Eavesdropping or sniffing take places when an attacker uses software to monitors
or listens to all traffic activities and interprets all unprotected data such as
username password combinations, confidential emails, credit card numbers or
reports. This type of software poses significant risk to the network as it can be
used to capture the most sensitive network passwords and allow an attacker to
do anything on the network (Farahmand, et. al., 2005);
iii.Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing attacks occur when a hacker steals an authorised IP
address, which is a unique address for a node on a communication network.
Typically, it is done by determining the IP address of a computer and waiting
until there is no one using that computer, and then using the temporarily inactive
IP address (Farahmand, et. al., 2005);
iv.Malware refers to computer viruses, worms, Trojans and any other kinds of
malicious program designed to damage network equipment as well as cause
disruption by deleting files or sending emails. Virus code can replicates by
attaching itself to existing executables, whereas worms are programs that
reproduce by copying themselves through computers on networks. Trojan horse
refers to program that performs a desired task but also includes unexpected
functionality (Mell, Kent and Nusbaum, 2005);
v.Accidental directing or re-routing of messages to the wrong person can lead to a
loss of confidentiality and integrity if these messages are not protected and
allowing unauthorised changes to be made prior to delivery to the original
addressee;
vi.Password attacks exist when hackers find a user who has system privileges with an
easy password to gain unauthorised access to the system (Farahmand, et. al.,
2005);
vii.Session hijacking occurs when a hacker taps into a connection between a client and
a server, then simulates the connection by using its Internet Protocol (IP)
address (Farahmand, et. al., 2005);
viii.Probes and scans refer to unusual attempts to gain access or discover information
about remote computers. Probes are sometimes followed by a more serious
security event, but they are often the result of curiosity or confusion. Whereas,
scans such as a port scan are often a prelude to a more directed attack on
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systems that the intruder has found to be vulnerable (Eisenberg and Lawthers,
2005);
ix.Transmission errors may occur due to the failure of any of the network components
that are used for the transmission of data. These errors can destroy the integrity
and reliability of data and can lead to a loss of availability;
x.Website defacement is an attack usually initiate by a system cracker who breaks
into a web server and changes the visual appearance of the website. Penetration
and hacking of web sites is increasing due to the growth of virtual private
networks and online business.
(d) Data Security Threats
Data security is the practice of protecting and ensuring privacy of personal or corporate
data resides in databases, network servers or personal computers from corruption and
unauthorised access. The ISO 7498-2:1989 (1989) document considers the threats to
data as: 1) Destruction of information and other resources, 2) Corruption or
modification of information, 3) Theft, removal or loss of information and other
resources, 4) Disclosure of information; and 5) Interruption of services. There are
several other threats that could jeopardise data security such as follows: a) Data
diddling or changing of data before or during input into a computer system; b) Data loss
due to wrong procedures of updating, storage or backup; c) Data manipulation; e) Delay
in updating or dissemination; f) Destruction due to natural disaster; g) Exposure of
patrons sensitive data through web attack; h) Impersonation or social engineering; i)
Loss of patron data or privacy ideas; j) and Malware and Malicious code (e.g. virus,
worm, Trojan horse, logic/time bombs and trapdoor); k) Masquerading of user identity;
l) Password attacks, sniffing, stealing, phishing or pharming; m) Theft of proprietary
data; n) Unauthorised access; o) Unauthorised data copying; p) Unauthorised transfer of
data; and q) Unauthorised, accidental disclosure, modifications or alteration of data.
Malware refers to computer viruses, worms, Trojans and any other kinds of malicious
program designed to damage data by infecting open files and program libraries on an
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operating system, deleting data and files in the hard drives, steal information and send it
to third parties for illegitimate reasons.
(e) Physical Facilities and Environmental Threats
The most common problem of physical threats that must be factored into a security
program includes natural disaster and theft. It has been reported that the relationship
between physical threats and virtual threats is most apparent as both physical
infrastructure and systems are needed to provide an access point to the virtual world
(Lindstrom, 2003). Tittel et al. (2003) listed the most common types of physical threats
including: 1) Fire and smoke; 2) Water (rising or falling); 3) Earth movement
(earthquakes, landslides or volcanoes); 4) Storms (wind, lightning, rain, snow, sleet or
ice); 5) Sabotage or vandalism; 6) Explosion or destruction; 7) Building collapse; 8)
Toxic materials; 9) Utility loss (power, heating, cooling, air or water); 10) Equipment
failure; and 11) Personnel loss (strikes, illness, access or transport).
Perhaps the most prevalent threat is the natural calamity caused by natural and man-
made environmental problems. Computing equipments, physical infrastructure assets
and data can be destroyed due to fire, floods, electricity spikes and power outages.
Besides that, chemical, radiological and biological hazards can also cause damage to
electronic equipments both from intentional attack or accidental discharge in an
information system environment (Vacca, 2009). Intrusion or authorised access into
library building is seen as another threatening threat which can lead to theft of valuable
materials. For instance, stolen computing and network equipment can be resold on the
black market for the value of its computing power. In addition, physical attacks can also
occur at system consoles through available ethernet ports and in network equipment or
wiring closets rooms (Lindstrom, 2003).
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(f) Human Related Threats
Prior literature consistently reports that human errors are the most highly ranked
security threats (Loch, Carr and Warkentin,1992; Whitman, 2004; Im and Baskerville,
2005). Instances of poor security practices that may put an organisations’s IS security
at risk caused by human are human errors, poor passwords selection, piggybacking,
shoulder surfing, dumpster diving, installing unauthorised hardware and software,
access by unauthorised users and social engineering, lack of discipline or knowledge
among library staff and patrons (e.g. no data backups) (Pipkin, 2000 and Conklin, et.
al., 2005). Dhillon’s study (1999) indicated that computer fraud by insiders is
recognised as a severe problem which could be difficult to prevent especially when it
blends with legitimate transactions.
Human errors including data entry errors or carelessness, though often not considered as
threats but they are highly likely to occur. Lindstrom (2003) revealed that erroneous
actions by employees or users can threaten the integrity, availability, confidentiality and
reliability of data. Examples include: 1) Incorrect set-up of security features could result
in loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of data; 2) Switching off computers
when an error is displayed instead of correctly closing all current applications; 3)
Deletion of files; 4) Inadequate back-ups; and 5) Processing of incorrect versions of
data.
Employee misconducts especially in large corporation may be the most difficult
problem to manage, as use of perfect intrusion detection controls become irrelevant
when trusted employees either accidentally or unknowingly do something they should
not do (Swartz, 2006). Gawde (2004) reported that as much as 80% of the security
compromises are due to actions by insiders. The effects of employees’ misuses to
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organisations include loss of productivity, loss of revenue, legal liabilities and other
workplace issues. Therefore, organisations need effective countermeasures such as by
enforcing appropriate usage policies to minimise its losses and increase productivity.
Similarly, Lindstrom (2003) highlighted the risk of sabotage against sensitive systems
by internal employees as they are familiar with the systems. Their knowledge provides
them opportunities in sabotaging the organisation’s computer systems Common
examples of sabotage include: a) Destroying hardware and infrastructure; b) Changing
data; c) Entering erroneous data; d) Deleting software; e) Planting logic bombs; f)
Deleting data; and g) Planting a virus. Even though, the number of incidents of
employee sabotage is believed to be less than for theft and fraud but the individual
losses can be high. Despite reports and findings on the seriousness of human errors in
threatening IS, these threats have been poorly recognised as important element for IS
security (Im and Baskerville, 2005).
2.5 Sources of Information Security Threats
Researchers reported that threats to ISec could derive from variety of sources. For
instance, Loch et al. (1992) developed a comprehensive threat model which
encompasses sources, perpetrators, intent and consequence. They divided threats’
sources into insiders or outsiders with the perpetrators either human or non-human and
the actions accidental or intentional with the consequence a disclosure, modification,
destruction or denial of service. On the other hand, White et al. (1996) in their study of
responses to threats distinguished between internal and external IS security functions,
where internal functions focused on technical issues, whereas external functions
stressed managerial and operating security, or non-technical issues, on the basis of the
US security standard NIST SP800-30.
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Bryson (1999) in her handbook on ‘Effective Library and Information Center
Management indicated that security threats can be found through; 1) Human error or
deliberate human intervention (human error, incorrect keying of input data and errors in
program development or maintenance); 2) Natural and political disasters (earthquake,
flood, fire, industrial sabotage, terrorism and war); and 3) Hardware and software
failures (power failure, equipment failure, network failure or system malfunction).
Microsoft’s white paper on security (2000) divided cause of security threats into human
and natural disasters. Human-caused threats include malicious and non-malicious
threats (Figure 2.2). The non-malicious threats usually come from employees (e.g.
users, data entry clerks, system operators and programmers) who are frequently make
unintentional errors (e.g. data entry errors or programming errors) that contribute to
security problems directly and indirectly (e.g.: system crashes).
Security Threats
Human                                                                     Natural Disasters
Malicious                           Non-Malicious                               Floods, Fires
Earthquakes,
Hurricanes
Outsiders like Crackers        Insiders like
and Hackers                                   Disgruntled Employees
Figure 2.2: Security Threat Classification
(Source: Microsoft White paper on security, 2000)
On the other hand, Volonino and Robinson (2004) categorised origin of the intrusion or
threat from external and internal sources. They includes malware, hackers, script
kiddies, former employee, espionage, adversaries or terrorists as the external threats to
the IS security. Whereas the management, employees, consultants, contract workers,
maintenance crew and temporary staff are identified as the internal threats to the IS
security. Similarly, Vaast (2007) also reported that IS professionals working in a
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hospital believed that most of the external IS security threats came from outside in the
form of viruses, ad-ware, intruders and hackers. Whereas internal threats came from
employees due to their curiosity, recklessness, lack of time, malevolence and
ignorance. Other researchers identified natural environments, infrastructure (like
electrical power), hardware malfunction, software misbehavior, communication media
failures and human errors as the major causes of security threats (Neumann, 1995; and
Im and Baskerville; 2005). On the other hand, Gawde (2004) indicated that the majority
of security threats are introduced by employees themselves due to their lack of sense of
security, due care and diligence such as: a) accidental errors of attaching wrong files in
email attachment and sending email to wrong recipient; b) social engineering attacks; c)
sharing folders on a PC; and d) use of weak passwords and sharing passwords.
2.6 Information Security Countermeasures
Countermeasures are controls for vulnerabilities which include deterrent controls,
preventive controls, corrective controls, detective controls and recovery controls
(Merkow and Breithaupt, 2005). Countermeasures also include action, device,
procedure, technique or other measure that reduces the vulnerability of an automated
information system (Digital Guards, 2005). In dealing with IS security threats, some
researchers have directed attention not only to technological but also to organisational
dimensions (Calder and Watkins, 2003; Chan et. al., 2005; Ma and Pearson, 2005;
Mercuri, 2004b and Vaast, 2007). As stressed by Tarimo (2006), security program can
no longer rely entirely on traditional security controls such as using physical access
controls and security guards to ensure the security of an organisation’s assets, processes
and communications but it must also focus on the human element.
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In the literature, there is a rapidly evolving body of knowledge around the principles
and practices of cyber security that gives proper attention to the roles of people (i.e.
organisational dimensions), process (i.e. policies and procedures dimensions) and
technology (i.e. technical dimensions) in order to implement an effective digital security
program (Volonino and Robinson, 2004).
For instance, Icove et al. (1999) used a criminology perspective to group security
approaches for information system security into seven categories: software, hardware,
data, network, physical, personnel and administration (including security regulations
and policies). Similarly, Yeh and Cheng (2007) listed 50 fundamental security
countermeasures commonly adopted to evaluate the adequacy of IS security in 109
Taiwanese enterprises by using questionnaires. The countermeasures are broadly
divided into two main categories that are IT-related countermeasures and non IT-related
countermeasures. Each category of countermeasure contained five to eight
countermeasures (Table 2.8). Their study revealed that regardless of industry, higher
security was applied to software, hardware, data, and physical assets, whereas lower
security was apparently required of the network, personnel, and regulation or legality
assets. As for overall security, they reported that the banking or finance industry was the
most secure (Yeh and Chang, 2007).
Table 2.8: A summary of fundamental security countermeasures
IT-related countermeasures Non IT-related countermeasures
Software
User entrance log
System recovery
Multi-user system
Scanner
Automatic debug and test
Access control to program source
Verification of system modified
Covert channels and Trojan code
Physical facilities and environment
Lightning protector
Air conditioner
Fireproof installations
Waterproof installations
Quakeproof installations
(Source; Yeh and Chang, 2007)
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Table 2.8: Continued.
IT-related countermeasures Non IT-related countermeasures
Hardware
Remote mirroring
Surveillance system use
Entrance limitation
Emergency power source (UPS)
Periodical disk checking
Personnel
Confidentiality agreement
Invalid account removing
ISec consultant
Security audit irregularly
Security education and training
Operational procedures training D
Incident report procedures
Data
Information backup
Data access controls, authentication
User access rights, authorisation
Enforced path
Event logging
Information handling procedures
Management of removable media
Disposal of media
Regulation and legality (including risk
transference)
Security policy
ISec policy
Security in job responsibilities
Business continuity management
Compliance with legal requirements
Privacy of personal information
Intellectual property rights
Risk transference
Security service provider
Security outsourcing
First party insurance
Third party/public liability insurance
Network
Anti-virus software
Encryption
User authentication
Instruction detection systems
Firewalls
Alternative circuit
Digital signatures
Limitation of connection time
(Source; Yeh and Chang, 2007)
2.6.1 Technological Measures (Technical dimensions)
Technological controls or logical controls refer to the use of object access restrictions
implementation through the use if software or hardware. Moreover, the traditional IS
security has emphasised on the security technologies as the basis of a security system
(Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). It is undeniably true that some answers to
security challenges have been technological (Volonino and Robinson, 2004). Most often
the IS professionals have adopted IT tools such as user identification, authentication,
encryption, segregated network architecture, firewall, access management and backup
systems in order to deal with security challenges (Volonino and Robinson, 2004;
Solomon and Chapple, 2005).
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(a) Hardware Security Measures
A library IS security consists of several hardware equipments such as telephone lines,
input or output ports, modems, network cablings, scanners, printers and storage media.
These equipments need to be secured from any threats including thefts, power failures,
equipment incompatibilities, careless damage and ensure the availability, confidentiality
and integrity of data in a library (Yeh and Chang, 2007; INTOSAI, 1995). For example,
Eisenberg and Lawthers (2005) and Rajendran and Rathinasabapathy (2007)
encouraged the use of closed circuit television (CCTV), visual camera, magnetic
detection system and electronic anti-theft system at strategic places. Besides that, the
use of locks, security cables, locked cable trays, metal cages or anchoring devices are
advisable for protecting hardware equipments (INTOSAI, 1995; Rajendran and
Rathinasabapathy 2007). Telephone lines can be cut or lost and electricity failure might
happen, thus a company should set up alternative telephone lines as alternative
communication lines and generators as backup power sources (INTOSAI, 1995).
Besides that, physical damage to storage media such as hard disks can always happen
and might cause some data loss. Consequently, data recovery techniques such as remote
mirroring or file mirroring are often employed to save important data. These remote
mirror and copy feature are hardware solution that enables the mirroring of data from
the local site to a second storage unit at another site or the remote site (Wikipedia
Encyclopedia, 2010).
(b) Software Security Measure
Flaws and risks related to the library software are more likely to be found when services
such as library systems, OPACs, online databases and resources are made accessible via
the Internet. Eisenberg and Lawthers (2005) suggested the use of the following
measures for protecting the software security: a) Cleanup software to erase files or
settings left behind by a user; b) Desktop security software at application level and
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operating level to monitor, restrict usage or disable certain features of the workstations;
c) Distribution agents to automate the process of installing an application or updates to
workstations on a network; e) Menu replacement software to replace the standard
windows desktop interfaces and provide control on timeouts, logging and browsing
activities; f) Rollback software to keep track and record of any changes made to the
computers and allow the system to be restored to its original starting point from any
chosen point in time; and  g) Timer software to control the amount of time a patron can
use a workstation.
On the other hand, Yeh, and Chang (2007) listed the following countermeasures in
order to secure the software; a) use of multi user operating systems and application
software to allow concurrent access by multiple users of a computer; b) use of
periodical automatic debugging to remove any defects from newly developed software
or hardware components; c) use of systems recovery to rebuild and repair the computer
systems after disaster or crash; and regularly analysed the user entrance logs. Yasin
(2002) encouraged organisations to use ID management software to automate
administrative tasks and the use of single sign on system as a user authentication and
authorisation to access all computers and systems. Despite that, organisation should also
consider the use of anti-spyware software, spam filtering software and anti-phishing
solutions to prevent any spyware, spamming and phishing attacks as well as web
filtering software to prevent access to inappropriate materials or sites (Ferrer and Mead,
2003; Ohaya, 2006; Orme, 2001).
Therefore, the scope of software security in libraries should encompass the above
components from software security breaches and assure the confidentiality, availability
and integrity of the library software.
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(c) Workstation Security Measure
As more libraries make available to their patrons Internet-connected computers, there is
a need to secure each computer from any security threats from the Internet as well as
threats from the users such as viruses and worms, theft and unauthorised access.
Creating a secure public access workstation involves many discrete procedures and
these steps are interdependent with other security features such as network security,
server security and user issues (Eisenberg and Lawthers, 2005). Eisenberg and Lawthers
(2005) suggested several considerations in order to create secure public access
workstations in libraries such as:
i. Install the special third party lockdown software to customise operating system
installations.
ii. Use of operating system hardening. Operating system hardening is the process
of modifying and locking down a standard default installation of an operating
system on a server or a workstation.
iii. Computers operating systems and applications especially for antivirus should be
kept up to date with the latest patches and updates, especially for antivirus.
iv. Secure the computer's BIOS.
v. Install the computer with minimal operating system features
vi. Securely configure applications such as browsers and office productivity.
vii. Educate and constantly remind staff about the need for security
viii. Install desktop security software and personal firewall to restrict user access to a
desktop computer's operating system, desktop, printing functions and many
applications.
ix. Install rollback software, which resets a public access computer to a previous
state every time the computer is rebooted.
x. Install cleanup software which automates the process of deleting temp files and
cookies.
xi. Install distribution agent which can automate the process of deploying software
to many computers at once.
xii. Require user authentication prior access to workstations.
Gawde (2004), also urged organisations to implement comprehensive desktop security
and controls such as implementation of role based access control, host based intrusion
detection system, centralised automated antivirus solution, patch and update
management system, software metering, monitoring system, personal firewall and
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enterprise backup solution that covers the desktops. These initiatives should be pro
active rather than reactive with the blend of preventive, detective and corrective in order
to mitigate risks due to misuse and in appropriate desktop computers.
(d) Network Security Measure
Good security systems protects the network in a manner that is consistent with its
purpose and secures it from adware, spyware or network intruders (Eisenberg and
Lawthers, 2005; Yeh and Chang, 2007). The network security for a library would need
to be simultaneous to ensure that full access of its bibliographic database to legitimate
users on the Internet and in the library as well as disallow access from unauthorised
users. Eisenberg and Lawthers (2005) suggested libraries to use firewalls as means to
protect their internal network against attackers from the Internet (or outsiders) as well as
providing content filtering, web caching and virus protection to the libraries’ internal
networks. They also urged libraries to consider the use of authentication, anti-virus
software, desktop security software and separate cablings for each network or virtual
LAN switches to physically separating public and staff local area networks (LANs), in
order to protect the internal library networks security breaches by internal patrons or
staff. Besides these, libraries should also consider the use of firewall with virtual private
network (VPN) capabilities to protect remote access connections especially for wireless
network connectivity (Eisenberg and Lawthers, 2005).
(e) Server Security Measure
In a library's network, servers play a vital role in providing access to key library
services such as online databases, catalogs and circulation systems to internal and
remote patrons (Eisenberg and Lawthers, 2005). The availability, confidentiality and
integrity of the library server can be assured via proper implementation of specific
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counter measures, because it becomes accessible to those within and outside the library.
Thus, libraries need to take steps to secure the e-mail and web server applications from
any intrusion and application failure due to viruses, hackers and natural disasters.
Eisenberg and Lawthers, (2005) identified several technological security measures in
order to protect servers at many different levels such as follows:
i. Install firewall to protect servers from intrusion.
ii. Hardened the server operating systems and the server applications to protect
from vulnerabilities.
iii. Employ authentication to ensure that only authorised and valid users can access
the system.
iv. Install anti-virus software and keep anti-virus virus definition files up-to-date.
v. Provide physical security for the server such as to place servers in a secure
location for instance place it in a lockable cage in a locked room with
environmental controls.
vi. Review server logs periodically by using a log file monitor utility which
monitors log files for signs of intrusion or security violations.
vii. Protect the file system by restricting access to the directory structure using file
or directory permissions.
viii. Make regular backups for the data, installation software, hardware specifications
and installation passwords as they are vulnerable to viruses, hackers, fire or
flood. The backup media and documentation should be placed at an offsite
location.
ix. Implement fault tolerance as backup system if one system such as a hard drive
or the computer itself fails.
x. Install intrusion detection software and host auditing software to monitors for
signs of intrusion or changes on files and directories of computers or servers.
(f) Data Security Measure
Since a library stores, processes and provides access to vast amounts of data such as the
patron records, personnel data, bibliographic records, MARC records, circulation data
and so on, it will definitely require a sound data management system to assure the
security of its data against accidental loss, unauthorised modifications and access by
taking appropriate measures. Ortiz-Caceres (2006) suggested that IT department should
block all the physical ports such as the Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports to prevent
information theft or data lost in the public domain because of the user's ISec ignorance
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or negligence. Yeh and Chang (2007) listed seven countermeasures for protecting the
data including use of information backup, authentication for data access controls,
authorisation for user access rights, enforced path, event logging, procedures for
information handling, management of removable media and disposal of media.
(g) Physical Facilities and Environmental Security Measure
The term physical and environmental security refers to measures taken to protect the
library systems, buildings and related supporting infrastructures or resources (including
air conditioning, power supply, water supply and lighting) against physical damage
associated with fire, flood and physical intrusion (INTOSAI, 1995). The use of security
personnel to undertake patrol within the library and to enforce appropriate library access
at the main lobby has become increasingly common (Rajendran and Rathinasabapathy,
2007). However, they should not necessarily have access rights to IS, sensitive output
and secure areas during quiet hours to prevent abuse of privilege (INTOSAI, 1995).
Other use of physical security systems or the non-electronic systems in libraries include:
a) inspection of bags and other belongings of library users while entering and leaving
the library by security or library staff, b) visual inspection by library staff through floor
walks to overcome the unethical practices, and c) the use of window protection with
locks, grills, guards, bars, screens and films, door protection, display case protection
and dummy security devises to controlled access to the library buildings and library
collections.
Rajendran and Rathinasabapathy (2007) also suggest the use of electronic security
systems to overcome the security threats in the library by using the following tools: 1)
burglar protection to provide alarm notification to the appropriate authorities, 2)
Electromagnetic system to combat library material theft, 3) Electronic surveillance
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cameras to monitor the library entry control and site surveillance, and 4) Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) system for easy handling and security of the library
collection. These electronic security systems are believed to be effective in reducing the
levels of theft and unethical practices within the library premises at reasonable cost for
many libraries.
Another popular physical security measure in libraries is the use of air conditioner.
This is because the computers and their peripherals often have specific environmental
requirements. Failing to comply with the environmental conditions specified by the
manufacturer may lead to machine failure and disputes over maintenance (INTOSAI,
1995). Beside air conditioners, Yeh and Chang (2007) also encouraged the use of
lightning protectors, fireproof installations, waterproof installations and quakeproof
installations to protect the IS against physical damage due to natural disasters.
2.6.2 Organisational Measures (Process and Human dimensions)
Most of today’s security challenges are related to the human and organisational aspects
of security (Anderson, 2007). Often human factor receives less attention in ISec
practices as huge amounts of money and time are invested in technical solutions.
Technical solutions are necessary to address vulnerabilities such as viruses and denial of
service attacks. However, many examples of security issues related to humans such as
phishing and social engineering are increasingly exist (Kruger, Drevin and Steyn
(2007). Therefore, the relying on the advanced technologies alone will not solve the
security problem as technologies are generally served as static barriers and it will
become ineffective in an environment where humans exist (Conklin, et al., 2005).
Recent research has also recognised the needs to understand the impact of human and
organisational factors as well as the technological factors on the effectiveness of ISec
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controls (Beznosov and Beznosova 2007; Werlinger, Hawkey and Beznosov, 2009).
This is because prevention of the misuse of ISec by employees has direct business value
including increased productivity, maximization of corporate assets, compliance with
privacy regulations, protection from legal liabilities, preservation of network bandwidth
and resources (Gawde, 2004). Thus, organisations should deploy comprehensive
countermeasures that include human and organisational security measures to defend
against misuse of its resources.
(a) Information Security Policy
Security process comprises administrative safeguards which refer to administrative
actions, policies and procedures to manage the selection, development, implementation
and maintenance of security measures to protect information as well as to manage the
workforce in relation to the protection of that information (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS), 2005). These include hiring practices, usage monitoring and
security awareness training (Solomon and Chapple, 2005).
In general, policies are formal and high-level-broad statements which describe required
actions the organisation wants to accomplish and why (Guel, 2007). Specifically,
security policy is the set of rules and practices that inform and regulate users, staff and
managers on how an organisation manages, protects and distributes its key assets
including people, hardware and software resources and information (Weise and Martin,
2001). As indicated by Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) security policy is a high-level
management document that informs all users of the goals and constraints on using a
system and must answer three questions, namely who can access which resources in
what manner.
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The characteristics of good security policies are that they must be implementable
through system administration procedures, be enforceable with security tools, clearly
define the areas of responsibility for the users and should be documented, distributed
and communicated (Weise and Martin, 2001). Weise and Martin (2001) also listed
several purposes of a security policy such as; i) to specify the mechanisms through
which the security requirements can be met; ii) to provide a baseline from which to
acquire, configure and audit computer systems and networks for compliance with the
policy; and iii) to allow for the development of operational procedures and the
establishment of access control rules for various applications, systems and networks.
There are variety types of security policies in an organisation, but the common types of
security policies are acceptable use policy, back up policy, confidentiality policy, data
retention policy and wireless device policy (Solomon and Chapple, 2005). Existence of
such policies would reflect the top management commitment towards all ICT security
aspects and play as a reference framework to all other ICT security sub policies,
standards, procedures and countermeasures in an organisation (Bakari et al.,
2005). Dimopoulos et al. (2004) suggested that the IT security policies in small medium
enterprises (SMEs) should be reflective of the ICT usage. For instance, an IT security
policy is not necessary if there is limited or no ICT usage in SMEs, but a detailed policy
which addresses all issues about usage of ICT infrastructure is needed for SMEs with
sophisticated ICT usage. Gawde (2004) also suggested organisations to develop
acceptable use policy for desktop usage that specify on what kind of applications users
can run, what kind of data they can store, what can they surf on Internet, what type of
activity is strictly forbidden and what consequences will result if the policy is violated.
In libraries, the security policy will have some areas of overlap with the acceptable use
policy. An acceptable use policy is generally focused at patron use of the library IS,
whereas a security policy is developed as an administrative guide, which includes rules
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and guidelines for all access and use of IS (Williams, 2001). The security policy is
needed in a library as they provide continuity, consistency and a basis for enforcing
staff and patron conduct on using the library IS (Williams, 2001).
Literature reveals various benefits of adopting an IT security policy. An international
accepted standard ISO 17799, indicates that a security policy is essential foundation for
successful security strategy, as it defines issues such as the IT security goals of the
organisation, what specifications and guidelines need to be followed and what is
acceptable and not acceptable. Dimopoulos et al. (2004) indicated other benefits of
creating IT security policy such as follows:
i) ISec policies help clearly defined responsibilities involved in protecting your
information such as (reviewing firewall logs and conducting backups)
thereby ensuring that necessary tasks are actually carried out.
ii) ISec policies help the organisation understand what tools and hardware are
required for protecting their information and ensure that the organisation
actual security measures are at an acceptable level.
iii) ISec policies help protect the organisation’s investment in IT by defining
what must be done to ensure all IT assets are adequately protected against
damage.
iv) The practice of developing ISec policies is considered a source of
competitive advantage amongst security conscious practitioners.
(b) Information Security Procedures and Controls
In order for ISec policies to be practical and implementable, they must be further
defined by standards, guidelines and procedures (Weise and Martin, 2001). As indicated
by Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) procedure or guideline documents are created to define
how the security policy translates into specific actions and controls.
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Procedures are the step by step instructions on how to implement and enforce policies in
the organisation (Conklin, et. al., 2005). They are equally important as policies as they
outline how to protect the resources. For example, a Password Policy would outline
password construction rules, rules on how to protect the passwords and how often to
exchange them. In contrast, the Password Management Procedures would draft the
process to create new passwords, distribute them as well as the process for ensuring the
passwords have changed on critical devices (Guel, 2007).
The importance of creating the policies, guidelines and procedures in an organisation is
seen as one of the best tools in defending against human-created security problems as
well as establish details on the roles and responsibilities for security administrators and
users to maintain the security of the systems and networks (Dhillon, 2001 and Conklin,
et al., 2005). As stressed by Breeding (2003) having all the best equipments and
software in place will be in vain unless the individuals in the organisation follow the
right procedures.
(c) Administrative Tools and Methods
Administrative tools and methods are both proactive and reactive means in ensuring the
security of IS in a library which includes asset classification, risk analysis, audits and
incident reporting systems. As indicated by Hagen (2008), a technical administrative
system must be in place before a system of training and education is adopted, because
the formal system provides a framework for the content of the training program.
(d) Information Security Awareness
Awareness programs explain the employee’s role in the area of information security.
The aim of a security awareness effort is participation. Technology alone cannot solve a
problem that is controlled by individuals (Hight, 2005). ISec depends not only on
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technology, but also on the awareness, knowledge and intentions of the users of IS. It
has been reported that ISec awareness programs have emerged as an important aspect of
information security. This is because people are the weakest link in any security-related
process, thus organisation is suggested to focus on educating personnel through a
security program which address user education, awareness and training on policies and
procedures that affect them (Merkow and Breithaupt, 2005). Also, top management is
expected to take an active approach to the security of their organisation by supporting
and following the policy themselves. Nothing can undermine a security education and
awareness effort faster than lack of support from the management of an organisation
(Hight, 2005). Moreover, not all employees know their roles and responsibilities in
relation to IT security, therefore management should make sure that employees are
aware of their roles and if possible stipulate these roles and responsibilities in their job
descriptions (Kimwele, Mwangi and Kimani, 2005).
Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff (2009) highlighted the importance of well designed and
periodic ISec awareness campaigns in educating the users on the emerging threats and
ways in reporting the security incidents when the new threats and countermeasures are
introduced. The importance of security awareness programs is further emphasised in the
BS7799:1 where the objective of user training is given as ‘to ensure that all users are
aware of ISec threats and concerns, and are equipped to support organisational security
policy in the course of their normal work’. Owners, providers, users and other parties of
IS should readily be able to maintain security by gaining appropriate knowledge and be
informed about the existence and general extent of IS security measures within an
organisation (Zoughbi, 2009).
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Im and Baskerville (2005) had recommended a topic on mechanisms for avoidance of
human error to be included in any security training and awareness programs. According
to them, such training can help individuals update their skill and knowledge and educate
the users of their systems. So that, they become more attentive in solving the security
problems and making less security errors.
Despite the ISec awareness campaigns, Vaast (2007) on the other hand, stressed the
vital of well designed and periodical updates of ISec awareness policies within an
organisation in order to make the end-users aware of IS security issues including the
potential breaches to security and of the risks associated with these breaches. These
policies thus rely on the implicit assumption that if the end-users were sufficiently
informed, they would develop the same awareness of security issues. This is because
effective communication of a security policy to all employees is critically important for
it to be enforceable (Casmir, 2005).
Research also has listed several benefits of providing ISec awareness programs in
organisations. For instance, Chan, Woon and Kankanhalli (2005) studied the impact of
security related factors on the user’s perception of usefulness of secured Knowledge
Management Systems (KMS). Their finding suggests that for effective protection of
KMS, people should fully understand the purpose of security and their own roles in
securing the KMS. They also suggested that organisations should provide training and
awareness programs to promote an individual’s understanding and awareness.
Kahan (2004) revealed that the aware employees may support the ISec efforts and can
create as ‘human firewall’ (much like a firewall) to prevent and deter threats to a
company’s critical information assets. This ‘human firewall’ can be more powerful than
67
properly configured firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems. Similarly, Schwartz
(2006) also indicated that educating the employees on network security is a key point in
preventing security breaches. Of the companies surveyed 84% with security awareness
programs credit it with reducing breaches.
2.7 Security Assessment Models, Criteria, Packages and ISO
Standards
There are a number of assessments models, criteria, schemes and standards that are
related to information security. Kwok (1997) stressed that the Bell-Lapadula Model and
the Clark-Wilson Model address only on ways to maintain a secure environment by
controlling the flows of information within protection systems and access to controlled
data items. Chao (2005) also indicated that these two models are inadequate in
reflecting the current position of ISec in an organisation.  The following is the
comparison of several traditional assessment models which related to ISec of an
organisation (Table 2.9).
Table 2.9: Comparison of Security Assessment Models
Model Description Research
Bell-Lapadula
Model
Provides a theoretical basis for
authorisation in traditional computer
systems.
Bell and Lapadula,
1975; Lin, 1992;
Sandhu, 1993;
Waldhart, 1990.
Clark-Wilson
Model
Deal with integrity of information in
business environment through
separation of duty and proper
transaction mechanisms to ensure
data validity.
Smith-Thomas and
Wang, 1995; Zviran
and Glezer, 2000.
Risk Data
Repository Model
Assess risks based on assets, systems
and environments. Uses the threats
and countermeasures diagram to
identify the security architecture, its
countermeasures and threats.
Kwok and Longley,
1996; Kwok, 1997.
(Source: Adapted from Chao, 2005)
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Besides the security models, there are several security assessment criteria which are
commonly used in organisations. The security assessment criteria such as ISO17799,
Best Practice and NIST Security Self Assessment Guide consider security issues more than
products or systems by incorporating security issues such as policies, training and
awareness (Table 2.10).
Table 2.10: Comparison of Security Assessment Criteria
Security Assessment
Criteria
Description Research
BS7799/ISO17799 It defines Code of Practices and a
specification of ISec management
system as reference for identifying
the required ISec controls where IS
are used in industry and
commerce.
NIST, 2002;  Tong, et
al. 2003.
Best Practice Working
Group
It addresses the ISec issues such as
security policy, processes, people
issues and technology adoption in
any organisation.
ISAlliance, 2002
NIST Security Self
Assessment Guide for IT
Systems
It is a guide for information system
security administrators to identify
the security status of security
program in government agents or
general organisations. It evaluates
management controls, operational
controls and technical controls
based on five level of effectiveness
by using questionnaire approach.
Swanson, 2001
(Source: Adapted from Chao, 2005)
A standard is a document that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or
characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes
and services are fit for their purpose. There is a need for a set of benchmarks or
standards to help ensure that an adequate level of security is attained, resources are used
efficiently, and the best security practices are adopted (Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 2008). There are various standards and regulations that are
available for information security such as the ISO standards and some non-ISO
standards (Anday, et al, 2012).
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Table 2.11: Comparison of ISO Standards
ISO Standards Description Research
ISO/IEC 27002:2005
(developed from BS7799)
(Code of Practice for
Information Security
Management)
This standard contains guidelines
and best practices
recommendations for these 10
security domains: security policy;
organisation of information
security; asset management;
human resources security; physical
and environmental security;
communications and operations
management; access control;
information systems acquisition,
development and maintenance;
information security incident
management;  business continuity
management; and compliance .
Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region,
2008.
ISO/IEC 27001:2005
(Information Security
Management System -
Requirements)
It specifies the requirements for
establishing, implementing,
operating, monitoring, reviewing,
maintaining and improving a
documented Information Security
Management System (ISMS)
within an organisation
Ozkan and Karabacak,
2010.
(Source: Adapted from Anday, et al, 2012)
There are some other commonly used information security standards, which are not
under the ISO body of standards (Table 2.12).
Table 2.12: Comparison of Non-ISO Standards
Non-ISO Standards Description
Organization for Economic
Cooperation
and Development (OECD)
Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and
Networks.
Generally Accepted
Information Security
Practices (GAISP)
A comprehensive guide to security standards and practices.
The first two levels are the Pervasive Principles, which target
top executive leadership of organizations, and Broad
Functional Principles, which targets IT management. The
third level, Detailed Principles, is intended to address the
day-to-day security measures needed to fulfill the other two
levels.
Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard (PCID)
An information security standard for organizations that
handle cardholder information to reduce credit card fraud via
its exposure.
Control Objectives for
Information and related
Technology (COBIT)
It is a framework created by ISACA for information
technology (IT) management and IT governance. It defines
34 generic processes to manage IT. Each process is defined
together with process inputs and outputs, key process
activities, process objectives, performance measures and an
elementary maturity model.
(Source: Adapted from Anday, et al, 2012)
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There are also a number of ISec assessment packages in the market (Table 2.13). The
ISec assessment helps organisation understand the weaknesses and strengths of their
security programs as well as ensure the effectiveness of the programs. These security
assessment packages target different audiences but they can be apply to the general ISec
programs as they shared common ISec objectives and use checklist to assess the ISec
programs (Chao, 2005).
Table 2.13: Comparison of Security Assessment Packages
Security Assessment Package Targeted Audience Assessment Component
and Percent of Coverage
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA):
‘Security Principle and
Criteria’ (AIG, 2003).
Accountants in the
information assurance
field.
Access control: 50.01%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 5.88%
Audit: 5.88%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 11.76%
People Issue: 11.76%
Management issue: 14.71%
American Insurance Group’s
(AIG): ‘Information Security
Self Assessment’ (AIG, 2003)
Cyber insurance
clients/applicants
Access control: 32.30%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 3.2%
Audit: 9.67%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 9.68%
People Issue: 12.90%
Management issue: 32.25%
Arizona Cyber Security
Alliance’s (ACSA) : ‘Arizona
Cyber Alliance Self
Assessment Questionnaire’
(ACSA, 2004)
IT professionals and
executives of small
business and nonprofit
organisations in
Arizona
Access control: 33.30%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 0.0%
Audit: 16.67%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 25.00%
People Issue: 16.67%
Management issue: 8.33%
Computer Security Insitute’s
(CSI) : ‘Information
Protection Assessment Kit
(IPAK)’ (CSI, 2002)
IT professionals,
Information security
managers and system
administrators.
Access control: 24.5%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 10.00%
Audit: 5.91%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 14.08%
People Issue: 20.90%
Management issue: 24.99%
Georgia State University’s
(GSU) : ‘Security Assessment
Questionnaire’ (Georgia State
University, 2003)
University community Access control: 37.80%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 0.0%
Audit: 6.67%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 22.22%
People Issue: 4.44%
Management issue: 28.89%
(Source: Adapted from Chao, 2005)
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Table 2.13: Continued.
Security Assessment Package Targeted Audience Assessment Component
and Percent of Coverage
IBM’s: ‘Security Self
Assessment Survey’ (IBM,
2003)
IT professionals,
Information Security
managers and system
administrators.
Access control: 17.90%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 4.47%
Audit: 5.96%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 14.94%
People Issue: 21.66%
Management issue: 35.14%
INSUREtrust.com’s (INS):
‘Security Assessment
Questionnaire’ (INSUREtrust,
2000)
Cyber insurance
clients/applicants.
Access control: 15.20%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 2.20%
Audit: 21.70%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 10.87%
People Issue: 26.14%
Management issue: 23.89%
Internet Security Alliance’s
(ISA): Common Sense Guide
For Senior Managers Top Ten
Recommended Information
Security Practices’
(ISAlliance, 2002)
IT professionals,
Information Security
managers and system
administrators.
Access control: 11.70%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 3.33%
Audit: 21.67%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 21.66%
People Issue: 5.01%
Management issue: 36.60%
Maryland Health Care
Commission’s (MHCC):
‘HIPPA Security Assessment
Guide’ (MHCC, 2002)
Health care providers
and organisations in
Maryland.
Access control: 18.70%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 18.75%
Audit: 18.75%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 6.25%
People Issue: 31.25%
Management issue: 6.25%
NIST ‘s: ‘Security Self
Assessment Guide for IT
Systems’ (NIST, 2000)
Government agencies. Access control: 22.70%
Confidentiality/Integrity
Control: 9.33%
Audit: 10.22%
Incident Handling/Disaster
Discovery: 19.11%
People Issue: 9.78%
Management issue: 30.66%
(Source: Adapted from Chao, 2005)
It is believed that the following criteria based on the security assessment criteria, ISO
standards, Non-ISO Standards and security assessment packages are difficult to realise
into the organisation’s need due to lack of educated and skilled IT staff in an
organisation (Chao, 2005).
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2.8 Studies on Information Security Frameworks
Kim (1992) has compared five IS security models from the literature and the
summarised the frameworks in Table 2.14. Based on the summary, he concluded that
the effectiveness of ISec is largely determined by: a) organisational factors such as
industry susceptibility, b) managerial factors such as security policies and procedures,
and c) user factors such as user’s system usage and security awareness (Table 2.14).
Table 2.14: Summary of Security Frameworks
Framework Dependent Factor Independent Factor
Managerial Control Model
(Madnick, 1978)
Effectiveness of computer
security
 Operational
considerations
 Organisational impact
 Economics
 Objective and
accountability
User’s security concern
(Goodhue and Straub,
1991)
User’s security concern  Industry risk
 Company action
 Individual factors
Security Impact Model
(Straub, 1990)
Computer abuse  Deterrent factor
 Rival explanations
factor
PC Security Behavior
Framework (Frank, Shamir,
and Briggs. 1991)
Security-related behavior of
personal computer user
 Motivation
 Role clarity
 Ability
Model of Organisational
Factors on Personal
Computing Problems
(Guimaraes and
Ramanujam, 1986)
Incidence and intensity of
personal computing
problems, such as:
- Integration
- Costs
- MIS-User relations
- Data integrity and
security
 Level of personal
computing usage
 Level of control
 Level of support
(Source: Kim, 1992)
Kim (1992) also proposed a new security framework of IS environmental factors which
influence an organisation’s effort to reduce security risks based on the relevant IS
security literature. The framework consists of five IS environmental factors such as
organisational context, risk assessment by management, organisational impact,
organisational use of IS and system characteristics which might influence the
effectiveness of security efforts by an organisation in reducing the potential IS security
risks.
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Loukis and Spinellis (2001) assessed IS security in the Greek public sectors based on
implemented organisational measures, technical measures and human resources
measures. This study adopted the framework for IS development risks assessment,
proposed by Willcocks and Margetts (1994) to determine the organisational and
technological context factors which affect the application of the ISS measures, and to
find contexts favoring their application. Based on the framework, they classified the risk
factors into four categories: internal context risk factors, external context risk factors,
process risk factors and content risk factors.
Chao (2005) developed an ISec assessment model to evaluate the security level of an
ISec system in higher education institutions around the world. The assessment model
consisted of a two-layer structure: the security controls and the sub-security controls
which are formed based on literature reviews, ISec standards, best practices and ISec
assessment guides. The main security controls include authentication, authorisation,
access control, confidentiality/integrity control, audit, incident handling or disaster
discovery, people issue and management issue. This model is used to verify the varying
importance levels of security controls and sub-security controls among different types
and different sizes of institutions and organisations. This model is contributes in
improving security evaluation metric over extant methods and provides a potential
baseline for the standard of ISec metric.
Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) performed a qualitative IS security assessment based on
the value-focused thinking approach to identify fundamental objectives for IS security
and means of achieving them in an organisation. Based on in-depth interviews with 103
managers about their values in managing IS security revealed 86 sub objectives,
grouped into nine fundamental and 16 means categories that are essential in managing
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IS security. The nine fundamental objectives related to IS security include: 1) enhance
management development practices; 2) provide adequate human resource management
practices; 3) develop and sustain an ethical environment; 4) maximise access control; 5)
promote individual work ethic; 6) maximise data integrity; 7) enhance integrity of
business processes; 8) maximising privacy; and 9) maximise organisational integrity.
Their findings suggested that for maintaining IS security in organisations, it is necessary
to go beyond technical means and adopt socio-organisationally grounded principles and
values.
Suhazimah (2007) used Integrated System Social-Technical Theory as the basis of the
research framework to identify the underlying dimensions of ISec management system,
explore the relationship between these dimensions and test their impact as the
antecedents of ISec maturity of the organisation in the Malaysian Public Service. The
research framework consists of four independent variables representing the technical
factors (formal coping mechanism) and social factors (organisational structure,
organisational ISec culture and individual ISec key players’ perception). Based on the
findings, she had proposed the newly Integrated System Social-Technical Theory which
consisted of risk management mechanism and six social factors namely organisational
structure, awareness and training culture, individual perception on information security,
social barriers and technical barriers as answer on underlying dimensions of ISec
management approach in the Malaysian
Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008) studied the implementation of organisational
ISec measures and assessed the effectiveness of such measures among ISec managers in
selected Norwegian organisations. Based on a web-based survey, the results revealed
the companies participating in the study have emphasised developing and applying
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formal systems, like security policies, procedures and controls, while awareness
activities are less applied in the organisations. The study also highlighted that there was
a deviation between measures the respondents used and how they assessed the
effectiveness of the security measures. They reported that that measures that are not
implemented were assessed to be more effective than implemented measures. This
inverse relationship was interpreted as a metaphorical staircase of four steps of security
policy, procedures and control, tools and methods, and awareness creation.
Schuessler (2009) assessed IS security effectiveness in large and small organisations by
using general deterrence theory (GDT). This research model consists of four primary
constructs: organisational factors (size and industry affiliation), threats, GDT’s
components and IS security effectiveness. The GDT’s deterrence, prevention, detection
and remedy constructs are used as a baseline to assess the countermeasures in
eliminating a threat or at least mitigate some of the risk. This theory is used to examine
the effects of organisational size, industry affiliation and threats faced by an
organisation on the organisation’s use of countermeasures as well as the impacts on an
organisation’s IS security effectiveness.
The IBM Security Framework provides organisations with a baseline to assess their
security posture holistically that addresses technical, behavioral and managerial issues
related to ISec (Buecker, et al., 2010). The model consists of six domains including: a)
People and identity cover aspects on how to assure that the right people have access to
the right assets at the right time; b) Data and information cover aspects on how to
protect critical data in transit or at rest across the organisation; c) Application and
process cover aspects on how to ensure application and business services security; d)
Network, server and endpoint (IT infrastructure; e) cover aspects on how to stay ahead
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of emerging threats across IT system components; and f) Physical infrastructure cover
aspects on how to leverage the capability for digital controls to secure events, people or
things.
Haniza (2009) carried out a study to gauge the level of enforcement and effectiveness of
ISec policy from the users’ perspective at a public university in Malaysia. This study
proposed a theoretical framework for the effectiveness of institution’s ISec policy,
which consists of enforcement, users’ awareness, users’ understanding and users’
acceptance as independent variables, whereas an effectiveness of ISec policy identified
as dependant variable.
Based on the existing ISec frameworks described above, it can be concluded that
assessing ISec in any organisation should incorporated  the technical issues as well as
management and people issues. As any organisation including a library comprised of
people, therefore if an organisational factor is an issue in information security, there
may be a reason to study the human element as well. This study used the idea of the
metaphorical staircase of four steps of security policy, procedures and control, tools and
methods, and awareness creation (Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008) but details it
by proposing additional factors for each steps to assess the implementation of
technological and organisational ISec measures in the library.
2.9 Empirical Studies on Information Security
Post and Kievit (1991) argued that research in the ISec largely falls under three major
categories, which related to technical aspects of system security, management-oriented
approaches and causes of computer security breaches. Kim (1992) reviewed 12 major
empirical studies related to IS security (Table 2.15) and concluded that the success of
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security depends on many factors but users’ awareness of system security is identified
as one of the most prominent factors.
Table 2.15. Summary of Empirical Studies
Author Research Questions Findings/Conclusion
Loch, et al.
(1992)
Senior IS managers
perception on computer
security risks
 Greater risk in the microcomputer
environment than in the
mainframe environment.
 The most serious threats are
natural disasters and employee
accidental actions.
 Management needs to be more
informed  potential risks in the
mainframe and network
environment.
Goodhue and
Straub (1991)
Factors influencing
system’s user security
concern
 Negative relationship between
firm’s security action and user’s
concern.
 Transportation industry is in the
highest risk.
 No significant relationship
between user awareness and
sensitivity to risk and company
actions.
Post and
Kievit (1991)
System users’ demand on
security
 Increased demand for more
complex security as the number
and diversity of users increase.
 The most critical factor of
successful security is users’
awareness.
 Users do not satisfy with existing
security system.
Frank,
Shamir, and
Briggs (1991)
Factors influencing PC’s
users security-related
behavior
 PC user’s knowledge and
informal norms are the most
significant.
 The existence of formal policies is
not significant.
Bradbard, et
at. (1990)
Computer security in
small business firms
 When there is a high level of
security, it tends to be
comprehensive.
 Firms need more adequate
disaster recovery plans.
(Source: Adapted from Kim, 1992)
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Table 2.15. Continued
Author Research Questions Findings/Conclusion
Hoffer and
Straub (1994)
Profile of computer abuse
incidents
 Large organisations experience
more significant and frequent
computer abuse than small
organisations.
 Educational institutions,
wholesale and retail trade and
utilities are more vulnerable to
computer abuse than other
industries.
 No significant relationship
between users’ system privileges
and their propensity to computer
abuse.
Gupta et al.
(1989)
Impact of organisational
factors in problem related
to personal computing.
 The level of PC usage and the
level of support significantly
influence the intensity of PC
problems.
Richards
(1986)
Profile of computer-
related crime
 Financial service industry is
in the highest risk.
 Significant portion of the
crime is committed by
insiders.
 Significant portion of the
crime is not discovered by
control procedures.
(Source: Adapted from Kim, 1992)
Hermanson et al. (2000) conducted an exploratory survey using questionnaires to
understand how organisations address their IT risks and to examine evaluations of IT
risks performed by internal auditors in their organisations. The results of the study
revealed that internal auditors focus primarily on traditional IT risks and controls, such
as IT asset safeguarding, application processing, and data integrity, privacy and
security.
White and Pearson (2001) surveyed over two hundred USA companies to investigate
the security controls of personal use of computers, controlling e-mail accounts and
securing company data. The results of the study reinforced the need for better security
control in the majority of surveyed companies. The results also revealed that many
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corporations began to use computer technology before implementing appropriate
safeguards and the majority of the company's safeguards continue to be lacking.
Loukis and Spinellis (2001) studied a representative sample of 90 public sector
organisations to determine the organisational and technological context factors which
affect the application of organisational measures, technical measures and human
resources measures and to find contexts favoring their application. Analysis of data
collected via structured questionnaires revealed that Greek public sector organisations
have only a basic level of information system security awareness and adopted mostly
basic IS security measures, such as back-up copies, recovery procedures, security zones
and firewall. Only a small percentage has developed a systematic, complete and
integrated approach towards the security of their information system, including IS
security plans, IS security policies and internal audit procedures. Results also found that
the investigated public sector organisations were more concerned about digital data
confidentiality, probably because the IS security of many public sector organisations
contain personal and sensitive data. Cluster analysis revealed that critical public
enterprises such as banks, hospitals, social security organisations had applied most of
the outlined IS security measures, including the written and approved IS security plan,
written and approved ISS policy with specific roles and procedures and full-time IS
security officer. As comparison, the central and local government organisations had
applied only some basic IS security measures. However, the application of basic IS
security measures varied significantly among the investigated public sector
organisations, affected by the extent of usage of IT in the organisation (the number of IS
users and the number of the functions supported by the IS) and the size (from the staff
number viewpoint) of the IS organisational unit responsible to design and apply IS
security measures.
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Warren (2002) investigated the IS security practices in three countries: Australia, UK
and USA. The survey reported that security practices in the USA seemed to be more
effective than those of Australia or the UK. The results of the survey revealed that
Australian organisations have poor levels of computer security due to poor
implementation of security procedures and lack of budget for computer security. In UK,
42% of organisations did not have ISec policy and 49% of the organisations listed
budget constraints as an issue in implementing computer security. In USA, theft of
information and financial fraud caused great financial damage to organisations.
Chao (2005) utilised web survey to study the different importance levels of security
controls and sub-security controls in universities. Based on analysed responses from
159 Information System administrators in IT centers of universities around the world,
she found that authentication was the most important security control in small and
medium-sized organisations. However, confidentiality or integrity was viewed the most
important security control in large size organisations. Apparent results revealed that
people issue was the least important security control in most of the organisations
regardless of size. This study also revealed that the importance of management support
increases parallel with the size of an organisation. In comparison, security awareness
training was rated important only to large size organisations but small organisations
viewed encryption technology as extremely important.
Suhazimah (2007) analysed 210 questionnaires from chief information officers, ICT
managers and ICT officers to identify the antecedents of ISec maturity in organisations
of Malaysian Public Service (MPS). Her analysis revealed that 60% of MPS
organisations’ ISec maturity was at Level 3 of maturity level signifying that awareness
about ISec exists and that respondents believed the ISec management practices were
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documented and have been communicated throughout their organisations. Results also
reported that the most common attacks were spamming and malicious codes attacks but
there were low occurrence of website defacement and distributed denial-of-service
(DDos) attacks. This study also found that the antecedents of ISec maturity are risk
management mechanism, organisation structure, technical barriers and awareness and
training culture.
Haniza (2009) studied the level of enforcement and effectiveness of ISec policy from
the users’ perspective at a public university in Malaysia. This study involved three
phases of data collection: a) a preliminary study to explore the IT arrangement and
organisational structural practices in the university; b) interview with an IT-expert to
understand the establishment of the ISec in the university; and c) survey questionnaire
to gauge the level of users’ perception on the institution’s security policy. The study
found that nearly half of the respondents perceived that they are aware, understand and
accept the university’s policy, whereas more than half of them agreed that the
university’s policy is effective.
Schuessler (2009) surveyed 1000 professional of the Association of IT Professionals
(AITP) members by using online survey to assess the IS security effectiveness in large
and small organisations. Results indicated that industry affiliation was found to be
related to prevention efforts but not the deterrence, detection and remedy efforts. Both
deterrence and prevention efforts were found to be positively related to the IS security
effectiveness and the application of countermeasures in an organisation has changed the
effectiveness of the threats faced. However, organisational size was not found to be
positively related to ISS effectiveness as was industry affiliation. The results also
indicated that certain industries are more effective at securing IS than others.
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Dionysiou, Kokkinaki and Magirou (2010) presented the preliminary results on ICT
security practices in 33 Cyprus private and public sectors based on a nationwide survey
initiated by the University of Nicosia Research Foundation (UNRF) and the Cyprus
Academic Research Institute (CARI). The survey used questionnaire which was drafted
based on the IT Security Guidelines promoted by the national security agency of the
German federal government. The questionnaire consisted of simple checklists that
addressed all factors related to security policies and procedures, ICT Security
Management, ICT Security measures, networking and Internet connection. The
preliminary results indicated that the majority of organisations in the sample have made
provisions for security mechanisms and its management.
Findings from the previous research have revealed that there are various types of ISec
controls deployed in various organisations. However, the level of implementation of
these security measures in many industries was still lacking as they tend to focus
primarily on technical measures. Studies also found that the application of ISec
measures in organisations was affected by several factors such as the organisation size
and lack of budget for computer security. The review has highlighted the need to assess
the actual status or the level of implementation of the different types of ISec controls in
Malaysian academic libraries as well as the identification of the possible factors which
might affect the level of implementation of the security measures in these libraries.
2.10 Chapter Summary
The first section reviewed on definitions of the key terms such as information, security,
ISec and IS security. The next section provides brief overview on characteristic and
roles of an academic library as well as its changes within the five automation phases.
The third section highlights on the various issues and factors why a library needs for
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IS and IS security. The fourth section reviews the sources and the possible types of
threats, vulnerabilities and security issues related to the organisation’s hardware,
software, data, network, people and its physical facilities which are relevant to the
study.
Main focus of this chapter was the review relating to the common types of information
system security controls use in organisations. The countermeasures are reviewed from
two different approaches; IT-related countermeasures and the non-IT related
countermeasures. The IT-related countermeasures which also known as traditional
approaches emphasised on the use of security technologies. Under the technical
dimensions, the review covers the use of IT security tools for protecting the hardware,
software, workstation, network, server, data and physical facilities. Whereas, the non-IT
related countermeasures or also known as the ‘soft approach’ focused on the process,
organisational and human aspects of security. Under the non-technical dimensions, the
review covers on the use of ISec policy, ISec procedures, administrative tools and ISec
awareness initiatives.
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Chapter Three
_____________________________________________________
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND DESIGN
3.0 Introduction
Information security management (ISM) describes controls that need to be implemented
by a library in order to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its
information resources. As libraries are increasingly reliant on computer technology and
the Internet, there is no doubt that security becomes an important component of their
technological infrastructures (Williams, 2001). However, not much is known about the
actual implementation level of ISec in the library area. No academic library security
study has been conducted specific to this area, and searches of journals and the Internet
substantiated this finding. Thus, one could not make an assertion whether the library
sector is lacking or adequate in IS security. As highlighted by Newby (2002), IS
security is often under-appreciated in libraries and this is surprising as information is
the library’s main business. Therefore, this research aims to assess the current practices
of Malaysian libraries in managing their information security. This chapter outlines the
research methods used in answering the research questions. It describes the research
framework, review of research methodology related to information security,
development of the instrument, as well as an assessment of the reliability and validity of
the instrument, the way data was collected and analysed.
3.1 Research Purpose, Research Questions and Hypotheses
Most of the empirical evidence on ISec and its determinants are confined to the use of
data from Western countries. Evidence from other environments, where the social,
economic and cultural characteristics are different, is needed before any generalisation
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can be made (Seliem, et al., 2003). Thus, the purpose of this research is to get a clear
picture of ISec threats and security practices in libraries. This study would be a
significant analysis of ISec threats and ISec management in a library environment,
which is lacking in published literature. The results of this study may help the
management of academic libraries identify their strengths, weaknesses and priorities in
managing their ISec so that relevant actions can be applied in a more organised manner.
3.1.1 Research Purpose
This study aims to achieve the following objectives:
1) To explore the general IT infrastructures in Malaysian academic libraries in
terms of number of personal computer (PC) allocations, availability of wireless
connection, type of operating system used, years of ICT adoption, percentage of
IS security budget and availability of IS security staff.
2) To explore the most common perceived ISec threats and the frequency of their
occurrence (in term of hardware, software, data, network, physical and other IS
security threats) discovered by these libraries during a period of six months;
3) To find out the most common perceived source of ISec threats in Malaysian
academic libraries;
4) To ascertain the extent of technological measures deployed by Malaysian
academic libraries. This would include identifying the level of implementation
of  hardware, software, workstation, network, server, data and physical security
measures in these libraries;
5) To investigate the differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in
applying technical measures based on type of university, years in ICT
implementation, yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and
availability of wireless connection;
6) To ascertain the extent of organisational measures deployed by Malaysian
academic libraries. This would include identifying the level of implementation
of security policy, procedures and controls, tools and methods and awareness
activities in these libraries;
7) To investigate the differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in
applying organisational measures based on type of university, years in ICT
implementation,  yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and
availability of wireless connection; and
8) To propose a model and an assessment tool to assess the implementation status
of ISec in Malaysian academic libraries.
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3.1.2      Research Questions
In order to meet the purpose and objectives of the study, the following research
questions are asked:
Research Question 1:
What is the general background of IT infrastructures in Malaysian academic libraries in
terms of number of PC allocations, availability of wireless connection, type of operating
system used, years of ICT adoption, percentage of IS security budget and availability of
IS security staff?
Research Question 2:
What are the most common perceived IS security threats and the frequency of their
occurrence in Malaysian academic libraries in terms of hardware, software, data,
network, physical and human- related threats?
Research Question 3:
What is the most common perceived source of IS security threats in Malaysian
academic libraries?
Research Question 4:
What is the level of implementation of technological security measures (in terms of
hardware security, software security, workstation security, network security, server
security, data security and physical security measures) in Malaysian academic libraries?
Research Question 5:
Are there significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measures based on the type of university, number of staff, years in ICT
implementation, yearly information system security budget, availability of IS security
staff and availability of wireless connection?
Research Question 6:
What is the level of implementation of organisational security measures (in terms of
security policy, procedures and controls, tools and methods and awareness activities) in
Malaysian academic libraries?
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Research Question 7:
Are there significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying the
organisational measures based on type of university, number of staff,  years in ICT
adoption, yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection?
Research Question 8:
What is the overall implementation status of technological security measures and
organisational security measures in Malaysian academic libraries based on the proposed
assessment tool?
3.1.3 Hypotheses
3.1.3.1 Differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying technical
measures based on type of university, number of staff,  years in ICT adoption, yearly
ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless connection are
suspect. Hence, it is therefore hypothesised that;
Hypothesis 1
There are no significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technical measures based on type of university, years in ICT implementation, yearly
ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless connection.
3.1.3.2 Differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures based on type of university, number of staff,  years in ICT
adoption, yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection are suspect. Hence, it is therefore hypothesised that;
Hypothesis 2
There are no significant differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
the organisational measures based on type of university, years in ICT implementation,
yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection.
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3.4 The Research Framework
The framework in this research is adapted from the Organisational Information Security
Staircase Model developed by Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008). The original
model (Figure 3.1) is constructed to show the degree of implementation and the
subjective assessment of its effectiveness. The original model specifies 16 items on
organisational measures that are grouped into four: policy; procedures and control; tools
and methods and awareness creation. Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008) reported
that technical-administrative security measures, such as security policies, procedures
and methods are the most commonly implemented organisational ISec measures in a
sample of Norwegian organisations. The awareness-creating activities are applied by
these organisations to a considerably lesser extent, but are assessed as being more
effective organisational measures than the technical-administrative measures. This
inverse relationship is interpreted as a metaphorical staircase of four steps: (1) security
policy; (2) procedures and control; (3) tools and methods; and (4) awareness creation.
Figure 3.1. Organisational Information Security Staircase Model (Hagen, Albrechtsen
and Hovden, 2008).
Tools and methods
- Asset classiﬁcation, risk analysis; internal and
external audits, KPIs, systems for reporting and
incident handling plans.
Procedures and control
- Security routines for hired staff and telecommuters; user
instructions; non-disclosure agreements and disciplinary processes.
Information security policy
- Information security policy
Technological security foundation
Increasing
implementation
Awareness creation
- Training/education; awareness
campaigns; user participation; top
management’s engagement and
involvement .
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The basic premise of adapting the Organisational Information Security Staircase Model
by Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008) as the research framework is that the model
is built around particular view of the technical-administrative measures in managing
information security management such as technological measures, security policies,
procedures and controls and awareness creation. The model provides a solid framework
for incorporating the human part of information security measures. This is particularly
mandatory in the adoption of effective information security measures since in most
cases human is the key component in managing ISec in an organization. The model  is
chosen as it is considered  generic and has  enough  flexibility  to  allow  for  planning
for  expandability by altering the variables or security elements measured. For instance,
the model does not specify and assess on the implementation of technological solutions,
thus, the revised model in this study is designed to simplify and make clear the different
features of technological measures and organisational measures. The data used in the
model is also flexible where it can be used for a large and a small sample size. This
allows for flexibility to include more or less data elements in certain areas.
This study proposes a library Information Security assessment model (LISAM) which is
derived by mapping the insights obtained from literature with the four steps of the
Organisational Information Security Staircase Model to define and list the essential
areas of ISM for libraries (Figure 3.2). This study proposes additional variables for each
step to assess the implementation of technological and organisational ISec measures in
the library. Also, the assessment instrument that aligns with the LISAM is proposed to
provide more detailed guidance on how the LISAM can be used in assisting a library to
assess the degree of implementation of technological measures and organisational
measures as well as its overall ISec level.
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Figure 3.2. Library Information Security Assessment Model (LISAM)
Awareness Creation
- Awareness programmes - Updates on security policies
- Key performance indicators - Security training and education
- Updates on security threats - Top management  support
- Awareness of information security responsibilities
Procedures and Control
- Controls and disciplinary procedures - Procedures for handling sensitive data
- Intellectual property rights - Requirement for outsourced activities
- Non-disclose agreement
- Procedures for reviewing current information security policies
Technological Security Foundation
- Hardware security - Server security
- Software security - Network security
- Workstation security - Data security
- Physical facilities & environment
Administrative Tools and Methods
- Asset and personnel classification - Risk analysis procedures
- Incident handling/reporting procedures
- Internal and external audits
- Owner accountability procedures
Technological
Measures
Security goals for Academic library information
systems: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
Organisational
Measures
Degree of Implementation
Information Security Policy
- Acceptable use policy - Job responsibilities policy
- Asset protection policy - Data classification & retention policy
- Policies on access controls - Backup policy
- Policies on sharing, storing and transmitting of library data
Very High Very Low
Overall Security
Level/Status
Very Good Practice Very Poor Practice
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The proposed components in the assessment of the ISec measures in libraries are
pictured in a staircase model in Figure 3.2. The model is formulated on the basis that
ISec includes organisational aspects, legal aspects, institutionalisation and applications
of best practices in addition to security technologies (Von Solms, 2000). The
relationship between the groups of organisational measures and technological measures
metaphorically looks like a staircase. The model illustrates that in order for ISec
measures to become effective, security should be built like a staircase of combined
measures. To produce any effect, security measures are mutually dependent on each
step (Sundt, 2006; Berghel, 2005). The steps in the staircase follow a logical order to
achieve the three primary goals of a good security system practice, which are to ensure
and protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of an IS (Eisenberg and
Lawthers, 2005). These three objectives guide the development of security measures to
avoid different security threats in libraries. In this context, library IS security refers to
means and ways that a library protects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
information processed by an IS and of the IS itself.
a) Protecting confidentiality means the privacy of information assets, such as the
library’s financial information, patrons’ circulation information, applications
and passwords to access library systems. These must be kept private and cannot
be accessible or revealed to unauthorised people. Protecting confidentiality also
means that the library should always follow the principle of least privilege,
which states that the patrons are given only the privileges that they need to
perform their jobs or tasks. For instance, if a user only needs to check or print
out their emails using a library's Internet connection, they should have no ability
to access the operating system files of that print server.
b) Protecting data integrity means a library has to make sure that data made
available via the library IS is accurate, complete and is not inappropriately
changed or deleted by unauthorised persons. Therefore, the library needs to
implement appropriate security measures so that the library can recognise,
protect and recover the systems from any breaches of integrity such as viruses,
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worms and Trojan horses. It also means that the library should allow only
appropriate access to the library computers, websites, databases and servers.
c) Ensuring data availability means a library should be able to recognise and
defend against denial-of-service attacks and viruses by implementing a good
backup policy and recovery procedures. This also implies that the library has to
make sure that library services are available and not interrupted during routine
hardware and software maintenance. This means that the data can be accessed
whenever it is needed and that data can be restored quickly during downtime.
The model also highlights that the higher the position on the staircase, the more
complex is the state of IS security management in a library. The first staircase illustrates
that in any security environments, including a library, the technological foundation must
always be in place. Next, the security policies must be the foundation to develop rules,
guidelines and plans. These IS security procedures must be in place to develop
appropriate tools and methods. When these formal systems are implemented, the library
can deal with the human element of ISec as the staff and patrons in libraries must abide
by administrative security routines by applying them in their day-to-day activities.
3.2.1 Technological Measures: Step 1
Technical security mechanisms are used to guard the library IS integrity,
confidentiality, and availability - these include the mechanisms that are put in place to
protect, control and monitor information access and prevent unauthorised access to data
that is transmitted over a library system. The staircase is constructed based on the
assumption that a technological foundation must always be in place in any security IS
environment as the main defensive system to any organisation; especially in a library
setting. It is argued that without technological security solutions, there would be no
need to have administrative measures (Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008). This is
because it is technological solutions that prevent, detect and react to virus and spam
attacks faced by most organisations (Hagen, 2008). Moreover, there is obvious evidence
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that many research on ISec has traditionally been dedicated to technological aspects, as
security technologies form the basis of a security system (Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen, 2007). Thus, level one comprises technological security foundation, which a
library should have to protect its workstations, servers, hardware, software, data,
network, physical facilities and environment.
i) Hardware Security
A library IS consists of several hardware equipments such as telephone lines,
input/output ports, modems, network cablings, scanners, printers and storage media.
These equipments need to be secure from any threats including thefts, power failures,
equipment incompatibilities, careless damage and ensure the availability, confidentiality
and integrity of data in a library (Yeh and Chang, 2007; INTOSAI, 1995).
ii) Software Security
Flaws and risks related to the library software are more likely to be found when services
such as library systems, OPACs, online databases and resources are made accessible via
the Internet. The scope of software security in libraries therefore encompass protecting
the software components from breaches and assure the confidentiality, availability and
integrity of the library software (Eisenberg and Lawthers, 2005; Yeh, and Chang, 2007;
Newby, 2002).
iii) Workstation Security
As more libraries make available to their patrons Internet-connected computers, there is
a need to secure each computer from any security threats from the Internet as well as
threats from the users (Eisenberg and Lawthers, 2005; INTOSAI, 1995). The most
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common library’s workstation security threats come from the Internet. Those from the
users include viruses and worms, theft and unauthorised access.
iv) Network Security
Good security systems protect the network in a manner that is consistent with its
purpose and secures it from adware, spyware or network intruders (Eisenberg and
Lawthers, 2005; Yeh and Chang, 2007). The network security for a library would need
to disallow access to the IS from unauthorised users, while simultaneously ensuring full
access to legitimate users.
v) Server Security
In a library's network, servers play a vital role in providing access to key library
services such as online databases and catalogues, circulation systems to internal and
remote patrons, computer hardware, the operating systems, application programmes
loaded on the hardware to perform specific functions, such as a web server or email
server (Eisenberg and Lawthers, 2005). Libraries need to take steps to secure the email
and web server applications from any intrusion, hardware or application failure due to
viruses, hackers and natural disasters. The availability, confidentiality and integrity of
the library server can be assured via proper implementation of specific
countermeasures.
vi) Data Security
Since a library stores, processes and provides access to vast amounts of data, it will
definitely require a sound data management system to assure the security of its data
against accidental loss, unauthorised modifications and access by taking appropriate
measures (Yeh and Chang, 2007, Thiagarajan, 2003, Powell and Gillet, 1997).
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vii) Physical Facilities and Environmental Security
The term physical and environmental security refers to measures taken to protect the
library systems, buildings and related supporting infrastructures or resources (including
air conditioning, power supply, water supply and lighting) against physical damage
associated with fire, flood and physical intrusion (INTOSAI, 1995; and Yeh and Chang,
2007).
3.2.2 Information Security Policy: Step 2
Information Security (ISec) policy forms the basis of every administrative security
regime (Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008). It refers to protecting various assets
including hardware, software, data and people. This is laid out in the form of written
documents directly linked to the overall security strategy of the library (Hone and
Elloff, 2002; Doherty and Fulford, 2006). In libraries, the security policy will have
some areas of overlap with the acceptable use policy. An acceptable use policy
generally focuses on patron use of the library IS, whereas a security policy is a guide
that includes rules and guidelines for access and use of IS. A security policy is needed
in a library as it provides continuity, consistency and a basis for enforcing staff and
patron conduct when using the library IS (Williams, 2001).
3.2.3 Procedures and Controls: Step 3
Procedures are step-by-step instructions on how to implement and enforce policies in
the organisation (Conklin et al., 2005). Procedures and controls are implemented
through work processes and procedures, which outline how resources are protected. For
example, a password policy would outline password construction rules, rules on how to
protect the passwords and how often to change them. In contrast, the Password
Management Procedures would draft the process to create new passwords, distribute
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them as well as the process for ensuring the passwords are changed on critical devices
(Guel, 2007). This step consists of documents guiding individuals and organisations
through user instructions, security plans, non-disclosure agreements and follow-up
activities of the documented systems.
3.2.4 Administrative Tools and Methods: Step 4
Administrative tools and methods are both proactive and reactive means in ensuring the
security of IS in a library, which includes asset classification, risk analysis, audits and
incident reporting systems.
3.2.5 Awareness Creation: Step 5
This step refers to the process of making people understand and aware of the
importance of security, the use of security measures, the implications of security on
their ability to perform their jobs and the process of reporting security violations
(Pipkin, 2000). The human factor is the biggest threat to IS and assets and ironically, is
also the best way to prevent loss. This implies that lack of awareness can lead to a
variety of security issues.
3.2.6 Implementation Index
The sequence of steps shown in the model illustrates the ideal sequence of combined
security measures for library ISec. However, there is a possibility that some measures
were more fully implemented than the others. The implementation index based on the
Information Security Measure Benchmark (Information-Technology Promotion
Agency, 2008) was applied to the model to create an instrument that can be used to
assess the level of implementation of ISec measures in a library. At each level, the
variables are measured based on five status of implementation scores (1 = Not
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Implemented to 5 = Fully Implemented) that reflect the attributes of implementation
(Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Levels of Implementation of Information Security Measures in Libraries
Level Status Description of the attributes of IS security practice
1 Not Implemented No security measure has been established
2 Only some part has beenimplemented Only some part of security measure has been implemented
3 Implemented but has not beenreviewed Implemented but the stage has not been reviewed
4 Implemented and reviewed onregular basis Implemented and the state reviewed on regular basis.
5 Implemented and recognised as goodexample for other libraries
Implemented enough to be recognised as good example for
others libraries
(Source: Information-Technology Promotion Agency. 2008)
3.5 Research Methodology Related To Information Security
Management
Review of previous work relating to research approaches used in the area of ISec
indicates that surveys and case studies are the most popular methods used in ISec
research. Bolan and Mende (2004) identified that the most popular approaches used by
researchers in three computer security journals and articles published in 2000 until 2004
included subjective/argumentative, case studies, surveys, action research, experiments,
grounded theory, ethnography, theorem proof, simulation and forecasting.
Review of literature related to ISec threats and countermeasures indicated that surveys
and questionnaires are the most popular research method and data gathering technique
utilised by researchers. For instance, Loch and Carr (1991) adopted a survey to examine
the organisation’s view on ISec threats in Atlanta based on questionnaires sent to the
Directors of Management of IS (MIS) or MIS security in various organisations in
Atlanta, Georgia. Loukis and Spinellis (2001) investigated ISec measures and its
associations with the context factors (number of IS users, number of IS staff, connection
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to Internet and etc.) in the Greek public sectors by means of a structured questionnaire.
May and Lane (2006) examined the current status and key issues of ISM in tertiary
environment using the survey instrument administered to all Australian Vice
Chancellor-listed universities. Yeh and Chang (2007) identified the threats and
countermeasures for IS security in Taiwanese enterprises using mail questionnaires.
Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008) in their survey explored the relationship
between implementation and effectiveness of security measures through a web-based
questionnaire among ISec managers in a selection of Norwegian organisations.
Galliers (1991) presented a taxonomy of IS research approaches based on suitability of
different research methods in the context of: 1) research objects (having an impact on
society, an organisation or group, or an individual); 2) whether the concentration is on
technological or methodological factors; and 3) the process of theory building, testing
or extension (Table 3.2). Thus, this research adopted a survey method to obtain a
snapshot of ISec threats and security practices at a particular point in time, which is
deemed appropriate for a project impacting Malaysian academic libraries
(organisations), and also where the concentration is on process (methodology) rather
than technology itself.
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Table 3.2. Information System Research Approaches: A Revised Taxonomy (Galliers,
1991, p.168)
OBJECT
Modes for traditional empirical approaches (observation)                  Modes for newer approaches
(interpretations)
Theorem
Proof
Laboratory
Experiment
Field
Experiment
Case
Study
Survey Forecasting
and Future
Research
Simulation
and Game
or Role
Playing
Subjective or
Argumentative
Descriptive
or Review
Society No No Possibly Possibly Yes Yes Possibly Yes Yes
Organisation
or Group No Possibly Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual No Yes Yes Possibly Possibly Possibly Yes Yes Yes
Technology
Methodology
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Possibly
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Possibly
Yes
Possibly
Yes
Theory
Building No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Theory
Testing Yes Yes Yes Possibly Possibly No Possibly No Possibly
Theory
Extension
Possibly Possibly Possibly Possibly Possibly No No No Possibly
3.6 Population and Sample
There are two important considerations when embarking on research in the ISec field:
1) the research should addresses an area of importance to the organisation, and 2) the
information gained from the research can be applied in practice within the organisation
(Suhazimah, 2007). Many factors influence the implementation of ISec measures in a
library; hence it is necessary to examine the libraries in their natural setting. The
population in this study is libraries in Malaysia. Malaysia has several types of libraries,
including the National Library, academic libraries, special libraries, public libraries and
school libraries. Based on purposeful sampling, the targeted sample chosen for the
context of actual study are academic libraries because of the higher level of ICT
implementation compared to other types of libraries. Since the population of all
academic libraries at public universities, private universities and college universities in
Malaysia is small (57), all academic libraries at these three types of universities were
chosen for study, excluding the small academic libraries at private colleges. It was
recognised that this may create disproportionate numbers of small libraries, but if
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stratified sampling was done, the sample population would have been too small to
provide meaningful results.
Another issue that rose in ISec literature is the sensitive nature of surveys that ask
questions about ISec practices. Previous research reported that many companies are
reluctant to provide hard data regarding computer abuse or security practices because of
the extremely sensitive nature of the topic (Kotulic and Clark, 2004; Straub and Welke,
1998). Based on the lessons offered in the literature and due to the sensitive nature of
the topic, researchers investigating ISec practices should proceed with caution, and as
an alternative, should opt to use professional subjective judgment to questions posed.
Thus, the unit analysis in this study is the individual designated to be responsible for the
security of IS or IT in an academic library.
This study seeks to capture the ISec threats and practices of academic libraries,
therefore the target individuals are the middle and top management group that are the
custodian and implementers of ICT related to library functions and services. Only one
individual may be sampled from each academic library, which depends on the
designated Head of ICT Department, ICT Librarian, ICT Manager, ICT Officers or ICT
Executive responsible for the System or IT Division/Unit/Department in an academic
library. The common characteristic of these people is that all of them are either directly
or indirectly responsible for the safeguarding or protection of the library’s information
system assets.
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3.4.1 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this study was academic library. The questionnaire enquired
individuals about their perception regarding the security postures with respect to threats
and countermeasures within the context of their academic libraries. The goal of using
the academic library as the unit of analysis was to provide findings that were useful to
academic libraries in assessing their current state of IS security threats and practices, as
well as to provide a metric with which to compare academic libraries of similar
characteristics and types.
The scope of targeted libraries covers all the academic libraries in Peninsular Malaysia,
and also Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia. The total number of academic libraries in
Malaysia is based on the total number of public universities and private universities in
Malaysia (see Table 3.3 and Table 3.4).
Table 3.3. List of Public Universities and Year of Establishment
No. Public Universities Year of Establishment
1 University of Malaya (UM) 1962
2 Science University of Malaysia (USM) 1969
3 National University of Malaysia (UKM) 1970
4 Putra University Malaysia (UPM) 1971
5 University of Technology Malaysia (UTM) 1975
6 International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) 1983
7 Northern University Malaysia (UUM) 1984
8 University of Malaysia, Sarawak (UNIMAS) 1992
9 University of Malaysia, Sabah (UMS) 1994
10 Sultan Idris University of Education (UPSI) 1997
11 MARA University of Technology (UiTM) 1999
12 Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UNISZA) 2005
13 Islamic Science University of Malaysia (USIM) 1998 (2006)
14 University of Malaysia Terengganu (UMT) 1999 (2006)
15 Tun Hussein Onn University of Malaysia (UTHM) 2000 (2006)
16 University of Technical Malaysia Melaka (UTeM) 2000 (2006)
17 University of Malaysia Pahang (UMP) 2001 (2006)
18 University of Malaysia Perlis (UNIMAP) 2001 (2006)
19 University of Malaysia, Kelantan (UMK) 2006
20 National Defence University of Malaysia (UPNM) 2006
* Year in bracket indicates the year upgraded to University status)
(Source: IPTA Management Sector, Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia, 2010)
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Table 3.4: List of Private Universities and Year of Establishment
No. Private Universities Year of
Establishment
1 Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN) 1999
2 Universiti Tun Abdul Razak (UNIRAZAK) 2000
3 Multimedia University (MMU) 1999
4 Universiti Teknologi Petronas (UTP) 2000
5 Malaysia University of Science and Technology (MUST) 2000
6 University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus (UNMC) 2000
7 Monash University Malaysia (MUM) 2000
8 Curtin University of Technology Sarawak, Campus Lutong
(CUTS)
2000
9 Industrial University of Selangor (UNISEL) 2001
10 International Medical University (IMU) 2001
11 AIMST University (AIMST) 2001
12 Open University Malaysia (OUM) 2001
13 Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) 2002
14 Universiti Kuala Lumpur (UniKL) 2002
15 Management and Science University (MSU) 2002
16 Kuala Lumpur Infrastructure University College (KLIUC) 2003
17 Limkokwing University 2003
18 UCSI University 2003
19 Twintech International University College Of Technology
(TWINTECH)
2003
20 Sunway University 2010
21 Asia Pacific University College of Technology and Innovation
(UCTI)
2004
22 Kolej Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Selangor (KUIS) 2004
23 HELP University College (HUC) 2004
24 Binary University College of Management & Entrepreneurship
(BUCME)
2004
25 Swinburne University of Technology, Campus Sarawak (SUT) 2004
26 Cyberjaya University College of Medical Sciences (CUCMS) 2005
27 INTI International University (INTI IU) 2010
28 Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan University College
(METROPOLITAN)
2006
29 Kolej Universiti Insaniah (KUIN) 2006
30 TAYLOR's University 2010
31 Al-Madinah International University (MEDIU) 2007
32 International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) 2007
33 Asia e University (AeU) 2007
34 Nilai University College 2007
35 TATI University College (TATIUC) 2007
36 Wawasan Open University (WOU) 2007
37 Albukhary International University 2007
(Source: IPTS Management Sector, Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia, 2010)
All academic libraries in Malaysia as listed by the Ministry of Higher Education
Malaysia (2010) were selected to produce a representative sample and to reduce
sampling errors (Table 3.5). These academic libraries were selected based on the
assumption that they have automated library systems and provide Internet access and
online services to their patrons. A total of 57 questionnaires were distributed at each
103
respective academic library either by hand, post or e-mail depending on their locations.
The researcher aimed to collect 51 questionnaires with 10% allowance for non-return
rate and spoilt questionnaires. Targeting a specific individual within an academic library
would increase the accuracy and quality of response because the individual chosen, due
to the nature of his role and responsibilities, is in the most relevant position to provide
the desired information.
Table 3.5: Number of Academic Libraries in Malaysia as at 2008
Academic libraries N % of total
population (N)
Estimate
response
Public universities 20 35% 20
Private universities 22 39% 22
University Colleges 15 26% 15
Total 57 100% 57
(Source: Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia, 2009)
3.5     Research Instruments
The instrument used to collect data for this study is a structured questionnaire. The
survey research is believed to be well understood and applied by management IS
scholars. It has been applied for several years and it has precise procedures that, when
followed closely, yield valid and easily interpretable data (Pinsonneault and Kraemer,
1993). Surveys are useful in describing the characteristics of a large population,
whereas no other method of observation can provide this general capability. Fowler
(1984) indicates that there are several elements in the conduct of surveys that can be
used to assess the quality of survey research. These elements include: (a) research
design, (b) sampling procedures and (c) data collection methods. These elements and
their related dimensions constitute the framework used to assess survey research
methodology in management of IS.
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The design of the survey instrument was completed following a comprehensive
literature review, which directly affected the design of the questions. The sections of the
survey that were designed each deal with a specific section of the research: a) Part A
deals with questions related to demographic profiles of academic libraries and
demographic profiles of respondents; Part B deals with questions related to the most
common ISec incidences, frequency of ISec incidence occurrences and the most
common perceived source of ISec threats experienced by academic libraries, and b) Part
C deals with questions pertaining to the level of implementation of technological and
organisational measures in academic libraries. Questions related to academic libraries’
profile, respondents’ profile and the source of ISec threats were assessed based on
multiple choices. These scales consist of a few possible responses from which
respondents may select either one or more responses. The indicator for occurrence of
ISec threats experienced by academic libraries requires responses to a Likert-scale to
measure the frequency of the threats. In contrast, the indicator level of implementation
of technological and organisational measures in academic libraries were assessed based
on the five status of implementation scores (1 = Not Implemented to 5 = Fully
Implemented) that reflect the attributes of implementation (Table 3.1).  A complete
questionnaire with its cover letter can be referred in Appendix A.
3.5.1 Validity of the Measurement
Content validity can be identified via three sources, including literature,
representativeness of the relevant population and experts (Burns and Grove, 2004). The
instrument for this study was developed through several stages, as follows: First, a
sample of items for relevant ISec threats and countermeasures was identified by
employing an exhaustive review of literature generally on ISec and IS security threats
and safeguarding measures. In order to better understand the current security threats in
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academic libraries, this study categorised each threat based on hardware threats,
software threats, network threats, data threats, physical threats and human-related
threats. The list of threats under each category was based on the index or list of threats
developed by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2005), Farahmand, et al.
(2003), Yeh and Chang (2007), Samy, Rabiah and Zuraini (2009) and other researchers
(Table 3.6).
Table 3.6. Types of Information Security Threats
Threats Descriptions Representative References
Hardware security
threats
Threats of physical damage to
physical components in an
information system.
Farahmand, et al. (2003); Samy,
Rabiah and  Zuraini, (2009).
Software security
threats
Threats that jeopardise the operating
systems and related applications.
Farahmand, et al. (2003); Gawde,
(2004); Samy, Rabiah and
Zuraini (2009).
Network security
threats
Threats related to the network such as
virus and hackers
Williams (2001); Farahmand, et.
al. (2005b); Eisenberg and
Lawthers (2005); Mell, Kent and
Nusbaum (2005); Yeh and Chang
(2007); Samy, Rabiah and
Zuraini (2009).
Data security
threats
Threats related to data, such as
unauthorised access.
Adam (1992).
Physical and
environmental
security threats
Threats due to interference of natural
disasters such as fires and flooding.
Lindstrom (2003); Tittel et al.
(2003); Samy, Rabiah and
Zuraini (2009); Vacca (2009).
Human-related
threats (Other
security threats)
Threats from humans or users such as
human errors.
Pipkin (2000); Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services
(2005); Lindstrom (2003);
Conklin, et al. (2005); Samy,
Rabiah and  Zuraini ( 2009).
Similarly, the relevant security countermeasures listed in this study were those
identified by Eisenberg and Lawthers (2005), Rajendran and Rathinasabapathy (2007),
Yeh and Chang (2007) as well as by other relevant researchers (Table 3.7). The
identified security countermeasures were each classified into the respective dimensions
of LISAM.
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Table 3.7: Types of Information Security Controls or Security Measures
Security Control Descriptions Representative References
Technological
security
The technical mechanisms or
controls that are put in place to
protect hardware, software,
workstation, network, server, data
and physical facilities security.
INTOSAI (1995);  Bryson
(1997);  Ormes (2001);
Thiagarajan (2003), Yasin
(2002); Banerjee (2003); Ferrer
and Mead (2003); Oder (2004);
Shahid (2005); Eisenberg and
Lawthers (2005);  Ohaya (2006);
Ortiz-Caceres (2006a);
Rajendran and Rathinasabapathy
(2007); Yeh and Chang (2007).
Information
Security policy
Policies that state job
responsibilities, acceptable use of
library IS, backup policy, privacy
and confidential policy, asset
protection policy, data classification
policy, wireless device policy and
authorisation policy.
Weise and Martin (2001);
Thiagarajan (2003);
EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Security
Task (2004); Eisenberg and
Lawthers (2005); Breeding
(2006); Yeh and Chang (2007).
Procedures and
controls
Any documented procedures and
formal practices to manage the
selection and execution of IS
security policies including
disciplinary controls, confidentiality
agreement, requirement for
outsourced activities and intellectual
property rights.
Thiagarajan (2003); Adomi and
Eruvwe (2004); Yeh and Chang,
(2007).
Administrative
tools and
methods
Any proactive and reactive means in
assuring security of IS such as asset
classification, risk analysis, audits
and incident reporting systems.
Thiagarajan (2003); Yeh and
Chang, (2007).
Awareness
creation
The existence and maintenance of
ISec awareness initiatives via
security trainings, active user
participation, awareness programmes
and the top management support.
Pethia (2003); Thiagarajan
(2003);  Hight (2005); Im and
Baskerville (2005); Kimwele,
Mwangi and Kimani (2005);
Merkow and  Breithaupt
(2005); Vaast (2007); Yeh and
Chang (2007); Zoughbi (2009);
Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff
(2009).
3.5.1.1 Pre-Testing the Instrument for Content Validity
Content validity refers to the extent to which the items, questions and measures reflect
or represent the specific or the real construct domain and eliminates undesirable items
to a particular construct. Although content validity is a highly desirable and
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recommended practice in order to ensure rigour in any empirical research, its
application is limited in ISec research (Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen, 2004). This study
involves designing and building a new survey instrument, thus pre-testing the
instrument is undeniably essential to examine the questionnaire for any ambiguity,
misleading or unclear terminology. As asserted by Boudreau, Gefen and Straub (2001),
every instrument should be pretested as a preliminary step to ensure that there are no
unanticipated difficulties. The literature suggested a range of 2 to 20 content experts to
be selected to review relevant and clarity of research instrument (Malmgreen, et al.
2009). However, in this study a total of five individuals were involved in the pre-testing
exercise. They include two IS librarians, one IS executive and two academicians. The
objectives of this pre-testing approach were to obtain feedback for improvement before
finalising the questionnaire and to identify relevant items that adequately cover relevant
dimensions on ISec threats and safeguarding measurements in a library setting.
A copy of the drafted instrument along with an introductory letter that explains the
research objectives, instructions and definitions of key terminologies was sent to each
of these individuals by hand or e-mail depending on their locations. These individuals
were asked to respond in three ways based on D’Arcy’s approach (2005): (1) to indicate
whether they felt that the individual items and the scenarios serve to answer the larger
research-guiding questions; (2) to recommend other items that they felt would be useful
for the survey, and (3) to comment on content and structure of the instrument as a
whole. The feedback focused mostly on suggestions to improve the instrument for
readability, clarity and usefulness for gathering the required data. Major changes
resulted from this feedback, including revision to the wording of some threats questions
to eliminate ambiguities and make the statements for security countermeasures more
concise. For instance, question 17.1 in the Hardware Security was reworded greater
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concision: “Surveillance systems at strategic places, public computer areas and server
areas (e.g. use of CCTV, visual camera, magnetic detection system and electronic anti
theft system)” was changed to “CCTV, visual camera, magnetic detection system and
electronic anti theft system at strategic places, public computer areas and server areas”.
Minor changes also resulted from this feedback, including the omission of question 23.7
in Part C (Presence of Hardware Security Threat), the question 23.7 “Physical sabotage
or intentional destruction of computing equipments” was replaced with question 23.8
“Theft, physical sabotage, vandalism of ICT hardware equipments”, which carries a
similar meaning. Additional items were also suggested for the ‘Presence of ISec Policy’
and ‘Presence of Awareness Creation’ sections. Thus, the results of the pretest
suggested that the instrument possessed adequate content validity.
3.5.1.2 Pilot Study
The corrected version of the instrument was finally adopted and piloted in order to
determine approximate length of the survey in terms of time as well as to further refine
the instrument. As indicated by Phelps (2005), the pilot test of the instrument included
opportunities for comments relating to the clarity and content of the instrument. The
proposed questionnaire was piloted based on the convenience sample of 110 public and
special libraries in Malaysia between the months of September 2009 and November
2009. When choosing the public and special libraries, the same criteria are applied as
for the academic libraries, i.e. that the libraries have automated library systems as well
as provided Internet and online services.
The questionnaires were distributed to the individual responsible for ISec or IT in the
public or special library, either by post, hand or e-mail attachment depending on
locations of the libraries. Each questionnaire booklet or email attachment was attached
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with an introductory letter that explains the research objectives, instructions and
definitions of key terminologies together with self-addressed and stamped envelope.
Some follow-up telephones calls and reminders via e-mails were made to encourage
respondents to answer and return the questionnaires. A total of 110 questionnaires were
distributed and a total of 50 (constituting 45%) useable questionnaires were collected at
the time of data collection (Table 3.8)..  Minor changes resulted from this feedback,
including a modification to choice of answers for question five, i.e. ‘Numbers of
PC/workstation with Internet connection for patrons in your library’ in the Library
Profile section to conform more directly to the actual scenarios. Also, in the initial
sections, Part B (a list of the most common ISec incidents experienced by organisations)
and Part C (a list of ISec safeguarding measures) were exchanged in order to encourage
a higher response rate, as the researcher believed that the questions listed in Part C were
more difficult to answer than questions listed in the Part B.
Table 3.8. Breakdown of Questionnaire Distribution for Pilot Test
Type of Libraries N* Distributed % ofDistributed Response Obtained
% of
Returned
Public libraries 15 15 100% 10 66.7%
Special libraries (Public) 497 55 11.0% 30 54.5%
Special libraries (Private) 93 40 43.0% 10 25.0%
Total 605 110 18.2% 50 45.5%
(* Source: National Library of Malaysia, 2008)
3.5.2 Reliability of the Measurement
A research instrument must be evaluated in terms of reliability and validity (Kerlinger,
1986). Reliability refers to the extent to which the measures give consistent results and
can be improved via a pretest or a pilot test. Cronbach’s alpha was used to evaluate the
consistency of the responses for each item within the instrument. Cronbach's alpha is an
index of reliability associated with the variation accounted for by the true score of the
underlying construct. The construct is a hypothetical variable that is being measured
(Hatcher, 1994). Alpha coefficient value from 0 to 1 and may be used to describe
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internal consistency, the reliability of factors extracted from dichotomous (i.e.
questions with two possible answers) and multi-point formatted questionnaires or scales
(e.g. with a rating scale: 1 = poor, 5 = excellent). A commonly-accepted rule of thumb
is that an Alpha (α) of 0.7 indicates acceptable reliability, and 0.8 or higher indicates
good reliability. The goal in designing a reliable instrument is for scores on similar
items to be related (internally consistent), but for each to contribute some unique
information as well (Nunnally, 1978; Akuezuilo and Agu, 2002; and Vaus, 2004).
Cronbach alpha values for the various items of the instrument used in this research are
shown in Table 3.9. The five components for ISec safeguarding measures in libraries
used in this research have Cronbach alpha values in the .70 to .80 range. ISec policy is
shown to have the highest reliability as alpha is .844, whereas procedures and controls
is shown to have the lowest reliability as alpha at .689. This reliability value provide
statistically sound justification for continuing to use all the research items for the real
sample, as reliability coefficient of .70 or higher is considered acceptable in most social
science research situations (Nunnally, 1978; Akuezuilo and Agu, 2002; and Vaus,
2004).
Table 3.9: Cronbach’s Alpha Scores for the Various Items in the Survey Instrument.
Section Themes of Items on Survey Cronbach’s
Alpha (Pilot
Test)
1 Type of ISec incidents experienced by my academic
library in the last six months
.940
2a Presence of technological countermeasures in my
academic library
.699
2b Presence of ISec policies in my academic library .844
2c Presence of ISec procedures and controls in my academic
library
.689
2d Presence of ISec administrative tools and methods in my
academic library
.705
2e Presence of ISec awareness creation in my academic
library
.755
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3.6 Data Collection
In this research, survey is adopted for data collection procedure due to economy of
design and the rapid turn-around in data collection. Judging from the relatively new
issues of ISec management in libraries, many librarians may have difficulty in
articulating their own responses. As indicated by Suhazimah (2007), asking respondents
to give their response about scenarios or statements, based on their individual, attitude
and the practices in an organisation will invite higher and better quality response.
Following Suhazimah’s (2007) approaches, the statements in the questionnaire were
grouped into themes and assessed based on multiple choices and Likert-scale so that the
respondent is prepared to answer with the appropriate mainframe. Since this study was
aimed to answer provide empirical data from natural settings, a self-administrated
survey design was deemed appropriate as it allows the respondents to answer with no
interference from the researcher as well as allowing anonymity, thus encouraging
forthrightness and honesty due to the highly sensitive information involved.
A questionnaire was sent to the individual responsible for the information system, IT or
Information Communication and Technology Division/Unit/Department in an academic
library, such as the Head of ICT Department, ICT Librarian, ICT Manager, ICT Officer
or ICT assistant. The time scope for information pertaining to security incidents and
trainings are limited to the respondents’ experience of the last six months. However,
there is no timeframe reference for other aspects of the study. The respondents only
needed to draw answers from their own beliefs, perceptions and knowledge regarding
prevalent IS security practices of their library.
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However, this method of data collection has the risk of a low response rate and no
assurance that the questions were understood. In order to address the risk of
incomprehensible questions, a pre-test of the questionnaire with an enclosed booklet
that provides a list of definitions of key terms became the mitigating measure. As for
the issue of low response rate, the researcher adopted the strategy of having personal
contact in advance with some respondents and enclosing each questionnaire booklet
with a self-addressed, stamped envelope and a cover letter explaining the purpose of the
study along with the requisite statements that participation was voluntary and that no
personally identifiable information was being gathered.
3.6.1 Data Collection Process
The whole administration of the questionnaire took about four months to complete
(January 2010 until April 2010). The questionnaires were distributed to the targeted
respondents from all academic libraries in Malaysia either by post, hand or e-mail
depending on their locations. The respondents were expected to return the
questionnaires within one to two weeks. Approximately a week after the questionnaires
were sent, some follow-up telephone calls were made and e-mail reminders were sent to
encourage respondents to return the survey questionnaires. Approximately three weeks
after the initial follow-up telephone calls and e-mail reminders were sent, follow-up
emails were sent again thanking those who had already responded and encouraged those
who had not. The bulk of responses were received after three to four weeks of the
questionnaire distribution.
Finally, upon completion of the data collection, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to
ensure internal consistency within the six sections of the survey instrument, those
involving separate questions to determine the overall score within that section based on
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a summation of the individual questions. The five constructs for IS safeguarding
measures in libraries used in the actual research have Cronbach's alphas in the .80 to .90
range, which is considered acceptable (Table 3.10). This reliability values provide
statistically sound justification to use all the research items for the different samples i.e.
for academic libraries, as reliability coefficient of .70 or higher is considered acceptable
in most social science research situations (Nunnally, 1978; Akuezuilo and Agu, 2002;
and Vaus, 2004).
Table 3.10: Cronbach’s Alpha Scores for the Various Items in the Survey Instrument.
Section Themes of Items on Survey Cronbach’s
Alpha (Actual
Study)
1 Type of ISec incidents experienced by my academic library
in the last six months
.958
2a Presence of technological countermeasures in my academic
library
.949
2b Presence of ISec policies in my academic library .867
2c Presence of ISec procedures and controls in my academic
library
.921
2d Presence of ISec administrative tools and methods in my
academic library
.898
2e Presence of ISec awareness creation in my academic
library
.930
3.7 Response Bias
Before proceeding to data analysis, absence of response bias was established. Response
bias is the effect of non-responses on survey estimates (Fowler, 1984). This procedure
examines the scenario that if the non-respondents had responded, their responses would
have substantially changed the overall results of the survey (Suhazimah, 2007). The
non-response analysis may be performed to identify characteristics that may differ
between respondents and non-respondents in order to potentially clear out any bias that
may exist within a dataset. While directly inquiring non-respondents as to the reasons
for not participating in the study would be ideal, it would be unlikely that such non-
participants would respond to further inquiries given their lack of participation in the
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initial inquiry. Another method of assessing non-response bias is to compare early
responders and late responders to the survey. Table 3.11 below displays a means
comparison between the early and late responders. An independent sample t-test was
performed against responses to ten demographic variables. The table illustrates that
there are no significant differences at the .05 level of significance between early and late
respondents.
Table 3.11: T- Test for Non Response Bias
Demographics
Early
respondents
(n=15)
Late
respondents
(n=15)
t-value p-value
Total Number of Staff 2.4000 2.8000 -.972 .348
Number of Staff PCs 2.5333 2.7333 -.400 .695
Types of Operating Systems 4.7333 3.8667 .638 .534
Percentage of IS Security Budget 2.4000 2.0000 .802 .443
Availability of IS Security Staff .8000 1.2000 -1.000 .334
Years in ICT Implementation 2.2667 2.8000 -1.372 .192
Academic Qualification 3.4000 2.9333 1.974 .068
Numbers of IS
Conferences/Workshops/Trainings
Attended
.8667 .5333 -.972 .348
Types of Ownerships 2.0000 1.9333 .193 .849
Types of Universities 1.9333 1.6667 .845 .413
p> .05. 100%
3.8 Data Analysis Strategy
The information from the questionnaire was coded and compiled using Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows Version 17.0 for statistical
computation and evaluation. A range of statistical analysis techniques were used to
capture the descriptive profile of academic libraries, respondents, ISec threats and ISec
practices of the academic libraries. The level of measurement for the quantitative data is
in nominal, ordinal and interval values. The data was analysed using descriptive
statistics (Table 3.12). Descriptive statistics was used to show the distribution process
including frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviations. The descriptive data
was used to present the profile of academic libraries and respondents (individuals
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responsible for IS and IT in the library). Other descriptive statistics included the ISec
breaches, sources of ISec breaches, types of safeguard technological and organisational
measures deployed the libraries. All these present the IS security threats and practices of
Malaysian academic libraries.
Table 3.12: Data Analysis Strategy: Approaches for Solving the Research Questions.
No. Research Questions Approaches
1. What is the IT infrastructures in Malaysian
academic libraries in terms of number of
PC allocations, availability of wireless
connection, type of operating system used,
years of ICT adoption, percentage of IS
security budget and availability of IS
security staff?
Descriptive analysis of number of PCs
allocations for patrons and staff,
availability of wireless connection, type of
operating system used, years of ICT
adoption, percentage of IS security budget
and availability of IS security staff.
2. What are the most common perceived IS
security threats and frequency of their
occurrence in terms of hardware, software,
data, network and human-related threats in
these academic libraries?
Descriptive analysis of hardware threats,
software threats, data threats, network
threats, physical and human-related
threats.
Descriptive analysis of frequency of
occurrence of hardware security threats,
software security threats, data security
threats, network security threats, physical
security threats and human-related threats.
3. What is the most common perceived source
of ISS threats in Malaysian academic
libraries?
Descriptive analysis of the most common
perceived source of ISec threats.
4. What is the level of implementation of
technological measures (in terms of
hardware security, software security,
workstation security, network security,
server security, data security and physical
security measures) in Malaysian academic
libraries?
Descriptive analysis of types and level of
implementation of hardware security,
software security, workstation security,
network security, server security, data
security and physical security measures in
Malaysian academic libraries.
5. Are there significant differences between
academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
the technological measures based on type
of universities, number of staff,  years in
ICT adoption,  yearly ISec budget,
availability of IS security staff and
availability of wireless connection?
Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U
Test for testing the differences between
Malaysian academic libraries in applying
technical measures. The hypothesis was
separated into six sub-hypotheses and
every sub-hypothesis is tested separately.
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Table 3.12: Continued
No. Research Questions Approaches
6. What is the level of implementation of
organisational measures (in terms of
hardware security, software security,
workstation security, network security,
server security, data security and physical
security measures) in Malaysian academic
libraries?
Descriptive analysis of types and levels of
implementation of security policies,
procedures and controls, tools and
methods and awareness activities in
Malaysian academic libraries.
7. Are there significant differences between
academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures based on
universities, number of staff,  years in ICT
adoption, yearly ISec budget, availability of
IS security staff and availability of wireless
connection?
Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U
Test for testing the differences between
Malaysian academic libraries in applying
organisational measures. The hypothesis
was separated into six sub-hypotheses and
every sub-hypothesis is tested separately.
8. What is the overall implementation status
of technological security measures and
organisational security measures in
Malaysian academic libraries?
Descriptive analysis of overall status of
technological measures and organisational
measures based on the proposed library
ISec measures assessment tool for library.
3.9 Instrument to Assess Status of Implementation
Not much is known about the actual scenario of ISec practices specifically in the library
setting. Thus, one cannot assert whether the library sector is lacking or adequate in
information security. As highlighted by Newby (2002), ISec is often under-appreciated
in libraries and this is surprisingly as information is the library’s main business.
Therefore, we attempt to propose an assessment tool for assessing the current ISec
practices deployed by Malaysian libraries in managing their information security. This
assessment tool is designed based on the proposed Library Information Security
Assessment Model (LISAM) to encourage academic libraries to adopt best practices for
ISec measures. It represents a roadmap for the implementation, evaluation and
improvement of IS security practices for a library that adopts it.
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3.9.1 Assessment Tool and Scoring Tool
A scoring tool is designed specifically to determine the overall score for ISec
safeguarding measures in a library as well as a total score for each component of ISec
measures. This tool is an adaptation from the Information Security Governance (ISG)
Assessment Tool for Higher Education. The ISG assessment tool was developed by the
Security Risk Assessment Working Group of the EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Computer and
Network Security Task Force (EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Security Task, 2004).
Tthe ISG assessment tool is meant to be used in higher education context and it can also
be used with the LISAM model. The ISG Assessment Tool for Higher Education was
designed to support the ISG framework recommended by the Corporate Governance
Task Force and has been modified and can be used by institutions of varying sizes and
types to gain a better understanding at a level of the role information security
governance has in their organisations and how it can best be structured. The first section
of the original assessment tool is used to assess an institution of higher education (HIE)
reliance on information technology. The remaining sections are intended to help HIE
determine the maturity of information security governance at a strategic level. The
overall rating (good, needs improvement and poor) is depend on the raw score and an
institution’s reliance on information technology. In contrast, the proposed assessment
tool in this study is created to evaluate the technological and administrative or
organisational components of information security management in an academic library.
This tool is intended for use by an academic library as a whole, although a unit within
an academic library may also use it to help determine the maturity of its individual
information security program.
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(a) Assessing the Overall Implementation Status of Technological Measures
The library’s overall implementation status of technological measures is evaluated by
summing up all the seven sections of the technological components (sections i + ii+ iii +
iv + v + vi + vii), and the summed score should be entered into the corresponding box
(A) on this chart to determine the overall status of technological measures in a library
(Table 3.13).
Table 3.13 Total Score for Technological Measures
TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES Low High Presence
Total Score for Presence of Hardware Security i 0 2 Very Low
3 5 Low
6 10 Medium
11 15 High
16 20 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Software Security ii 0 10 Very Low
11 20 Low
21 40 Medium
41 60 High
61 80 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Workstation Security iii 0 2 Very Low
3 6 Low
7 12 Medium
13 18 High
19 25 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Network Security iv 0 5 Very Low
6 11 Low
12 22 Medium
23 33 High
34 45 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Server Security v 0 6 Very Low
7 12 Low
13 25 Medium
26 37 High
38 50 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Data Security vi 0 9 Very Low
10 18 Low
19 37 Medium
38 55 High
56 75 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Physical Security vii 0 5 Very Low
6 11 Low
12 22 Medium
23 33 High
34 45 Very High
TOTAL SCORE FOR PRESENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL
MEASURES
(Presence of Hardware, Software, Workstation, Network,
Server, Data and Physical Security)
(i+ii+iii+iv+v+vi+vii= A)
A 0 42 Very Low
43 85 Low
86 170 Medium
171 255 High
256 340 Very High
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The ISec measures assessment tool proposes a way to assess the status of technological
measures in a library as illustrated in Table 3.14. The total score for presence of
technological measures (A) is where n is the highest score for the total items in the
technological component (68 items) with each question giving a maximum 5 points. In
this case, the highest score (n) is 340, indicating the presence of technological measure
in a library is very high. The presence of technological measures in a library is
considered high (e₂) if the library’s total scores for technological measures is at 75% of
the full scale score (n). The medium rate (b₂) should be very close to exactly half (50%)
of the full scale score (n). The presence of technological measures in a library is
considered low (c₂) if the library’s total scores for the technological measures is at 25%
of the full scale score (n). The very low rate (d₂) should be very close to exactly half of
c₂, or at 12%-13% of the full scale score (n). The same formula is applied to assess the
presence of each component in the technological measures such as the presence of
hardware, software, workstation, network, server, data and physical security (section i,
ii,  iii, iv, v, vi and vii).
Table 3.14. The Proposed Scale for Assessing the Overall Implementation Status of
Technological Measures
Example Low High Presence
Total score for presence of
technological measures
d₁= d₂x0
[0%]
d₂= c₂/2
[12%]
Very Low
c₁= d₂+1
[13%]
c₂= b₂/2
[25%]
Low
b₁= c₂+1
[25%]
b₂= n/2
[50%]
Medium
e₁= b₂+1
[51%]
e₂= b₂+c₂
[75%]
High
a₁= e₂+1
[76%]
a₂= n
[100%]
Very High
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(b) Assessing the Overall Implementation Status of Organisational Measures
Table 3.15 illustrates that a library’s overall implementation status of organisational
measures is evaluated by summing up all the four sections of the organisational
components (section 1 + 2 + 3 + 4= B), and the summed score should be entered into
the corresponding box (B) on this chart to determine the overall status of organisational
measures in a library.
Table 3.15 Total Score for Presence of Organisational Measures
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURES Low High Presence
Total Score for Presence of Information Security Policy 1 0 7 Very Low
8 15 Low
16 30 Medium
31 45 High
46 60 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Procedures and Controls 2 0 4 Very Low
5 8 Low
9 15 Medium
16 22 High
23 30 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Administrative Tools and
Methods
3 0 2 Very Low
3 6 Low
7 12 Medium
13 18 High
19 25 Very High
Total Score for Presence of Awareness Creation 4 0 6 Very Low
7 13 Low
14 25 Medium
26 37 High
38 50 Very High
TOTAL SCORE FOR PRESENCE OF
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURES (Presence of
Information Security Policy, Procedures, Administrative tools
and Awareness creation)
B
(1+2+3+4 =B)
The same formula for assessing the overall implementation status of technological
measures is applied to assess the presence of each component in the organisational
measures (i.e. section 1, 2, 3 and 4) (Table 3.16). For example, the total score for the
presence of ISec policy in a library (1) is where n is the highest score for the total items
in the ISec policy component (12 items) with each question giving a maximum 5 points.
In this case, the highest score (n) is 60, indicating the presence of ISec policy in a
121
library is very high. The presence of ISec policy in a library is considered high (e₂) if
the library total scores for the technological measures is at 75% of the full scale score
(n). The medium rate (b₂) should be very close to exactly half (50%) of the full scale
score (n). The presence of ISec policy in a library is considered low (c₂) if the library’s
total scores for the ISec policy is at 25% of the full scale score (n). Lastly, the very low
rate (d₂) should be very close to exactly half of c₂, or at 12%-13% of the full scale score
(n).
Table 3.16. The Proposed Scale for Assessing the Total Score for Each Organisational
Component
Example Low High Presence
Total score for presence of ISec
policy
d₁= d₂x0
[0%]
d₂= c₂/2
[12%]
Very Low
c₁= d₂+1
[13%]
c₂= b₂/2
[25%]
Low
b₁= c₂+1
[26%]
b₂= n/2
[50%]
Medium
e₁= b₂+1
[51%]
e₂= b₂+c₂
[75%]
High
a₁= e₂+1
[76%]
a₂= n
[100%]
Very High
ISec measures assessment tool proposes a way to assess the status of organisational
measures in a library as illustrated in Table 3.17. The status of organisational measures
in a library is divided into poor, needs improvement and good implementation of
organisational measures. These three levels of implementation status are further mapped
according to the five different levels of implementation status for the technological
measures. This implies that the actual overall status for organisational measures in a
library is assessed based on the overall status of technological measures.
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Table 3.17 Total Score for Organisational Measures
Status of
Implementation of
Technological
Measures
Total Score for
Presence of
Organisational
Measures
Status of Implementation of
Organisational Measures
Very High 0 90 Poor
91 130 Needs Improvement
131 165 Good
High 0 80 Poor
81 120 Needs Improvement
121 165 Good
Medium 0 70 Poor
71 110 Needs Improvement
111 165 Good
Low 0 60 Poor
61 100 Needs Improvement
101 165 Good
Very Low 0 50 Poor
51 90 Needs Improvement
91 165 Good
For instance, if a library has a very high implementation score for technological
measures, the implementation status of the organisational measures in a library is
considered good if the library’s total score for the presence of organisational measures
is between 131 to 165. However, a library’s overall implementation of organisational
measure is also considered good, if that library’s total score for the presence of
organisational measures is between 101 and 165, as the library has a low score for
technological measures. The total score for the presence of organisational measures (B)
is where N is the highest score for the total items in the organisational component (33
items) with each question giving a maximum of 5 points. In this case, the highest score
(N) is 165. This N score is further prorated into three levels which are poor, needs
improvement and good (see Table 3.18). A higher level of the implementation status of
organisational measures (good) requires a higher total score for the presence of
organisational measures.
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Table 3.18 The Proposed Scale for Assessing the Overall Implementation Status of
Organisational Measures
Status of
Implementation
of
Technological
Measures
Total Score for Presence of
Organisational Measures
Status of
Implementation of
Organisational
Measures
Very High v₁=0 v₂= N-75 Poor
v₃= v₂+1 v₄= N-35 Needs Improvement
V₅= v₄+1 N Good
High h₁=0 h₂= N-85 Poor
h₃= v₂+1 h₄= N-45 Needs Improvement
h₅= v₄+1 N Good
Medium m₁=0 m₂= N-90 Poor
m₃= m₂+1 m₄= N-55 Needs Improvement
m₅= m₄+1 N Good
Low l₁=0 l₂= N-105 Poor
l₃= l₂+1 l₄=N-65 Needs Improvement
l₅= l₄+1 N Good
Very Low w₁=0 w₂= N-115 Poor
w₃= w₂+1 w₄= N-75 Needs Improvement
w₅= w₄+1 N Good
(e) Assessing the Implementation Status of Information Security Measures
Based on this score, the academic library can identify whether its overall organisational
security measures are good, needs improvement or poor as shown in Table 3.19. Later,
from the overall scoring level, an academic library can evaluate or modify the existing
security methods as well as add some new additional security measures at any time
based on its security needs and requirements.
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Table 3.19. Overall Information Systems Safeguarding Measures Assessment Rating
Pre
sen
ce 
of
Te
chn
olo
gic
al
Me
asu
res
To
tal 
Sc
ore
 fo
r
Pre
sen
ce 
of
Or
gan
isa
tio
nal
Me
asu
res
Pre
sen
ce 
of
Or
gan
isa
tio
nal
Me
asu
res
Overall Assessment
Very High 0 90 Poor Poor practices, organisational measures need
immediate attention
91 130 Needs
Improvement
Good practice, but organisational measures need
improvement
131 165 Good Very good practice
High 0 80 Poor Poor practices, organisational measures need
immediate attention
81 120 Needs
Improvement
Good practice, but organisational measures need
improvement
121 165 Good Very good practice
Medium 0 70 Poor Poor practices, technological measures need
improvement and organisational measures need
immediate attention
71 110 Needs
Improvement
Average practice, but organisational measures
need improvement
111 165 Good Good practice, but technological measures need
improvement
Low 0 60 Poor Very poor practices, technological measures and
organisational measures need urgent attention
61 100 Needs
Improvement
Poor practices, technological measures and
organisational measures need immediate attention
101 165 Good Poor practices, technological measures need
immediate attention
Very Low 0 50 Poor Very poor practices, technological measures and
organisational measures need urgent attention
51 90 Needs
Improvement
Poor practices, technological measures and
organisational measures need immediate attention
91 165 Good Poor practices, technological measures need
immediate attention
(n=1)
3.10 Chapter Summary
The chapter discusses the methodology that was used as the determining approaches
toward meeting the research purpose and answering the research questions. Firstly, the
research purposes, research questions and research hypotheses were listed, and then the
framework of the study was proposed. The research model presented was the reference
point of the research method and design adopted in the study. Research design chosen,
methods and techniques used were then explained. Based on the literature, the type of
IS security threats and countermeasures were listed and an instrument for assessing the
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countermeasures was developed. Consequently, in the process, the instrument of the
study was developed and later pre-tested and piloted. In order to make the instrument of
this research correct and reliable, the researcher checked and confirmed the reliability
and validity of the instrument based on the results of the pilot survey and actual survey.
Finally, the strategy for data collection was discussed, whereby a self-administrated
mail survey was to be deployed. Analysis of the data would include using statistical
analysis software package SPSS Version 17.0. Descriptive analysis would be used to
answer the research questions. The next two chapters are the highlight of the research
where findings and analyses of the empirical evidences would be presented and
discussed.
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Chapter Four
________________________________________________________
Postures and the Perceived Information Security Threats in Malaysian
Academic Libraries
5.0 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is the presentation of descriptive findings of an ISec survey
conducted at Malaysian academic libraries. It explains the perceived ISec threats and
the ISec practices generally adopted in these libraries. This chapter will answer
Research Questions 1, 2 and 3 as articulated in the Chapter One.
At first, general information about survey distribution information and subsequent data
collection results are presented. Section 4.2 then describes the demographic profiles of
the respondents and the academic libraries they represent. Section 4.3 presents the ISec
landscape of Malaysian academic libraries. It includes descriptive statistics profiles of
perceived ISec threats, their frequency of occurrences as well as the origin of these
security incidents experienced by these participating academic libraries.
4.4 Description of  Survey and Data Collection Results
Academic libraries in Malaysia are generally referred to as a library that is attached to
academic institutions, such as public universities, private universities and university
colleges. Public universities in Malaysia are fully-funded by the Government and are
governed as self-managed institutions. Private universities include locally established
universities and branches campuses of foreign universities. The private universities and
university colleges are mostly run by the private sector to provide tertiary education to
school-leavers.
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In this study, a total of 57 sets of printed questionnaires were distributed via post to all
57 academic libraries in Malaysia. Participants from these academic libraries
represented locations across Peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia) and extends to
another region, Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia). A total of 39 participants
completed the survey during the four months of data collection (Jan 2010 until April
2010), for a response rate of 68.4% (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Breakdown of Questionnaire Distributions and Response Obtained
Type of Academic
Libraries
N Distributed Response
Obtained
% of
Returned
Public University 20 20 15 75.0
Private University 22 22 12 54.5
College University 15 15 12 80.0
TOTAL 57 57 39 68.4
These 57 survey invitations incorporated the academic libraries in Malaysia at three
different types of universities, including 20 public universities, 22 private universities
and 15 university colleges (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1. Comparison between Actual and Representation in the Survey
4.5 Descriptive Profiles of the Respondents
The heading “Profiles of Respondents” covers the outcomes of information related to
the background of respondents, comprising: 1) the highest academic qualification of the
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respondents; 2) the respondents’ current position in the academic library; 3) the
respondents’ responsibility for ISec and IS security; 4) the number of IS formal training
attended by the respondents; and 5) the respondents’ perception towards role of IS in
academic libraries.
Table 4.2 summarises the demographic characteristics of respondents. Respondents'
highest academic status ranged from Master’s degree to diploma. Most of the
respondents had Bachelor’s degrees (64.1%) and none of them had Doctorate degrees.
This table also reveals that forty percent of respondents with Master’s degrees worked
in academic libraries in public universities. These findings may illustrate the growing
need and supports for continuing education for librarians in public universities as
compared with other academic libraries.
Table 4.2. Information Systems Staff Profile by Type of Academic Libraries
Characteristics
Type of Academic Library at
n (%)Public
university
Private
university
University
college
Highest academic
qualification
Diploma 2 (13.3) 2 (16.7) 1 (8.3) 5 (12.8)
Bachelor’s degree 7 (46.7) 9 (75.0) 9 (75.0) 25 (64.1)
Master’s degree 6 (40.0) 1 (8.3) 2 (16.7) 9 (23.1)
Current position
in academic
library
IT Assistant 1 (6.7) 2 (16.7) 1 (8.3) 4 (10.3)
IT Officer/Info Systems
Officer 3 (20.0) 1 (8.3) 1 (8.3) 5 (12.8)
Librarian/Library Executive 6 (40.0) 5 (41.7) 6 (50.0) 17 (43.6)
Automation librarian 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3) 1 (8.3) 2 (5.1)
Senior librarian 1 (6.7) 1 (8.3) 1 (8.3) 3 (7.7)
Head of Automation
Department 3 (20.0) 2 (16.7) 2 (16.7) 7 (17.9)
Chief librarian/Deputy Chief
Librarian 1 (6.7) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (2.6)
129
Table 4.2. Continued.
Characteristics
Type of Academic Library at n (%)Public
university
Private
university
University
college
Responsibility for
ISec and IS security No 2 (13.3) 4 (33.3) 7 (58.3) 13 (33.3)Yes 13 (86.7) 8 (66.7) 5 (41.7) 26 (66.7)
Number of ISec
Formal Training
Attended
None 7 (46.7) 6 (50.0) 9 (75.0) 22 (56.4)
1 4 (26.7) 4 (33.3) 2 (16.7) 10 (25.6)
2 3 (20.0) 1 (8.3) 1 (8.3) 5 (12.8)
3 1 (6.7) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (2.6)
4 or more 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3) 0 (.0%) 1 (2.6)
Perception towards
Role of IS in
Academic Libraries
IS serve an important role,
but are not critical to our
library 4 (26.7)
3 (25.0) 3 (25.0) 10 (25.6)
IS are critical to our library 11 (73.3) 9 (75.0) 9 (75.0) 29 (74.4)
The targeted respondents represent individuals who are responsible for ISec in their
respective libraries, at the senior management, middle management or the operational
level positions. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the respondents by their positions in
academic libraries. The majority (90%) was from the management division, which
include the Librarians or Library Executives (43.6%), Heads of Automation Unit
(17.9%), IT Officers or IS Officers (12.8%), Senior Librarians (7.7%), Automation
Librarians (5.1%) and Chief Librarians or Deputy Chief Librarians (2.6%). The
remaining ten percent of the respondents were operational staffs (i.e. IT assistants). This
breakdown implies that the results from the survey captured perception and knowledge
from various key individuals in the academic libraries.
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Figure 4.2 Distributions of Respondents by Positions in Academic Libraries
In term of responsibility for ISec and IS security, a majority of respondents (66.7%)
indicated that they were responsible for ensuring security of information and IS in their
respective academic libraries (Table 4.3). This finding again enhances credibility of the
responses given on the perception and knowledge about the various type of IS security
threats as well as the extent of IS security measures being adopted in their libraries. The
results show that libraries in public and private universities have more librarians to
oversee their ISec and IS security than libraries in university colleges. The smaller
figure for university colleges may be due to the smaller library collection and thus. The
libraries need only a small number of librarians or staff.
Table 4.3 highlights the proportion of respondents who are responsible for ISec and IS
security, indicating that they are librarians or library executives, Head of Automation
Department, IT Officer or IS Officers, Automation librarians, Senior Librarians as well
as IT Assistants. This situation demonstrated how the responsibility for ISec and IS
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security was placed on the shoulders of staff within a library regardless of position as
people are the key to a secure organisation. As frequently quoted in the literature, “ISec
is not the sole responsibility of just one ISec Officer but it is the responsibility of
everyone in an organisation” (Qayoumi and Woody, 2005). In some academic libraries,
the responsibility for ISec and IS security was given to fellow staff within IT
departments or units in their respective universities.
Table 4.3. Information Security and IS Security Responsibilities in Academic Libraries
Responsible for
info security and
info systems
security
Current position in library
Total
IT
Assistant
IT
Officer/
Info
Systems
Officer
Librarian/
Library
Executive
Automation
librarian
Senior
librarian
Head of
Automation
Department
Chief
librarian/
Deputy
Chief
Librarian
No Count 2 1 5 0 2 2 1 13
% within
Current
position
50.0% 20.0% 29.4% .0% 66.7% 28.6% 100.0% 33.3%
Yes Count 2 4 12 2 1 5 0 26
% within
Current
position
50.0% 80.0% 70.6% 100.0% 33.3% 71.4% .0% 66.7%
Total Count 4 5 17 2 3 7 1 39
% within
Current
position
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 4.2 testifies that half of the respondents (56.4%) have not received any formal
trainings and only less than five percent of them revealed that they have attended four
or more formal training sessions in ISec and IS security in the last two years. It is
apparent that these individuals did not receive adequate training to assist them in their
roles as individuals who are responsible for ISec and IS security. Staff awareness and
training are often considered key to successful IS security processes which are to impart
the knowledge and skills needed to defend their systems (Smith and Jamieson, 2005).
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4.5.1 Academic Libraries’ Profiles
This section discusses the background information of participating academic libraries
such as; 1) the academic libraries’ ownerships; 2) the numbers of staff in academic
libraries; 3) the number of patrons in academic libraries; 4) the availability of IS
security staff in academic libraries; 5) the IT infrastructures in academic libraries; and.
6) the percentage of IS security budget in academic libraries.
There are almost equal representation of libraries from public universities (38.5%),
private universities (30.8%) and university colleges (30.8%) in this survey. As
highlighted in Table 4.4, all academic libraries in public universities in Malaysia in this
study are owned by the government, whereas ninety-two percent of academic libraries
in private universities and eighty-three percent of academic libraries in university
colleges, respectively, are owned by private organisations.
Table 4.4 Profile of Academic Libraries
Characteristics
Type of Academic Library n (%)Public
university
Private
university
University
college
Library
Ownership
Government 15 (100.0) 0 (.0%) 2 (16.7) 17 (43.6)
Private 0 (.0%) 11 (91.7) 10 (83.3) 21 (53.8)
Non-profit 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3) 0 (.0%) 1 (2.6)
Number of Staff ‹10 0 (.0%) 2 (16.7) 6 (50.0) 8 (20.5)
10 - 50 3 (20.0) 7 (58.3) 5 (41.7) 15 (38.5)
51- 100 5 (33.3) 2 (16.7) 1 (8.3) 8 (20.5)
101 - 190 4 (26.7) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 4 (10.3)
› 191 2 (20.0) 1 (8.3) 0 (.0%) 3 (7.8)
Estimate Number
of Patrons
‹ 500 0 (.0%) 3 (25.0) 4 (33.3) 7 (17.9)
500- 1000 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3) 1 (8.3) 2 (5.1)
1001 -5 000 3 (20.0) 2 (16.7) 4 (33.3) 9 (23.1)
› 5 000 12 (80.0) 6 (50.0) 3 (25.0) 21 (53.8)
Availability of IS
Security Staff
No 5 (33.3) 7 (58.3) 5 (41.7) 17 (43.6)
Yes 10 (66.7) 5 (41.7) 7 (58.3) 22 (56.4)
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It is apparent that academic libraries in public universities have more staff than
academic libraries in university colleges. However, there was no significant difference
between the type of academic libraries and the number of patrons, as many academic
libraries both in public and private universities reported to have over 5,000 patrons. One
factor could be due to the fact that academic libraries serve both internal as well as
remote patrons, including their faculty members, staff, undergraduate students,
postgraduate students, alumni, private individuals or members of other academic
institutions and unaffiliated users.
More than half (56.4%) of academic libraries answered that they have dedicated staff
assigned for IS security-related jobs. These findings demonstrate some positive progress
and concerns regarding security of IS in these academic libraries, even though some
academic libraries are still lagging in terms of assigning dedicated staff for ISec roles.
(a) The Information Technology Infrastructures in Academic Libraries
General background on IT infrastructures at Malaysian academic libraries are derived
through five questions regarding the number of staff’s personal computers (PCs),
number of patrons’ PCs, availability of wireless connection, type of operating system
used and years of  ICT implementation in these libraries. As can be seen from the table
4.5, a majority of academic libraries (41.0%) provide adequate PCs for their staff and
the ratio is one PC for every single library staff (Table 4.5). As compared to academic
libraries in university colleges, academic libraries in public universities provide more
computers to their staff.
134
Table 4.5 shows that majority of the academic libraries (59.0%) provide less than 100
PCs for their patrons. These may be due to the fact that patrons are allowed to use their
own laptops inside the library building and connect their laptops to the Internet using
the free wireless connections.
Table 4.5. IT Infrastructures by Type of Academic Library.
Characteristics
Type of Academic Library n (%)
Public
university
Private
university
University
college
Number of
staff’s PCs
Less than 10 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3) 6 (50.0) 7 (17.9)
Between 10 and 50 4 (26.7) 8 (66.7) 4 (33.3) 16 (41.0)
Between 51 and 100 5 (33.3) 2 (16.7) 2 (16.7) 9 (23.1)
Between 101 and
190 2 (13.3) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (5.1)
More than 191 4 (26.7) 1(8.3) 0 (.0%) 5 (12.8)
Number of
patrons’ PCs Less than 100
4(26.7) 9 (75.0) 10 (83.3) 23 (59.0)
Between 101 and
200
2 (13.3) 1(8.3) 1(8.3) 4 (10.3)
Between 201 and
300
8 (53.3) 2(16.7) 1(8.3) 11 (28.8)
More than 300 1(6.7) 0(.0%) 0(.0%) 1 (2.6)
Availability of
Wireless
Connection
Currently piloting 1(6.7) 0(.0%) 2 (16.7) 3 (7.7)
Yes 14 (93.3) 12 (100.0) 10 (83.3) 36 (92.3)
Operating
system
Windows 8 (53.3) 8 (66.7) 8 (66.7) 24 (61.5)
Windows and Linux 5 (33.3) 1 (8.3) 2 (16.7) 8 (20.5)
Windows and Other 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3) 1 (8.3) 2 (5.1)
Windows and Unix
Variance 1 (6.7) 2 (16.7) 0 (.0%) 3 (7.7)
Windows, Linux and
Unix Variance 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3) 1 (2.6)
Windows, Linux,
Unix Variants and
Mac OS X 1 (6.7) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 1(2.6)
Years of ICT
implementation
Less than 5 years 1 (6.7) 1 (8.3) 2 (16.7) 4 (10.3)
5 years to 10 years 6 (40.0) 5 (41.7) 7 (58.3) 18 (46.2)
10 years to 15 years 5 (33.3) 6 (50.0) 3 (25.0) 14 (35.9)
More than 19 years 3 (20.0) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 3 (7.7)
It is interesting to note that almost all academic libraries (92.3%) in this study provide
wireless services to their patrons and only three (7.7%) academic libraries are currently
piloting the services. This appears that academic libraries in Malaysia are taking
advantage of the many benefits offered by the wireless data communication. By
deploying wireless technology, college and university administrators can save on wiring
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the buildings as well as for the continuous maintenance costs (Foster, 1996). It is also
believed that the mobility offered by wireless networks could provide better services in
fulfilling the computing needs and habits of students and faculty members than the
traditional wired version (Foster, 1996).
This study revealed that Windows is the most popular operating system used in these
academic libraries especially on the desktops and it is often used interchangeably with
other operating systems including Linux, Unix Variance, Solaris and Max OS x.
Approximately 46% of the academic libraries surveyed have five to ten years
experience in using ICT and only three (20.0%) public university libraries have
implemented ICT since more than 19 years ago. These findings illustrate that academic
libraries in Malaysia have sufficient years of experience in development and
implementation of ICT to be relevant for this study and permit the assessment of their
IS security threats and the common practices to ensure IS security in these libraries are
in place.
(b) Information Security Budget in Academic Libraries
Academic libraries (36%) in this study receive between 1% to 3% budget for IS
security of their overall library general budgets and only three (27.3%) public university
libraries obtained higher budget allocation (i.e. more than 5%) than the other academic
libraries (Table 4.6). This situation indicates that the academic libraries in this study
seem to receive limited funds for IS security. It is interesting to study how these
academic libraries achieve a balance between limited funds and the implementation of
necessary ISec protection to best meet their security needs.
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Table 4.6. Percentage of Information Systems Security Budget in Academic Libraries
Characteristics
Type of Academic Library n
(%)Public
university
Private
university
University
college
Percentage of IS
Security budget of the
library general budget
Less than 1% 1 (9.1) 3 (25.0) 4 (44.4) 8 (25.0)
Between 1% to 3% 3 (27.3) 5 (41.7) 3 (33.3) 11 (34.4)
Between 4% to 5% 4 (36.4) 3 (25.0) 2 (22.2) 9 (28.1)
More than 5% 3 (27.3) 1 (8.3) 0 (.0%) 4 (12.5)
4.3 Perceived Information Security Threats and Source of Threats in Malaysian
Academic Libraries
This section provides background information to the information security (ISec) of
Malaysian academic libraries from the aspect of IS security threats and their origin of
attacks that these libraries must cope with. The statistical findings related to the
perceived security threats challenging IS in Malaysian Academic Libraries are also
presented and discussed.
4.3.4 Perceived Information Security Threats in Malaysian Academic Libraries
Figure 4.3 provides information on the most common IS security threats experienced by
the participating academic libraries during a period of six months. Based on the
respondents’ opinions, hardware security threats are indicated as the most common
security threats in academic libraries (70.0%). The second highest threats in Malaysian
academic libraries are from ‘other threats’ or ‘human-related threats’ components
(66.0%), which include employee misconduct or human errors. Deloitte Global TMT
Security Survey 2009 also reported the same results; where forty-one percent of
respondents in this survey experienced at least one internal security breach in 12 months
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2009). The next most frequent threats are physical facilities
and environmental threats such as fire, flood, storm, earthquakes, lightning and power
supply failure. Unsurprisingly, the academic libraries in this study reported slightly
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lower occurrence of software security threats, network security threats and data security
threats.
Figure 4.3.  Information System Security Threats Experienced by Academic Libraries in
Malaysia (Jan’10- Apr’10).
(a) Hardware Security Threats
Table 4.7 illustrates the type of hardware security threats in the participating academic
libraries. Hardware maintenance errors are found to be the most commonly (87.2%)
reported by these academic libraries. It is noted that regular maintenance is necessary to
eliminate hardware failure errors and implications of maintenance errors can cause far
greater harm for the hardware. The next most threatening to hardware elements are the
failure of communication equipments (79.5%), electromagnetic interference (78.9%)
followed by malware and malicious code attacks including virus, worm, Trojan horse,
logic bombs and trapdoor (71.8%). Additionally, these academic libraries also
associated hardware security threats with theft, physical sabotage, vandalism of ICT
hardware equipments (66.7%). This is parallel with a security report on the major
breaches in healthcare data security in the United States, which also revealed that theft
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of computers and data storage devices account for 56% of all breaches, with stolen
laptops leading the pack and lost hardware accounting for another 6% (Lowes and
Robert, 2010).
Table 4.7. Hardware Security Threats Experienced by Academic Libraries in Malaysia.
No. Hardware Threats n %
1. Maintenance errors 34 87.2
2. Failure of communication equipments 31 79.5
3. Electromagnetic interference 30 78.9
4. Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan horse,
logic/time bombs, trapdoor) e.g. making it impossible to boot the
computer.
28 71.8
5. Theft, physical sabotage, vandalism of ICT hardware equipments 26 66.7
6. Installation/ use of unauthorised hardware 25 64.1
7. Hardware/ equipments failure 24 61.5
(b) Software Security Threats
Table 4.8 displays information on software security threats experienced by the
participating academic libraries. Software maintenance errors have been reported as the
most regular threat (69.2%) followed by corruption by system, program or system errors
(64.1%) and installation or use of unauthorised software (61.5%). In addition, these
academic libraries also experience adware and spyware threats (51.3%), hacking or
unauthorised access (51.3%), malware threats (46.2%) and abuse access control
(38.5%). The least likely software threats to the libraries were software piracy (38.5%),
use of library Internet for illegal activities (38.5%), weak passwords (38.5%), password
attacks (35.9%), unauthorised changes to software settings (35.9%), cyber-terrorism
(30.8%) and user abuses (30.8%).
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Table 4.8. Software Security Threats Experienced by Academic Libraries in Malaysia.
No. Software Threats n %
1. Maintenance errors 27 69.2
2. Corruption by system,Program/system errors or failure of system
software
25 64.1
3. Installation/ Use of unauthorised programmes or software 24 61.5
4. Adware and Spyware 20 51.3
5. Hacking/Intrusion/ unauthorised access to system resources 20 51.3
6. Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan horse, logic/time
bombs, trapdoor) e.g. program crashes, repeated error messages or
periodically reboot your system.
18 46.2
7. Abuse of computer access control 16 41.0
8. Software piracy 15 38.5
9. Use of library Internet for illegal or illicit communications or activities
(e.g. surfing for pornography and e-mail harassment)
15 38.5
10. Weak passwords 15 38.5
11. Password attacks/sniffing/stealing 14 35.9
12. Unauthorised changes to software settings 14 35.9
13. Cyber-terrorism 12 30.8
14. User abuse/fraud 12 30.8
(c)  Network Security Threats
Table 4.9 highlights the type of network security threats faced by academic libraries in
this study. IP address spoofing or IP spoofing, re-routing messages and use of weak
passwords have been reported as the most frequent attacks in these libraries (46.2%).
Many network attacks were due to weak passwords, hacking or intrusion and packing
sniffs, transmission errors (41.0%), password attacks (38.5%), probes and scans
(38.5%), malware and malicious code (33.3%) and session hijacking (30.8%).
Other network threats that are less frequently faced by academic libraries include
website defacement (28.2%), wiretapping (25.6%), wireless network breaches (25.6%),
spams (23.1%), zombie networks (23.1%) and denial of service attacks (20.5%). These
findings are parallel with a report by Malaysian Cybersecurity, which indicates that
incidents caused by denial of service attacks are becoming much lesser, however,
system or network administrators should not take these attacks for granted
(CyberSecurity Malaysia, 2010).
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Table 4.9. Network Security Threats Experienced by Academic Libraries in Malaysia.
No. Network Threats n %
1. IP spoofing attacks 18 46.2
2. Misrouting/re-routing of messages 18 46.2
3. Weak password 18 46.2
4. Hacking/ Intrusion/ unauthorised access 17 43.6
5. Packing sniffs 17 43.6
6. Transmission errors 16 41.0
7. Password attacks/sniffing/stealing 15 38.5
8. Probes and scans or unauthorised access to computers, data, services and
applications
15 38.5
9. Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan horse, logic/time
bombs, trapdoor) e.g. losses associated with the network downtime
or lowered network speed.
13 33.3
10. Session hijacking 12 30.8
11. Website defacement 11 28.2
12. Eavesdropping/ wiretapping 10 25.6
13. Wireless network breach 10 25.6
14. E-mail attacks /spams/ fraud 9 23.1
15. Zombie networks 9 23.1
16. Denial of service attacks (DoS) 8 20.5
(d)     Data Security Threats
Table 4.10 ranks the most common data security threats experienced by academic
libraries in Malaysia. These participating academic libraries received an overwhelming
numbers of threats on social engineering, loss of patron data and phishing or pharming.
The next most common data incidents involved exposure of patrons sensitive data
through web attacks, malware attacks (46.2% respectively), destruction due to natural
disaster (43.6%), unauthorised access (43.6%) and data loss due to wrong procedures of
updating or backup (41.0%). Additionally, data residing in the academic libraries’ IS
are also exposed to risks of delay in updating or dissemination, unauthorised transfer of
data, data manipulation, password attacks, data diddling, masquerading of user identity,
unauthorised data copying, unauthorised modifications of data and theft of proprietary
data. These 17 types of data threats might cause disturbances to these academic libraries
if they remain untreated.
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Table 4.10. Data Security Threats Experienced by Academic Libraries in Malaysia.
No. Data Threats n %
1. Impersonation/ social engineering 19 48.7
2. Loss of patron data/privacy ideas 19 48.7
3. Phishing/ pharming 19 48.7
4. Exposure of patrons sensitive data through web attack 18 46.2
5. Malware and Malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan horse, logic/time
bombs and trapdoor) e.g. destroy your data  or wipe your hard drives
clean
18 46.2
6. Destruction due to natural disaster etc. 17 43.6
7. Unauthorised access 17 43.6
8. Data loss due to wrong procedures of updating/storage/backup etc. 16 41.0
9. Delay in updating/dissemination 15 38.5
10. Unauthorised transfer of data 15 38.5
11. Data manipulation 14 35.9
12. Password attacks/sniffing/stealing 14 35.9
13. Data diddling (Changing data with malicious intent before or during input
into the system)
12 30.8
14. Masquerading of user identity 12 30.8
15. Unauthorised data copying 12 30.8
16. Unauthorised/accidental disclosure/modifications/alteration of data 12 30.8
17. Theft of proprietary data 10 25.6
(e) Physical Security Threats
Table 4.11 indicates that unauthorised access into the library building, leaking and theft
or vandalism is ranked as the highest occurring threats in the participating academic
libraries. It seems that unauthorised access into library building may be regarded as a
very serious offence as it might cause other related offences including theft, sabotage
and vandalism. Among the six physical incidents listed, failure of electricity, air-
conditioning or water utility are considered as the least physical threatening to these
academic libraries as compared to the other common threats caused by fire, flood, storm
or lightning and hazardous materials.
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Table 4.11. Percentage of Physical Security Threats Experienced by Academic Libraries
in Malaysia (Jan’10- Apr’10).
No. Physical Threats n %
1. Intrusion/unauthorised access into library building 17 43.6
2. Leaking 17 43.6
3. Theft, burglary, sabotage, vandalism or physical intrusions 14 41.0
4. Natural calamity (e.g. fire, flood, storm, earthquakes or lightning) 15 38.5
5. Hazardous material accident 12 30.8
6. Power supply failure (e.g. electricity, air-conditioning, water utility) 9 23.1
(f)   Human Related Threats
Human errors including data entry errors or carelessness (79.5%), employee
misconducts (71.8%) and unfaithful patrons (69.2%) are regarded as the most
dangerous human-related security threats to these academic libraries (Table 4.12).
These findings correspond to an audit report, which indicated that the biggest data
threats come from careless employees who do not properly secure the data they are
responsible for (Bosworth, 2006). In addition to these, the academic libraries are also
facing threats such as online extortion, social engineering and unfaithful staff. These
discoveries are consistent with the Ernst and Young’s 12th annual global ISec survey
results, which reported that authorised users and employees pose the greatest security
threat to an organisation (Ernst and Young, 2009).
Table 4.12. Human Related Threats Experienced by Academic Libraries in Malaysia.
No. Human Related Threats n %
1. Human errors (data entry errors or carelessness) 31 79.5
2. Employee misconduct 28 71.8
3. Unfaithful patrons 27 69.2
4. Online extortion 24 61.5
5. Social engineering 22 56.4
6. Unfaithful staff 22 56.4
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4.3.5 Occurrence of Information Security Threats in Malaysian Academic
Libraries
This section covers the frequency of occurrence of each IS security threat based on the
following choices:  never, very rarely, sometimes and always.
(a) Frequencies of Hardware Security Threats
The majority of respondents believed that hardware security threats due to maintenance
errors (43.6%), failure of communication equipments or services (64.1%),
electromagnetic interference (63.2%), malware and malicious code (35.9%) as well as
theft or vandalism of ICT hardware equipments (48.7%) very rarely occurred (Table
13). On the other hand, a majority of respondents also believed that use of unauthorised
hardware and equipments failure never happened before in their libraries. The minority
of respondents believed that attacks from virus or Trojan horse, maintenance errors,
electromagnetic interference, use of unauthorised hardware and equipment failure
always occurred in their libraries.
Table 4.13: Frequencies of Hardware Security Threats
No. Hardware Security Threats
Frequencies of  Hardware Security Threats
Never Veryrarely Sometimes Always
1. Maintenance errors 5(12.8%)
17
(43.6%)
16
(41.0%)
1
(2.6%)
2. Failure of communicationequipments and services
8
(20.5%)
25
(64.1%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
3. Electromagneticinterference
8
(21.1%)
24
(63.2%)
5
(13.2%)
1
(2.6%)
4.
Malware and malicious
code (e.g. virus, worm,
Trojan horse, logic/time
bombs, trapdoor) e.g.
making it impossible to
boot the computer.
11
(28.2%)
14
(35.9%)
8
(20.5%)
6
(15.4%)
5.
Theft, physical sabotage,
vandalism of ICT hardware
equipments
13
(33.3%)
19
(48.7%)
7
(17.9%)
0
(0.0%)
6. Installation/ use ofunauthorised hardware
14
(35.9%)
12
(30.8%)
12
(30.8%)
1
(2.6%)
7. Hardware/ equipmentfailure
15
(38.5%)
14
(35.9%)
9
(23.1%)
1
(2.6%)
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(b) Frequencies of Software Security Threats
It is observed that only a small number of respondents indicated that failure of system
software (5.1%), adware and spyware (7.7%), virus attacks (7.7%), abuse of computer
access control (2.6%), weak passwords (5.1%) and cyber-terrorism (7.7%) always
happened in their academic libraries (Table 4.14). The majority of respondents claimed
that these software security threats never happened before in their libraries. However,
among various types of software security incidents, 28% of respondents reported that
corruption by system, system errors or failure of system software sometimes occurred in
their libraries.
Table 4.14. Frequencies of Software Security Threats
No. Software Security Threats
Frequencies of  Software Security Threats
Never Veryrarely Sometimes Always
1. Maintenance errors 19
(48.7%)
12
(30.8%)
8
(20.5%)
0
(0.0%)
2. Corruption by system, system errors or failure of
system software
14
(35.9%)
12
(30.8%)
11
(28.2%)
2
(5.1%)
3. Installation/Use of unauthorised programmes or
software
15
(38.5%)
14
(35.9%)
10
(25.6%)
0
(0.0%)
4. Adware and Spyware 19
(48.7%)
11
(28.2%)
6
(15.4%)
3
(7.7%)
5. Hacking/ Intrusion/ unauthorised access to system
resources
20
(51.3%)
15
(38.5%)
4
(10.3%)
0
(0.0%)
6. Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm,
Trojan horse, logic/time bombs, trap door) e.g.
program crashes, repeated error messages or
periodically reboot your system.
21
(53.8%)
9
(23.1%)
6
(15.4%)
3
(7.7%)
7. Abuse of computer access control 23(59.0%)
9
(23.1%)
6
(15.4%)
1
(2.6%)
8. Software piracy 24(61.5%)
10
(25.6%)
5
(12.8%)
0
(0.0%)
9. Use of library Internet for illegal or illicit
communications or activities (e.g. porn surfing, e-
mail harassment)
24
(61.5%)
8
(20.5%)
7
(17.9%)
0
(0.0%)
10. Weak passwords 24(61.5%)
7
(17.9%)
6
(15.4%)
2
(5.1%)
11. Password attacks/sniffing/stealing 25(64.1%)
8
(20.5%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
12. Unauthorised changes to software settings 25(64.1%)
10
(25.6%)
4
(10.3%)
0
(0.0%)
13. Cyber-terrorism 27(69.2%)
6
(15.4%)
3
(7.7%)
3
(7.7%)
14. User abuse/fraud 27(69.2%)
7
(17.9%)
5
(12.8%)
0
(0.0%)
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(c) Frequencies of Network Security Threats
A minority of respondents (7.7%) expressed belief that mail attacks, spams or frauds
always happened in their libraries, while 23.1% of the respondents noted that these
network security threats occurred very rarely in their workplaces (Table 4.15). Some
respondents in this study believed that IP spoofing attacks (25.6%) and transmission
errors (25.6%) are sometimes threatening their academic libraries’ IS. However, the
majority of respondents firmly believed that website defacement (71.8%),
eavesdropping (74.4%), wireless network breach (74.4%), zombie networks (79.6%)
and denial of service attacks (DoS) (79.5%) never occurred in their libraries.
Table 4.15. Frequencies of Network Security Threats
No. Network Security Threats
Frequencies of  Network Security Threats
Never Veryrarely Sometimes Always
1. IP spoofing attacks 18
(46.2%)
10
(25.6%)
10
(25.6%)
1
(2.6%)
2. Misrouting/re-routing of messages 21
(53.8%)
9
(23.1%)
9
(23.1%)
0
(0.0%)
3. Weak password 18
(46.2%)
10
(25.6%)
9
(23.1%)
2
(5.1%)
4. Hacking/ Intrusion/ unauthorised access 22
(56.4%)
10
(25.6%)
6
(15.4%)
1
(2.6%)
5. Packing sniffs 17
(43.6%)
13
(33.3%)
9
(23.3%)
0
(0.0%)
6. Transmission errors 16
(41.0%)
13
(33.3%)
10
(25.6%)
0
(0.0%)
7. Password attacks/sniffing/stealing 24
(61.5%)
9
(23.1%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
8. Probes and scans or unauthorised access to
computers, data, services and applications
24
(61.5%)
12
(30.8%)
3
(7.7%)
0
(0.0%)
9. Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm,
Trojan horse, logic/time bombs, trapdoor) e.g.
losses associated with the network downtime or
lowered network speed.
15
(38.5%)
13
(33.3%)
9
(23.1%)
2
(5.1%)
10. Session hijacking 27
(69.2%)
8
(20.5%)
4
(10.3%)
0
(0.0%)
11. Website defacement 28
(71.8%)
8
(20.5%)
3
(7.7%)
0
(%)
12. Eavesdropping/ wiretapping 29
(74.4%)
9
(23.1%)
1
(2.6%)
0
(0.0%)
13. Wireless network breach 29
(74.4%)
7
(17.9%)
3
(7.7%)
0
(0.0%)
14. E-mail attacks/spams/fraud 14
(35.9%)
13
(33.3%)
9
(23.1%)
3
(7.7%)
15. Zombie networks 30
(79.6%)
7
(17.9%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
16. Denial of service attacks (DoS) 31
(79.5%)
6
(15.4%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
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(d) Frequencies of Data Security Threats
Table 4.16 reveals that a number of respondents expressed belief that virus attacks
(17.9%), unauthorised access (20.5%), data manipulation (17.9%) and data loss due to
wrong procedures of updating, storage or backup (15.4%) sometimes happened in their
academic libraries. On the other hand, delay in data updating or dissemination (51.3%),
impersonation or social engineering (46.2%), exposure of patrons’ sensitive data
through web attack (43.6%) and destruction due to natural disaster (35.9%) are
considered less threatening to library IS as many respondents indicated that these
incidents very rarely happened in their libraries.
Table 4.16. Frequencies of Data Security Threats
No. Data Security Threats
Frequencies of  Data Security Threats
Never Veryrarely Sometimes Always
1. Impersonation/ social engineering 19
(48.7%)
18
(46.2%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
2. Loss of patron data/privacy ideas 20
(51.3%)
14
(35.9%)
5
(12.8%)
0
(0.0%)
3. Phishing/pharming 20
(51.3%)
13
(33.3%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
4. Exposure of patrons sensitive data through web
attack
18
(46.2%)
17
(43.6%)
4
(10.3%)
0
(0.0%)
5. Malware and Malicious code (e.g. virus, worm,
Trojan horse, logic/time bombs and trapdoor) e.g.
destroy your data  or wipe your hard drives clean)
18
(46.2%)
14
(35.9%)
7
(17.9%)
0
(0.0%)
6. Destruction due to natural disaster etc. 22
(56.4%)
14
(35.9%)
3
(7.7%)
0
(0.0%)
7. Unauthorised access 22
(56.4%)
9
(23.1%)
8
(20.5%)
0
(0.0%)
8. Data loss due to wrong procedures of
updating/storage/backup etc.
23
(59.0%)
10
(25.6%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
9. Delay in updating/dissemination 15
(38.5%)
20
(51.3%)
4
(10.3%)
0
(0.0%)
10. Unauthorised transfer of data 24
(61.5%)
14
(35.9%)
1
(2.6%)
0
(0.0%)
11. Data manipulation 25
(64.1%)
7
(17.9%)
7
(17.9%)
0
(0.0%)
12. Password attacks/sniffing/stealing 25
(64.1%)
12
(30.8%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
13. Data diddling (Changing data with malicious intent
before or during input into the system)
27
(69.2%)
6
(15.4%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
14. Masquerading of user identity 27
(69.2%)
9
(23.1%)
3
(7.7%)
0
(0.0%)
15. Unauthorised data copying 27
(69.2%)
10
(25.6%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
16. Unauthorised/accidental
disclosure/modification/alteration of data
27
(69.2%)
10
(25.6%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
17. Theft of proprietary data 29
(74.4%)
5
(12.8%)
5
(12.8%)
0
(0.0%)
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It is comforting to notice that a majority of respondents believed that theft of proprietary
data (74.4%), data diddling (69.2%), masquerading of user identity (69.2%),
unauthorised data copying (69.2%) and unauthorised disclosure or modification of data
(69.2%) never occurred in their libraries. These results suggest that the low frequency
of occurrence of these data security threats might due to adequacy of implemented
controls in these participating academic libraries.
(e) Frequencies of Physical Security Threats
The results revealed that 20% of respondents indicated that leaks sometimes happened
in their libraries (Table 4.17). Although these results indicate that this threat is not
prevalent in Malaysian academic libraries, serious consideration should be given to
minimise its impact. As indicated by Adekanye (2010), more than half of university
libraries (53.3%) in Nigeria experienced a leaking roof, which resulted in heavy loss of
their vital library resources. About 38% of respondents believed that power supply
failure (including electricity, air-conditioning and water utility failure) very rarely
happened. In contrast, on other 38% respondents claimed that these threats never
happened in their libraries. A vast majority of respondents affirmed that threats due to
intrusion into library building (56.4%), theft or vandalism (43.6%), natural calamity
(including fire, flood, storm, earthquakes or lightning) (61.5%) and hazardous material
accident (69.2%) never occurred in their libraries.
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Table 4.17. Frequencies of Physical Security Threats
No. Physical Security Threats
Frequencies of  Physical Security Threats
Never Veryrarely Sometimes Always
1. Intrusion/ unauthorised access into library
building
22
(56.4%)
11
(28.2%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
2. Leaking 17
(43.6%)
14
(35.9%)
8
(20.5%)
0
(0.0%)
3. Theft, burglary, sabotage and vandalism 17
(43.6%)
16
(41.0%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
4. Natural calamity (e.g. fire, flood, storm,
earthquakes or lightning)
24
(61.5%)
8
(20.5%)
7
(17.9%)
0
(0.0%)
5. Hazardous material accident 27
(69.2%)
10
(25.6%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
6. Power supply failure (e.g. electricity, air-
conditioning, water utility)
15
(38.5%)
15
(38.5%)
9
(23.1%)
0
(0.0%)
(f) Frequencies of Human Related Threats
Table 4.18 shows that only one respondent (2.6%) believed that human errors such as
data entry errors or carelessness always occurred in his academic library, while 7% of
respondents indicated it might happen ‘sometimes’ and a vast percent of other
respondents (69.2%) believed that it never happened in their libraries. Twelve (30.8%)
and eight respondents (20.5%), respectively indicated that ‘unfaithful patrons’ and
‘employee misconduct’ are sometimes threatening their library IS.
Quite a number of respondents expressed their opinion that incidents due to online
extortion (33.3%) and social engineering (41.0%) never occurred in their academic
libraries. This result indicates that circumstances where the possibility of human-related
threats exist in these academic libraries regardless of their size and type.
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Table 4.18. Frequencies of Human Related Threats
No. Human Related Threats Frequencies of Human Related Threats
Never Very  rarely Sometimes Always
1. Human errors (data entry errors or carelessness) 27
(69.2%)
8
(20.5%)
3
(7.7%)
1
(2.6%)
2. Employee misconduct 20
(51.3%)
11
(28.2%)
8
(20.5%)
0
(0.0%)
3. Unfaithful patrons 14
(35.9%)
13
(33.3%)
12
(30.8%)
0
(0.0%)
4. Online extortion 24
(61.5%)
13
(33.3%)
2
(5.1%)
0
(0.0%)
5. Social engineering 17
(43.6%)
16
(41.0%)
6
(15.4%)
0
(0.0%)
6. Unfaithful staff 17
(43.6%)
14
(35.9%)
8
(20.5%)
0
(0.0%)
4.3.3 Sources of Information Security Threats in Malaysian Academic Libraries
This section describes the causes of ISec incidents in Malaysian academic libraries. The
respondents were asked their opinion regarding the most common source of IS security
breaches in their libraries. There are many possible sources of security threats, but as
illustrated in Figure 4.4, a majority of respondents (56.4%) believed that the most usual
source of IS security breaches in their libraries come from hardware and software
failures such as power failure, equipment failure, network failure or system
malfunction.
Interestingly, the other 41% of respondents believed that their library’s IS security
threats usually come from people or human threats, including intentional or
unintentional acts by library staff or patrons. In contrast, none of the respondents
indicated that natural or environmental threats such as fire, flood or earthquake have
given any negative impact on the safety of their IS. Only one respondent (2.6%)
believed that the cause of IS security incidents in his library come from the unknown
source. The results from this study are consistent with findings reported by Samy,
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Rabiah and Zuraini (2009), which indicated that the most critical threats in healthcare IS
are power failure followed by acts of human error and other technological factors.
Figure 4.4. Respondents’ Perception on the Most Common IS Security Threats Sources
in Malaysian Academic Libraries (n=39)
4.4 Chapter Summary
The answers to research questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are presented and discussed in this
Chapter. In summary this chapter indicated the following:
(1) There is low occurrence of software security threats, network security threats
and data security threats in Malaysian academic libraries.
(2) Hardware security threats (70.0%), human-related threats (66.0%) and
environmental threats (51%) are revealed by respondents as the most common
security threats in their academic libraries.
(3) Hardware maintenance errors are found to be the most commonly (87.2%)
reported hardware security threats by these academic libraries.
(4) Software maintenance errors have been reported as the most regular (69.2%) of
the software security threats in these academic libraries.
People or
human threats
(n=16)
Hardware and
software
failures
(n=22)
Unknown
(n=1)
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(5) IP address spoofing or IP spoofing (46.2%), re-routing messages (46.2%) and
use of weak passwords have been reported as the most frequent attacks for
servers in these libraries (46.2%).
(6) Social engineering, loss of patron data and phishing or pharming are found to be
the most common data security threats to these academic libraries.
(7) Intrusion, leaking and theft are ranked as the highest occurring threats in the
participating academic libraries.
(8) Human errors, including data entry errors or carelessness (79.5%), employee
misconduct (71.8%) and unfaithful patrons (69.2%) are regarded as the most
dangerous human-related security threats to these academic libraries.
(9) A majority of respondents also believed that hardware and software failures as
well as intentional or unintentional acts by library staff or patrons (people or
human-related threats) are the root cause of IS security incidents in their
academic libraries.
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Chapter Five
_____________________________________________________
Level of Implementation of Information Security Measures and
Differences in Applying These Measures
5.0 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to provide a descriptive presentation of level of
implementation of information security (ISec) measures in Malaysian academic
libraries. It explains the level of implementation of technological and organisational
measures adopted in these libraries. This chapter answers Research Questions 4, 5, 6, 7
and 8.
Firstly, section 5.1 presents findings related to the extent of technological and
organisational measures deployed by Malaysian academic libraries. This would include
identifying the level of implementation of hardware, software, workstation, network,
server, data and physical security measures in these libraries. Section 5.2 then reveals
findings related to the hypotheses testing on the differences between academic libraries
in Malaysia in applying technological measures based on type of university, years in
ICT implementation, yearly ISec budget, availability of information system security
staff and availability of wireless connection. Section 5.3 describes findings related to
the hypotheses testing on the differences between academic libraries in Malaysia in
applying organisational measures based on type of university, years in ICT
implementation, yearly ISec budget, availability of IS security staff and availability of
wireless connection. Section 5.4 reports on overall implementation status of
technological measures and organisational measures in Malaysian academic libraries
based on the proposed Information Security Measures Assessment Tool for Library.
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5.1 Descriptive Profiles of Level of Implementation of Information
Security Measures in Malaysian Academic Libraries
Using the Organisational Information Security Staircase Model (Hagen, Albrechtsen
and Hovden, 2008) as guidance, this study explores the ISec practices in Malaysian
academic libraries by focusing on technological security and organisational security
measures. This is because the bottom-line for effective security measures would always
need a balance between technological and non-technical measures. Technological
security measures describe the technical IT security measures, whereas the non-
technical measures deal with personnel, security policies, security procedures, security
administrative controls and security awareness initiatives. The study used five
dimensions based on the 5 levels implementation score (1 = Not Implemented to 5 =
Fully Implemented) adapted from the Information Security Measure Benchmark
(Information-technology Promotion Agency, 2008) to assess the presence of
technological security measures and organisational security measures that reflect the
degree of maturity. The implementation index is used to assess which measures or steps
are widely implemented and which measures or steps are least implemented in each
academic library in Malaysia.
5.1.1 Level of Implementation of Technological Security Measures
Technological security measures evaluated in this study relates to the seven technical
mechanism of managing IS security. At the macro level, the seven types of
technological security measures are implemented in the 38 participating Malaysian
academic libraries (1 academic library did not response to questions in Part C), but the
implementation has not been reviewed on regular basis. Table 5.1 shows that server
security measures have the highest total mean score with a statistical mean value of 3.32
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and standard deviation of 0.69. This is because serves are important for the library’s
networks and most of the valuable databases and electronic journals provided by the
libraries are placed on the web, thus they must be protected at many different levels.
Table 5.1. Total Mean Score for Implementation of Technological Measures
Technological  Measures Mean SD
Server security measures 3.32 0.69
Workstation security measures 3.13 0.68
Network  security measures 3.10 0.72
Hardware security measures 3.02 0.74
Physical and environmental security measures 2.92 0.60
Data security measures 2.89 0.67
Software security measures 2.80 0.74
At the micro level, this study used 67 items to evaluate the level of implementation of
technical security countermeasures, including control mechanisms for hardware
security, software security, workstation security, network security, server security, data
security and physical and environmental security. The distribution of responses among
is shown in the following section:
(a) Level of Implementation of Hardware Security Measures
The study used four items to evaluate the level of implementation of hardware security
measures based on Yeh and Chang (2007) and INTOSAI (1995). Table 5.2 shows the
highest mean with statistical mean value of 3.29 and standard deviation of 1.063
represents the use of CCTV, visual camera, magnetic detection system and electronic
anti theft system at strategic places, public computer areas and server areas.
Respondents also believed that their academic libraries have used emergency power
sources and alternative communication lines including the use of alternative telephone
lines or cables and generators (Mean=3.16, SD=0.95). It is apparent that these two
hardware security practices are being implemented in these participating academic
libraries in Malaysia, However, the stages have not been reviewed. Regarding the use of
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locks, security cables, locked cable trays to improve the security of hardware
equipments (Mean=2.87, SD=1.14) and periodical remote mirroring or file mirroring to
backup disk drives (Mean=2.76, SD=1.02), respondents indicated that these security
measures have been implemented but these measures have not been reviewed on regular
basis in their respective academic libraries.
Table 5.2. Level of Implementation of Hardware Security Measures
Items
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CCTV, visual camera, magnetic detection
system and electronic anti theft system at
strategic places, public computer areas
and server areas.
0
(0.0%)
13
(34.2%)
5
(13.2%)
16
(42.1%)
4
(10.5%) 3.29 1.06
Emergency power sources and alternative
communication lines. (e.g. use of
alternative telephone lines or cables and
generators)
1
(0.0%)
9
(23.7%)
13
(34.2%)
13
(34.2%)
2
(5.3%) 3.16 0.95
Locks, security cables, locked cable
trays, metal cages or anchoring devices to
improve the security of hardware
equipments.
5
(13.2%)
11
(28.9%)
7
(18.4%)
14
(36.8%)
1
(2.6%) 2.87 1.14
Periodical remote mirroring or file
mirroring to backup disk drives.
3
(7.9%)
15
(39.5%)
9
(23.7%)
10
(26.3%)
1
(2.6%) 2.76 1.02
Total 9(5.9%)
48
(31.6)
34
(22.4%)
53
(34.8%)
8
(5.3%) 3.02 0.74
(b) Level of Implementation of Software Security Measures
The utilisation of several software security tools at these participating academic
libraries are affirmed through the respondents’ responses as listed in Table 5.3.
Respondents in this survey believed that their academic libraries have used anti spyware
software to detect and remove any spyware threats (Mean=3.39, SD=1.33), anti-
phishing solutions to prevent phishing attacks (Mean=3.00, SD=1.25), cleanup software
to erase files or settings left behind by a user (Mean=3.42, SD=1.11), automated ID
management software (Mean=3.13, SD=1.28), multi-user operating systems and
application software to allow concurrent access by multiple users of a computer
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(Mean=3.00, SD=1.41), and web filtering software to prevent access to inappropriate
materials or sites (Mean=3.03, SD=1.40). However, these software security controls
have never undergone reassessment by these academic libraries.
Next, the respondents agreed that some parts of these software security safeguards were
practiced in their academic but the measures have not been reviewed regularly as
revealed by their responses to these following items: use of desktop security software at
application level and operating level to monitor, restrict usage or disable certain features
of the workstations (Mean=2.84, SD=1.20), use of distribution agents to automate the
process of installing an application or updates to workstations on a network
(Mean=2.84, SD=1.35), use of user entrance log to record and monitor user logs
(Mean=2.89, SD=1.23) and use of systems recovery to repair the library computer
systems after disaster or crash (Mean=2.74, SD=1.13).
The presence of the following software security tools at the participating academic
libraries are affirmed through the respondents’ responses for the use of spam filtering
software to detect the unwanted spam emails (Mean=2.53, SD=1.45), use of timer
software to control the amount of time a patron can use a workstation (Mean=2.50,
SD=1.29), use of rollback software to keep track of any changes made to the computers
(Mean=2.45, SD=1.31), use of menu replacement software to control timeouts, logging
and browsing activities (Mean=2.42, SD=1.18), use of periodical automatic debugging
to remove any defects on software or hardware components (Mean=2.37, SD=1.28) and
use of single sign on system for user authentication to access all computers and systems
(Mean=2.21, SD=1.14).
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Table 5.3. Level of Implementation of Software Security Measures
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Cleanup software to erase files or settings left behind by a
user.
2
(5.3%)
8
(21.1%)
4
(10.5%)
20
(52.6%)
4
(10.5%)
3.42 1.11
Anti spyware software to detect and remove any spyware
threats.
6
(15.8%)
4
(10.5%)
3
(7.9%)
19
(50.0%)
6
(15.8%)
3.39 1.33
ID management software to automate administrative
tasks such as resetting user passwords and enabling users
to reset their own passwords.
4
(10.5%)
11
(28.9%)
4
(10.5%)
14
(36.8%)
5
(13.2%)
3.13 1.28
Web filtering software to prevent access to inappropriate
materials or sites.
8
(21.1%)
8
(21.1%)
1
(2.6%)
17
(44.7%
4
(10.5%)
3.03 1.40
Anti-phishing solutions to prevent phishing attacks. 6
(16.2%)
8
(21.6%)
5
(13.5%)
16
(43.2%)
2
(5.4%)
3.00 1.25
Multi user operating systems and application software to
allow concurrent access by multiple users of a computer.
8
(21.1%)
9
(23.7%)
0
(0.0%)
17
(44.7%)
4
(10.5%)
3.00 1.41
User entrance log to record and monitor user logs. These
logs are regularly analysed by a library staff.
6
(15.8%)
10
(26.3%)
6
(15.8%)
14
(36.8%)
2
(5.3%)
2.89 1.23
Desktop security software at application level and
operating level to monitor, restrict usage or disable
certain features of the workstations.
6
(15.8%)
11
(28.9%)
5
(13.2%)
15
(39.5%)
1
(2.6%)
2.84 1.20
Distribution agents to automate the process of installing
an application or updates to workstations on a network.
9
(23.7%)
8
(21.1%)
3
(7.9%)
16
(42.1%)
2
(3.3%)
2.84 1.35
Systems recovery to rebuild and repair the library
computer systems after disaster or crash.
5
(13.2%)
14
(36.8%)
6
(15.8%)
12
(31.6%)
1
(2.6%)
2.74 1.13
Spam filtering software to automatically detect unwanted
spam emails from getting into a user's inbox.
15
(39.5%)
3
(7.9%)
9
(23.7%
7
(18.4%)
4
(10.5%)
2.53 1.45
Timer software to control the amount of time a patron
can use a workstation.
12
(31.6%)
9
(23.7%)
3
(7.9%)
14
(36.8%)
0
(0.0%)
2.50 1.29
Rollback software to keep track and record of any
changes made to the computers and allow the system to
be restored to its original starting point from any chosen
point in time.
13
(34.2%)
6
(15.8%)
11
(28.9%)
5
(13.2%)
3
(7.9%)
2.45 1.31
Menu replacement software to replace the standard
windows desktop interfaces and provides control on
timeouts, logging and browsing activities.
9
(23.7%)
14
(36.8%)
7
(18.4%)
6
(15.8%)
2
(5.3%)
2.42 1.18
Periodical automatic debugging and tests to remove any
defects from newly developed software or hardware
components.
13
(34.2%)
9
(23.7%)
7
(18.4%)
7
(18.4%)
2
(5.3%)
2.37 1.28
Single sign on system for user authentication and
authorisation to access all computers and systems
without the need to enter multiple passwords.
12
(31.6%)
14
(36.8%)
5
(13.2%)
6
(15.8%
1
(2.6%)
2.21 1.14
Total 134(22.1%)
146
(24.0%)
79
(13.1%)
205
(33.7%)
43
(7.1%) 2.80 0.74
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(c) Level of Implementation of Workstation Security Measures
It is apparent from Table 5.4, that the use of virus protection programs, configuration
settings and security software programs for web browsers and email programs carried
the highest mean with a statistical mean value of 3.87 and standard deviation of 0.78.
This is unsurprising as security software programs such as antivirus, anti-spyware and
anti-adware software programs are widely available and commonly used nowadays for
detecting and destroying malicious programs.
The respondents also believed that their academic libraries have practised the use of
user identification and authentication before logging into the library’s workstations,
library network or campus network (Mean=3.29, SD=1.33) and they also believed that
all office productivity software and browsers for the workstations and laptops are
configured to receive updates in a timely manner (Mean=3.26, SD=0.89). The
respondents also confirmed that some of their mobile laptops that connect to the library
external local area networks (LANs) are using application firewall (Mean=2.71,
SD=1.23) and some of their computer’s basic input-output systems (BIOS) are secured
by using passwords in order to add an extra layer of security for desktop and laptop
computers (Mean=2.50, SD=1.11). However, at the time of this survey, the usage of the
above workstation security tools has not been revised.
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Table 5.4. Level of Implementation of Workstation Security Measures
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Virus protection programs, configuration
settings and security software programs are
installed for web browsers and email
programs.
0
(0.0%)
3
(7.9%)
5
(13.3%)
24
(63.2%)
6
(15.8%) 3.87 0.78
User identification and authentication are
required before logging into the library’s
workstations, laptops screensavers, library
network or campus network.
5
(13.2%)
7
(18.4%)
5
(13.2%)
14
(36.8%)
7
(18.4%) 3.29 1.33
All office productivity software and browsers
for the workstations/laptops are configured
to receive updates in a timely manner.
1
(2.6%)
7
(18.4%)
12
(31.6%)
17
(44.7%)
1
(2.6%) 3.26 0.89
An application firewall is used for mobile
laptops that connect to the library external
LANs.
6
(15.8%)
14
(36.8%)
6
(15.8%)
9
(23.7%)
3
(7.9%) 2.71 1.23
The computer’s BIOS are secured in order to
create a secure public access computer.
8
(21.1%)
13
(34.2%)
7
(18.4%)
10
(26.3%)
0
(0.0%) 2.50 1.11
Total 20
(10.5%)
44
(23.16%)
35
(18.42%)
74
(38.95%)
17
(8.95%) 3.13 0.68
(d) Level of Implementation of Network Security Measures
In terms of network security controls (Table 5.5), the respondents revealed that their
academic libraries have configured their antivirus and desktop security software to
receive frequent updates (Mean=3.53, SD=0.86), used firewall (Mean=3.26, SD=1.20),
used digital signatures to assure the authenticity of any electronic document sent via the
library’s network (Mean=3.13, SD=1.12), implemented server segregation or perimeter
network (DMZ) (Mean=3.11, SD=1.25), segmented the network with a router to
increase the bandwidth (Mean=3.11, SD=1.16), used a variety of wireless security
products (Mean=3.11, SD=1.18) to protect the internal network from any security
breaches. However, these network security controls have not been revised. The
respondents also noted that their academic libraries have restricted access to the
libraries high-risk applications or databases via configuration routines (Mean=2.92,
SD=1.32), used separate cabling for each network to provide alternative circuit for the
public and staff’s local area networks (LANs) (Mean=2.92, SD=1.34) and installed
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firewall with virtual private network (VPN) for remote and wireless access connections
(Mean=2.82, SD=1.20). However, at the time of this survey, the usage of the above
network security tools has not been revised.
Table 5.5. Level of Implementation of Network Security Measures
Items
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Antivirus software and desktop security
software to receive regular updates to
protect the internal network from any
security breaches.
0
(0.0%)
6
(15.8%)
9
(23.7%)
20
(52.6%)
3
(7.9%) 3.53 0.86
Firewall to protect the internal network from external
threats.
4
(10.5%)
8
(21.1%)
3
(7.9%)
20
(52.6%)
3
(7.9%) 3.26 1.20
Digital signatures are used to assure the authenticity
of any electronic documents sent via the library’s
network. (e.g. use of passwords, private key
encryption, public key encryption or digital
certificates)
3
(7.9%)
10
(26.3%)
6
(15.8%)
17
(44.7%)
2
(5.3%) 3.13 1.12
Server segregation/perimeter network (DMZ) by using
firewalls and some other network access control
devices to separate systems that are at a relatively
high risk from unsecured network.
6
(15.8%)
7
(18.4%)
4
(10.5%)
19
(50.0%)
2
(5.3%) 3.11 1.25
The network is segmented with a router to increases
the bandwidth available to each user and reduce the
congestions or collisions of the library’s network.
3
(7.9%)
12
(31.6%)
3
(7.9%)
18
(47.4%)
2
(5.3%) 3.11 1.16
Wireless security products to secure the library
wireless network. (e.g. use of default passwords on
wireless access points, network ID, wireless intrusion
detection systems, wired equivalency protocol (WEP)
encryption, MAC address filtering or virtual private
networking (VPN))
4
(10.5%)
8
(21.1%)
3
(7.9%)
20
(52.6%)
3
(7.9%) 3.11 1.18
Limitation of connection time is performed via
configuration routines to control and restrict access
for the library’s high-risk applications or databases.
9
(23.7%)
6
(15.8%)
3
(7.9%)
19
(50.0%)
1
(2.6%) 2.92 1.32
Public and staff’s local area networks (LANs) are
physically separated by means of separate cabling for
each network to provide alternative circuit.
10
(26.3%)
3
(7.9%)
7
(18.4%)
16
(42.1%)
2
(5.3%) 2.92 1.34
Firewall with virtual private network (VPN) capabilities
is installed for remote and wireless access
connections.
8
(21.1%)
6
(15.8%)
10
(26.3%)
13
(34.2%)
1
(2.6%) 2.82 1.20
TOTAL 47(13.7%)
66
(19.3%)
48
(14.0%)
162
(47.4%)
19
(5.6%) 3.10 0.72
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(e) Level of Implementation of Server Security Measures
The study used ten items to evaluate the presence of server security measures in
Malaysian academic libraries. Table 5.6 shows that the highest mean with a statistical
mean value of 5.55 and standard deviation of 1.03 is for the use of authentication
systems to prevent unauthorised access to the library’s server. Respondents also
believed that their academic libraries have restricted access to file system in a server by
using the file or directory permissions (Mean=3.53, SD=1.06), placed server(s) in a
secure location (Mean=3.53, SD=1.18), used up-to-date anti-virus software on servers
(Mean=3.39, SD=1.13), used firewalls to protect the library network from unwarranted
intrusion (Mean=3.34, SD=1.21) and reviewed the server logs periodically using a log
file monitor utility (Mean=3.34, SD=1.05). Next, the respondents also agreed that their
academic libraries have performed regular backups for vital data and documents related
to the server and stored them at an offsite location (Mean=3.32, SD=1.02), the library
servers’ operating systems (OS) and applications are hardened to protect from any
vulnerabilities (Mean=3.32, SD=1.04), implemented fault tolerance to assure there is a
backup system if one system fails (Mean=3.16, SD=1.05) and used intrusion detection
software and host auditing software to monitor for signs of intrusion (Mean=2.76,
SD=1.22). It is apparent that academic libraries in Malaysia have implemented some
kind of security measures to secure their servers. However, there is a worry that those
security measures have not been reviewed regularly. The practice of regularly
reviewing any security measure is vital to allow an academic library to implement the
best possible security solutions.
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Table 5.6 Level of Implementation of Server Security Measures
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Authentication systems to prevent
unauthorised access to the library’s
server.
1
(2.6%)
7
(18.4%)
5
(13.2%)
20
(52.6%)
5
(13.2%) 3.55 1.03
The server is placed in a secure
location, such as in a lockable cage, a
locked room and place it with
environmental controls.
4
(10.5%)
4
(10.5%)
3
(7.9%)
22
(57.9%)
5
(13.2%) 3.53 1.18
The file system in a server is restricted
access to the directory structure using
file or directory permissions.
2
(5.3%)
6
(15.8%)
4
(10.5%)
22
(57.9%)
4
(10.5%) 3.53 1.06
Anti-virus software on servers and anti-
virus virus definition files are kept up-
to-date.
2
(53.4%)
7
(18.4%)
9
(23.7%)
14
(36.8%)
6
(15.8%) 3.39 1.13
Firewalls to protect the library network
from unwarranted intrusion.
4
(10.3%)
6
(15.4%)
6
(15.4%)
17
(43.6%)
5
(12.8%) 3.34 1.21
Server logs are reviewed periodically
by using a log file monitor utility to
monitor any signs of intrusion or
security violations.
2
(5.3%)
8
(21.1%)
5
(13.2%)
21
(55.3%)
2
(5.3%) 3.34 1.05
Regular backups for the data, hard
copy of server hardware specifications,
installation information, installation
software and passwords are regularly
performed and stored at an offsite
location.
3
(7.9%)
4
(10.5%)
11
(28.9%)
18
(47.4%)
2
(5.3%) 3.32 1.02
The library servers’ operating systems
(OS) and applications are hardened to
protect from any vulnerabilities.
2
(5.3%)
9
(23.7%)
3
(7.9%)
23
(60.5%)
1
(2.6%) 3.32 1.04
Fault tolerance is implemented to
make sure if one system fails, then
there is a backup system that
immediately takes over.
1
(2.6%)
13
(34.2%)
5
(13.2%)
17
(44.7%)
2
(5.3%) 3.16 1.05
Intrusion detection software and host
auditing software are installed to
monitor the servers or computers for
signs of intrusion.
6
(15.8%)
14
(36.8%)
2
(5.3%)
15
(39.5%)
1
(2.6%) 2.76 1.22
TOTAL 27(7.1%)
78
(20.5%)
53
(14.0%)
189
(49.7%)
33
(8.7%) 3.32 0.69
(f) Level of Implementation of Data Security Measures
The changing shifts of library users’ needs from physical to online resources require a
change in the paradigm by which a library provides access and protect information. The
study used fifteen items to evaluate the presence of data security measures in Malaysian
academic libraries. Respondents in this survey believed that their academic libraries
163
have regularly backed up the library’s vital business information or records
(Mean=3.55, SD=0.95), properly recorded the attributes for each removable media
application and kept the media from any unauthorised devices (Mean=3.32, SD=1.12),
used combination of authentication systems to restrict access of library data and
resources based on a variety of access rights (Mean=3.21, SD=1.07) and used log
management software to ensure the library computer security records are stored in
sufficient detail for an appropriate period of time (Mean=3.16, SD=1.17).
Unfortunately, according to the respondents these kinds of security measures have not
been reviewed regularly at their libraries (Table 5.7).
The presence of the other elements of the server security tools at the participating
academic libraries are affirmed through the respondents’ responses on the proper
management of disposable of unused media and sensitive media in order to maintain an
audit trail (Mean=2.95, SD=1.09), use of various security tools to ensure the safety of
online transactions such as use of password protection,  firewalls, and Internet Protocol
Virtual Private Networks (Mean=2.95, SD=1.16), use of web access management
systems to manage and validate user access to devices, applications and library systems
(Mean=2.89 SD=1.16), use of web content filtering or monitoring systems at the proxy
server or Internet server (Mean=2.89 SD=1.39), use of enforced path between a user
terminal and other library services to reduce risks of unauthorised access (Mean=2.79
SD=1.26), the library network and IS security services are properly managed in-house
or outsourced to a service provider (Mean=2.79 SD=1.49) and use of RFID tags to
manage and secure the library collection and access into the library building
(Mean=2.71 SD=1.31). However, at the time of this survey, the usage of the above data
security measures has not been revised.
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The respondents also confirmed that their academic libraries have adopted some
elements of these data security controls including some systematic approaches
conducted in-house or outsourced to a service provider to address the library
vulnerabilities (Mean=2.59 SD=1.24), use of some cryptography techniques, hardware
tokens, software tokens and single sign on systems to control data access (Mean=2.47
SD=1.16), use of public key infrastructure (PKI) to secure the exchange of personal
data via the library network and Internet (Mean=2.47 SD=1.27) and use of address
verification system (AVS), multiple login monitoring, password verification on
transactions or data access controls to control fraudulent activity and disclosure of
information (Mean=2.45 SD=1.37). However, the usage of the above data security tools
has not been assessed.
Table 5.7. Presence of Data Security Measures in Malaysian Academic Libraries
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Library’s vital business information or records are
regularly backed up. (E.g. inventory records,
patrons’ data, library databases, production
servers and critical network components and
backup media).
1
(2.6%)
5
(13.2%)
8
(21.1%)
20
(52.6%)
4
(10.5%)
3.55 0.95
Attributes for each removable media applications
in your library are properly recorded and the
media are kept from any unauthorised devices
from accessing, running or transferring data to
your library workstations and network. (e.g. USB
thumb drives, tape
3
(7.9%)
8
(21.1%)
3
(7.9%)
22
(57.9%)
2
(5.3%)
3.32 1.12
Combination of authentication systems to restrict
access of library data and resources based on a
variety of access rights. (e.g. user identification,
passwords or biometrics system)
2
(5.3%)
10
(26.3%)
6
(15.8%)
18
(47.4%)
2
(5.30%)
3.21 1.07
Event logging or log management software to
ensure the library computer security records are
stored in sufficient detail for an appropriate period
of time. (E.g. records for security incidents, policy
violations, fraudulent activities and operational
problems).
3
(7.9%)
12
(31.6%)
1
(2.6%)
20
(52.6%)
2
(5.3%)
3.16 1.17
Disposable of unused media and sensitive media
are properly managed to maintain an audit trail.
4
(10.5%)
10
(26.3%)
9
(23.7%)
14
(36.8%)
1
(2.6%)
2.95 1.09
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Table 5.7. Continued.
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Use of password protection of user accounts,
antivirus software, firewalls, wireless network
protections, intrusion detection systems and
Internet Protocol Virtual Private Networks/IP VPNs
to ensure data insert and sent from one end of a
transaction arrives unaltered at the other end.
6
(15.8%)
6
(15.8%)
12
(31.6%)
12
(31.6%)
2
(5.3%)
2.95 1.16
Web access management systems to manage and
validate user access to devices, applications and
library systems. (E.g. authentication management,
single sign-on convenience, audit or reporting
systems).
3
(7.9%)
16
(42.1%)
3
(7.9%)
14
(36.8%)
2
(5.3%)
2.89 1.16
Web content filtering/monitoring systems on
individual workstations or at a central point on the
network to prevent users from viewing
inappropriate web sites or content. (E.g. at the
proxy server or Internet server).
8
(21.1%)
10
(26.3%)
2
(5.3%)
14
(36.8%)
4
(10.5%)
2.89 1.39
Your library network and IS security services are
properly managed in house or outsourced to a
service provider. (e.g. Round-the-clock monitoring,
management of firewalls and intrusion detection
systems, management of patch management and
upgrades, performing security assessments,
performing security audits and responding to
emergencies).
11
(28.9%)
8
(21.1%)
2
(5.3%)
12
(31.6%)
5
(13.2%)
2.79 1.49
Enforced path is created between a user terminal
and other library services that the user is
authorised to reduce the risk of unauthorised
access.
7
(18.4%)
12
(31.6%)
2
(5.3%)
16
(42.1%)
1
(2.6%)
2.79 1.26
RFID tags to manage and secure the library
collection as well as to track attendance and
prevent unauthorised access into the library
building.
9
(23.7%)
9
(23.7%)
7
(18.4%)
10
(26.3%)
3
(7.9%)
2.71 1.31
Systematic approaches conducted in house or
outsourced to a service provider to address the
library vulnerabilities (e.g. managing on
vulnerability discovery, prioritization, remediation,
dynamic protection, verification and customizable
reporting).
8
(21.6%)
12
(32.4%)
6
(16.2%)
9
(24.3%)
2
(5.4%)
2.59 1.24
Public key infrastructure (PKI) to secure the
exchange of personal data via the library network
and Internet. (E.g. use of public and  private
cryptography key pair).
12
(31.6%)
9
(23.7%)
4
(10.5%)
13
(34.2%)
0
(0.0%)
2.47 1.27
Use of cryptography techniques, hardware tokens,
software tokens and single sign on systems to
control data access for the library internal and
remote computer systems.
9
(23.7%)
12
(31.6%)
8
(21.1%)
8
(21.1%)
1
(2.6%)
2.47 1.16
166
Table 5.7. Continued.
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Fraud detection and prevention measures to
control fraudulent activity and disclosure of
information. (E.g. use of address verification
system/AVS, proprietary encryption, internal
intrusion detection system, multiple login
monitoring, password verification on transactions
or data access controls).
13
(34.2%)
9
(23.7%)
5
(13.2%)
8
(21.1%)
3
(7.9%)
2.45 1.37
TOTAL 99
(17.4%)
148
(26.0%)
78
(13.7%)
210
(36.9%)
34
(6.0%)
2.89 0.67
(g) Level of Implementation of Physical and Environmental Security Measures
Physical and environmental safeguards play important roles to ensure that academic
libraries appropriately protect their IS equipments from physical and environmental
threats. Areas within the library building, especially the computer rooms, should be
well-ventilated and air-conditioned in order to solve overheating problems that can
cause serious damage to the equipments. Thus, it is understandable why the use of air
conditioning has the highest mean with statistical value of 3.92 and standard deviation
of 0.97 (Table 5.8). Next, the use of automatic sprinkler systems, smoke detectors, fire
extinguishers and fireproof installations in the library buildings to detect and prevent
fires, toxic chemical spills and explosions has the second highest mean with statistical
value of 3.61 and standard deviation equal of 0.86. The provisions of these
environmental security protectors in any library are necessary, as indicated by
Matthews and Feather (2003), that smoke detection may provide an opportunity as the
‘first aid’ action with portable extinguishers before the fire grows to a large size and
will activate the sprinkler heads.
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Respondents in this survey believed that their academic libraries have used lightning
and surge protectors to protect any valuable equipment from lighting strikes, voltage
spikes and surges (Mean=3.42 SD=0.95), have security guards to monitor people
entering and leaving the library buildings and sites (Mean=3.18 SD=1.27), used
magnetic stripe swipe cards, bar code cards or biometrics to control access to restricted
library areas (Mean=3.13 SD=1.32) as well as used warning signs, fencing, vehicle
height-restrictors, site lightings and trenches around the library areas to provide initial
layer of security for a library building (Mean=3.11 SD=1.25). Sadly, the respondents
revealed that the status of these security measures have not been reviewed regularly at
their libraries.
Furthermore, these physical and environmental safeguards such as the wireless gates,
biometrics or other user identifications and authentication forms are implemented at the
library main entrances, exits and public access areas to control access into the library
building (Mean=2.74 SD=1.27). However, at the time of this survey, the usage of the
above physical and environmental security tools has not been revised. It is quite
surprising to find that the use of flood detector to sense the presence of water as an early
warning of developing floods in a library (Mean=1.63 SD=1.05) and the use of
earthquake early warning system as an emergency warning prior to damaging ground
movement (Mean=1.25 SD=1.06) have slightly lower mean values. This result may be
due to the common perception that Malaysia is an earthquake-free country, thus many
would assume that this country is unlikely to suffer from any earthquake threats.
Another reason preventing most of the buildings from installing sufficient number of
earthquake early warning systems may be due to the high purchase and installation
prices.
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Table 5.8. Level of Implementation of Physical and Environmental Security Measures
Security
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Air conditionings to stabilise the air temperature and
humidity within the library building.
0
(0.0%)
4
(10.5%)
7
(18.4%)
15
(39.5%)
12
(31.6%) 3.92 0.97
Use of automatic sprinkler systems, smoke detectors,
fire extinguishers and fireproof installations in the
library buildings and areas adjacent to library’s key
assets to detect and prevent fires, toxic chemical spills
and explosions.
0
(0.0%)
3
(7.9%)
15
(39.5%)
14
(36.8%)
6
(15.8%) 3.61 0.86
Lightning protectors and surge protectors to protect
any valuable machines or equipments from lighting
strikes, voltage spikes and surges.
0
(0.0%)
9
(23.7%)
7
(18.4%)
19
(50.0%)
3
(7.9%) 3.42 0.95
Security guards to monitor people entering and
leaving the library buildings and sites.
5
(13.2%)
8
(21.1%)
4
(10.5%)
17
(44.7%)
4
(10.5%) 3.18 1.27
Use of magnetic stripe swipe cards, electronic lock,
proximity cards, bar code card or biometrics to secure
and control access to restricted library areas.
7
(18.4%)
5
(13.2%)
6
(15.8%)
16
(42.1%)
4
(10.5%) 3.13 1.32
Warning signs, fencing, vehicle height-restrictors, site
lightings and trenches around the library areas to
provide initial layer of security for a library building.
7
(18.4%)
5
(13.2%)
4
(10.5%)
21
(55.3%)
1
(2.6%) 3.11 1.25
Flood detector to sense the presence of water to
provide an early warning of developing floods in a
library.
24
(63.2%)
9
(23.7%)
1
(2.6%)
3
(7.9%)
1
(2.6%) 1.63 1.05
Earthquake early warning system to provide an
emergency warning to the library staff and patrons
prior to damaging ground shaking.
27
(71.1%)
5
(13.2%)
1
(2.6%)
5
(13.2%)
0
(0.0%) 1.58 1.06
TOTAL 77
(22.5%)
61
(17.8%)
48
(14.0%)
123
(36.1%)
33
(9.6%) 2.92 0.60
5.1.2 Level of Implementation of Organisational Security Measures
Organisational security measures should be integrated together with technological
security measures to form sound ISec controls. It is recognised that significant security
can often be achieved through or supported by administrative measures such as
organisational, personnel, physical and procedural controls (Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, 2006). Thus, an assessment of the academic libraries’ security
measures in a particular case should also consider management and organisational
security measures. At the macro level, the three types of organisational measures
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including ISec policies, ISec procedures and security awareness creation are
implemented in the 38 participating Malaysian academic libraries (1 academic library
did not response to questions in Part C), but the implementation has not been reviewed
on a regular basis. However, Table 5.9 shows that administrative tools and methods has
the lowest total mean score with a statistical value of 2.52 and standard deviation of
1.11. This might be because administrative tools and methods are not seen as important
elements in a library’s ISec programmes.
Table 5.9. Total Mean Score for Implementation of Organisational Measures
Organisational Measures Mean SD
Information Security Policies 3.13 0.68
Information Security Procedures and Controls 2.85 0.97
Information Security Awareness Creation Activities 2.73 0.91
Information Security Administrative Tools and Methods 2.52 1.11
The following sections present a micro view of the level of implementation of ISec
policies; ISec procedures and controls; ISec administrative tools and methods; and ISec
awareness creation in Malaysian academic libraries.
(a) Implementation of Information Security Policies
The presence of ISec policies in Malaysian academic libraries is assessed based on the
twelve items as shown in Table 5.10. It can be seen that policies on acceptable use of
wireless devices such as laptops and hand phones has the highest mean with a statistical
value of 3.50 and standard deviation of 1.01. This result agrees with the findings of this
research where 92.3% of participating academic libraries in this study have wireless
Internet connection. Policies on acceptable use of workstations, e-mails, databases,
intranet and Internet (Mean=3.24, SD=1.15) have the second highest mean value of 3.24
and standard deviation of 1.15. This is true as the use of workstations, e-mails,
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databases, intranet and Internet are the most common services at modern academic
libraries.
Respondents in this survey believed that their academic libraries have implemented
several types of ISec policies including those on reporting, notification and response of
IS security events to affected parties (Mean=3.21 SD=1.17), even though these policies
have not been revised regularly. These types of policies imply that all members of
academic libraries should be responsible for reporting any known or suspected IT
security incidents to affected parties. Affected parties would include the legitimate
owners, operators and users of the relevant computing facilities (Brownlee and
Guttman, 1998).
Respondents also reported availability of policies on identity management for the
library IS user registration and password management (Mean=3.18, SD=0.87), policies
on sharing, storing and transmitting of library data via ISPs, external networks or
contractors’ systems (Mean=3.18, SD=1.06), policies on access control, authentication
and authorisation practices for using the library IS (Mean=3.16, SD=0.92), policies on
protection of library IS assets to protect the library’s hardware, software, data and
people (Mean=3.16, SD=1.05), job responsibility policy related to the library IS
security practices (Mean=3.05, SD=1.11), policies on managing privacy and
confidentiality issues, including breaches of personal information (Mean=3.05,
SD=1.14) and secure disposal policies of library data, media or materials that contain
sensitive information (Mean=3.00, SD=0.99). However, at time of this study, these
policies have never been revised in the participating academic libraries.
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When assessed on the presence of policies on backups and off-site storage
(Mean=2.92, SD=1.05) and policies on data classification, retention and destruction for
library data or materials that contain sensitive information (Mean=2.87, SD=1.23),
respondents revealed that these policies have been implemented but the policies never
been assessed in their libraries. This is somehow contradictory with the general
assumption that academic libraries are expected to have regular data backed up and the
backup media should be sent to an off-site storage location to provide a copy of the
data in case of unforeseen disasters.
Table 5.10. Implementation Level of Information Security Policies
Items
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Policies on acceptable use of wireless
devices in your library such as laptops and
hand phones.
2
(5.3%)
5
(13.2%)
6
(15.8%)
22
(57.9%)
3
(7.9%) 3.50 1.01
Policies on acceptable use of
workstations, e-mails, databases, intranet
and Internet in your library.
3
(7.9%)
9
(23.7%)
5
(13.2%)
18
(47.4%)
3
(7.9%) 3.24 1.15
Polices on reporting, notification and
response of IS security events to affected
parties such as individuals, law
enforcement and campus or parent
organisations.
4
(10.5%)
8
(21.1%)
4
(10.5%)
20
(52.6%)
2
(5.3%) 3.21 1.17
Identity management policies for library
IS user registration and password
management.
1
(2.6%)
8
(21.1%)
12
(31.6%)
17
(44.7%)
0
(0.0%) 3.18 0.87
Policies on sharing, storing and
transmitting of library data via ISPs,
external networks or contractors’
systems.
2
(5.3%)
9
(23.7%)
10
(26.3%)
14
(36.8%)
3
(7.9%) 3.18 1.06
Policies on access control, authentication
and authorisation practices for using the
library IS.
1
(2.6%)
10
(26.3%)
9
(23.7%)
18
(47.4%)
0
(0.0%) 3.16 0.92
Policies on protection of library IS assets
to protect your library’s hardware,
software, data and people.
3
(7.9%)
9
(23.7%)
5
(13.2%)
21
(55.3%)
0
(0.0%) 3.16 1.05
Policies on managing privacy and
confidentiality issues, including breaches
of personal information.
2
(5.3%)
14
(36.8%)
5
(13.2%)
14
(36.8%)
3
(7.9%) 3.05 1.14
Job responsibility policy for individual
employee responsibilities related to the
library IS security practices.
4
(10.5%)
10
(26.3%)
4
(10.5%)
20
(52.6%)
0
(0.0%) 3.05 1.11
172
Table 5.10. Continued.
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Secure disposal policies to dispose library
data, media or materials that contain
sensitive information.
2
(5.3%)
12
(31.6%)
8
(21.1%)
16
(42.1%)
0
(0.0%) 3.00 0.99
Backups and off-site storage policies for
your library data, media or materials that
contain sensitive information.
3
(7.9%)
12
(31.6%)
9
(23.7%)
13
(34.2%)
1
(2.6%) 2.92 1.05
Data classification, retention and
destruction policies for your library data,
media or materials that contain sensitive
information.
9
(23.7%)
4
(10.5%)
8
(21.1%)
17
(0.0%)
0
(0.0%) 2.87 1.23
TOTAL 36
(7.9%)
110
(24.1%)
85
(18.6%)
210
(46.1%)
15
(3.3%) 3.13 0.68
(b) Implementation Level of Information Security Procedures and Controls
In terms of the presence of information security (ISec) procedures and controls, the
respondents revealed (Table 5.11) that their academic libraries have implemented but
never reviewed the controls and disciplinary procedures such as verbal warning, written
warning, suspension and dismissal in case a library staff or patron breaches the IS
security policies or rules (Mean=3.16, SD=1.03). ISACA (2009) suggests that
organisations should establish and apply a consistent formal disciplinary process in
dealing with those who commit security breaches such as employees and third parties.
The same goes with the procedures on intellectual property rights and copyrights as
means in controlling and protecting any digital work or resources that are stored,
transmitted, accessed, copied or downloaded via the library IS (Mean=3.08, SD=1.10).
Respondents in this survey also affirmed that their academic libraries have
implemented procedures for updating and reviewing existing ISec policies
(Mean=2.82, SD=1.14), procedures for non-disclose agreement or confidentiality
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agreement (Mean=2.71, SD=1.23), procedures on requirements to outsource any
library IS service or activity (Mean=2.66, SD=1.17) and procedures for handling
sensitive library data and personal data of library patrons (Mean=2.68, SD=1.23).
However, these procedures have never been revised in the participating academic
libraries.
The purpose of handling sensitive library data procedures is to provide detailed
guidance on how to handle sensitive library data, including physical security of
information as well as the distribution of classified information both internally and
externally. For instance, sensitive library data stored in databases and spreadsheets are
more vulnerable to exposure; therefore they require strong passwords for better
protection.
Table 5.11. Implementation Level of Information Security Procedures
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Controls and disciplinary procedures if a
library staff or patrons breach the IS
security policies or rules. (e.g. verbal
warning, written warning, suspension and
dismissal).
1
(2.6%)
11
(28.9%)
10
(26.3%)
13
(34.2%)
3
(7.9%) 3.16 1.03
Procedures on the intellectual property
rights and copyrights in controlling and
protecting any digital works or resources
that are stored, transmitted, accessed,
copied or downloaded via the library IS.
3
(7.9%)
11
(28.9%)
5
(13.2%)
18
(47.4%)
1
(2.6%) 3.08 1.10
Procedures for update and review existing
information security policies.
5
(13.2%)
12
(31.6%)
7
(18.4%)
13
(34.2%)
1
(2.6%) 2.82 1.14
Procedures for handling library sensitive
data and personal data of library patrons to
prevent errors, unauthorised disclosure or
misuse by those who handle it.
8
(21.1%)
10
(26.3%)
8
(21.1%)
10
(26.3%)
2
(5.3%) 2.68 1.23
Procedures that list all requirements with
regard to outsourcing any library IS service
or activities.
6
(15.8%)
15
(39.5%)
4
(10.5%)
12
(31.6%)
1
(2.6%) 2.66 1.17
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Table 5.11. Continued.
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Procedures for non-disclose agreement or
confidentiality agreement to all library
staff and patrons to protect any type of
confidential and proprietary information.
7
(18.4%)
12
(31.6%)
6
(15.8%)
11
(28.9%)
2
(5.3%) 2.71 1.23
TOTAL 30(13.2%)
71
(31.1%)
40
(17.5%)
77
(33.8%)
10
(4.4%) 2.85 0.97
(c) Implementation Level of Information Security Administrative Tools and
Methods
Information security (ISec) administrative tools and methods should also be viewed as
part of any library’s ISec programmes. As can be seen in Table 5.12, procedures on
handling, reporting, notification and response of IS security events to affected parties
are considered an important part of security monitoring even though respondents in this
study revealed that only some parts of these procedures are implemented in their
academic libraries (Mean=2.92, SD=1.32). As highlighted by Scarfone, Grance and
Masone (2008) establishing clear procedures for assessing current and potential
business impact of incidents as well as building relationships and establishing suitable
means of communication with other internal groups (e.g., human resources, legal) and
with external groups (e.g. other incident response teams, law enforcement) are vital in
any organisation.
Additionally, risk analysis process is also required to be performed in any security
programme. As indicated by Wold and Shriver (1997), security programme helps to
identify the most probable and related threats to an organisation and provide the
foundation for the entire recovery planning effort. In this study, respondents noted that
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there are procedures for the development and implementation of risk analysis to protect
their academic libraries from all types of threats (Mean=2.50, SD=1.29). But the
procedures have never been assessed periodically in the participating academic
libraries.
Other types of administrative tools and methods implemented in Malaysian academic
libraries include procedures for owner accountability to that ensure appropriate
protection is maintained for each library IS asset (Mean=2.42, SD=1.31), procedures on
asset classification in order to organise it according to its importance and sensitivity to
loss (Mean=2.39 SD=1.37) and regular internal and external audits programmes
appropriate for the library IS (Mean=2.34 SD=1.28).
Table 5.12. Implementation Level of Administrative Tools
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Procedures on handling, reporting,
notification and response of IS security
events to affected parties such as
individuals, law enforcement, campus or
parent organisation.
8
(21.1%)
7
(18.4%)
6
(15.8%)
14
(36.8%)
3
(7.9%) 2.92 1.32
Procedures for the development and
implementation of risk analysis to
protect your library from all types of
threats. (e.g. Performance of assets
analysis, threat analysis, annual loss
expectancy analysis, identification and
evaluation of security measure)
10
(26.3%)
12
(31.6%)
6
(15.8%)
7
(18.4%)
3
(7.9%) 2.50 1.29
Procedure for owner accountability to
ensure appropriate protection is
maintained for each library IS asset. (e.g.
information assets, software assets,
physical assets and library services).
12
(31.6%)
11
(28.9%)
4
(10.5%)
9
(23.7%)
2
(5.3%) 2.42 1.31
Procedures related to asset classification
in order to organise it according to its
importance and sensitivity to loss. (e.g.
unclassified, confidential, secret and top
secret)
13
(34.2%)
11
(28.9%)
3
(7.9%)
8
(21.1%)
3
(7.9%) 2.39 1.37
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Table 5.12. Continued.
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Regular internal and external audits
programs appropriate for your library’s IS
size, complexity of activities, scope of
operations, risk profile and compliance
with the relevant standards.
12
(31.6%)
12
(31.6%)
6
(15.8%)
5
(13.2%)
3
(7.9%) 2.34 1.28
TOTAL 55(28.9%)
53
(27.9%)
25
(13.2%)
43
(22.6%)
14
(7.4%) 2.52 1.11
(e) Implementation Level of Information Security Awareness Creation
Activities
Awareness creation is an essential element in any security control management and it
requires close attention by all levels of management and in all types of organisations
including libraries. Table 5.13 indicates types of information security (ISec) awareness
initiative in academic libraries. Respondents indicated that their academic libraries have
regularly identified and updated any threat that could harm and adversely affect critical
operations of the library IS’ security, but this stage have never been reviewed
(Mean=3.05 SD=1.11). It is necessary that each staff and patron is made aware security
threats. This is because today's computer threats are more invisible, numerous,
escalating rapidly, complex and increasingly dangerous like parasites (Trend Micro
White Paper, 2009).
Respondents in this study also revealed that staff and patrons are made aware of their
responsibilities with regard to protecting the library’s IS’ security and trained to report
any security breach incidences (Mean=2.87 SD=1.17). The same goes for ISec
awareness trainings, which are only compulsory to staff and patrons in their libraries
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(Mean=2.82 SD=1.20). NIST Special Publication Recommended Security Controls for
Federal IS, suggests “An effective ISec program should include...security awareness
training to inform personnel (including contractors and other users of IS that support the
operations and assets of the organisation) of the ISec risks associated with their
activities and their responsibilities in complying with organisational policies and
procedures designed to reduce these risks.” (Ross, et al., 2007).
Respondents also noted that there are some positive support and commitment from the
top management to coordinate the implementation of IS’ security controls in academic
libraries, in terms of allocation of budget, strong interest and active involvement
(Mean=2.79 SD=1.09). They also indicated that there are identified and regular
updating of the library IS vulnerabilities and their related processes (Mean=2.76
SD=1.36), staff and patrons at various levels received regular updates on the library IS’
policies and procedures (Mean=2.71 SD=1.27) and there exists risk assessment
approach that follows a defined documented process (Mean=2.63 SD=1.13).
Unfortunately, at the time of this study these awareness activities have never been
revised in the participating academic libraries.
However, some other awareness creations activities have the lowest mean values that
indicate those initiatives have been implemented in Malaysian academic libraries but
the awareness activities have never been revised. These security awareness initiatives
include all staff and patrons received appropriate ISec trainings and education
(Mean=2.58 SD=1.20), used of balanced set of key performance indicators (KPIs) and
metrics to assess the effectiveness of security awareness programmes (Mean=2.58
SD=1.06) and staff and patrons are trained to handle the library’s IS on their own
(Mean=2.55 SD=1.01).
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Table 5.13. Level of Implementation of Information Security Awareness Creation
Activities
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Threats that could harm and adversely
affect critical operations of your library
IS’ security are identified and up dated
regularly.
2
(5.3%)
12
(31.6%)
10
(26.3%)
10
(26.3%)
4
(10.5%) 3.05 1.11
All staff and patrons at various levels are
made aware of their responsibilities with
regard to protecting the library’s IS’
security and trained to report any
security breach incidences.
5
(13.2%)
11
(28.9%)
8
(21.1%)
12
(31.6%)
2
(5.3%) 2.87 1.17
ISec awareness trainings have become
mandatory to all staff and patrons at
various levels.
7
(18.4%)
9
(23.7%)
7
(18.4%)
14
(36.8%)
1
(2.6%) 2.82 1.20
There are positive supports and
commitments from the top
management to coordinate the
implementation of IS’ security controls
in your library. (e.g. via allocation of
budget, strong interest and active
involvements).
2
(5.3%)
18
(47.4%)
7
(18.4%)
8
(21.1%)
3
(7.9%) 2.79 1.09
Vulnerabilities in your library IS and
related processes are identified and up
dated regularly.
8
(21.1%)
12
(31.6%)
3
(7.9%)
11
(28.9%)
4
(10.5%) 2.76 1.36
All staff and patrons at various levels
receive regular updates on your library
IS’ policies and procedures.
7
(18.4%)
13
(18.4%)
5
(13.2%)
10
(26.3%)
3
(7.9%) 2.71 1.27
Risk assessment approach exists and
follows a defined process that is
documented.
7
(18.4%)
12
(31.6%)
7
(18.4%)
12
(31.6%)
0
(0.0%) 2.63 1.13
All staff and patrons at various levels
receive appropriate ISec trainings and
education.
8
(21.1%)
13
(34.2%)
5
(13.2%)
11
(28.9%)
1
(2.6%) 2.58 1.20
There are balanced set of key
performance indicators (KPIs) and
metrics used to provide the real insight
into the effectiveness of security
awareness programs.
4
(10.5%)
18
(47.4%)
8
(21.1%)
6
(15.8%)
2
(5.3%) 2.58 1.06
Staff and patrons at various levels are
trained to monitor and handle the
library’s IS on their own.
4
(10.5%)
19
(50.0%)
5
(13.2%)
10
(26.3%)
0
(0.0%) 2.55 1.01
TOTAL 54(14.2%)
137
(36.0%)
65
(17.1%)
104
(27.4%)
20
(5.3%) 2.73 0.91
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5.2 Differences in Applying the Technological Measures due to Selected
Demographic Variables
This section presents result of hypotheses testing on the differences among academic
libraries in Malaysia in applying technological measures due to the type of university,
number of staff, years in ICT implementation, yearly information system security
budget, availability of information system (IS) security staff and availability of wireless
connection.
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1
There is no significant different between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying the
technical measures by type of university, number of staff, years in ICT implementation,
yearly ISec budget, availability of information system (IS) security staff and availability
of wireless connection.
To test this hypothesis, the researcher uses Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U
Test for testing the differences between Malaysian academic libraries in applying
technical measures. The hypothesis is separated into six sub-hypotheses and every sub-
hypothesis is tested separately.
Testing hypothesis 1.1
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measure due to type of university.
The statistical result from the Kruskal-Wallis test shows no significant differences
between Malaysian academic libraries in applying technological measures due to type
of university (H(2)=4.898, p › 0.05) (Table 5.14). Therefore, the sub-hypothesis 1.1 can
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be accepted and it was concluded that there is no difference in applying technical
measures among the three types of the academic libraries, at public and private
universities as well as college universities.
Table 5.14. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Technological Measure due to Type of Universities.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. Technological  measures 4.898 2 0.086 Not Significant
Testing Hypothesis 1.2
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measures due to number of staff.
The Kruskal-Wallis test result shows no significant differences between Malaysian
academic libraries in applying technological measures due number of staff (H(4)=5.822,
p › 0.05) (Table 5.15). Therefore, the sub-hypothesis 1.2 can also be accepted and it is
concluded that there is no difference in applying technical measures among academic
libraries that have less than 10 staff with academic libraries that have more than 191
staff.
Table 5.15. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Technological Measure due to Number of Staff.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. Technological  measures 5.822 4 0.213 Not Significant
Testing Hypothesis 1.3
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measures due to years in ICT implementation.
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The results in the table (5.16) shows that the significance of technical measures is above
0.05, (H(3)=2.144, p › 0.05), denoting that there are no differences between academic
libraries in Malaysia in applying technological measures due to the number of years in
ICT implementation. Therefore, the sub-hypothesis 1.3 is accepted and it is concluded
that there is no difference in applying technical measures among academic libraries that
have less than five years ICT implementation than academic libraries that have ten
years or more than ten years of ICT implementation.
Table 5.16: Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Technological Measure due to Years in ICT implementation.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. Technological  measures 2.144 3 0.543 Not Significant
Testing Hypothesis 1.4
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measures due to yearly information systems security budget.
The result of Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 5.17) shows that the significance of
technological measures is below 0.05 (H(3)=11.776, p ‹ 0.05). This implies that there is
a difference between Malaysian academic libraries in applying technological measures
due to the current budget allocated for IS security. According to this result, the sub-
hypothesis 1.4 is rejected. It was summarised that there is a difference in applying
technical measures in academic libraries in Malaysia that receive more than 5% yearly
IS security budget compared to academic libraries that receive less than 1% budget
allocation for their annual IS security.
Table 5.17. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Technological Measure due to Yearly Information System
Security Budget.
No Variable Chi-Square df P Finding
1. Technological  measure 11.776 3 0.008 Significant
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Testing Hypothesis 1.5
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measures due to availability of information system (IS) security staff.
The results of rank test (Table 5.18) shows that academic libraries in Malaysia that have
designated staff responsible for IS security had the highest score in applying technical
measures.
Table 5.18. Rank Test between Academic Libraries in Applying Technological
Measures due to Availability of Information System (IS) Security Staff.
Availability of IS
Security staff N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Technological
measures
No 16 14.41 230.50
Yes 22 23.20 510.50
Total 38
Mann-Whitney U test (Table 5.19) reveals that there is a statistically significant
difference between the academic libraries that have staff responsible for IS security and
academic libraries that do not have staff responsible for IS security in applying
technical measures (U = 94.500, P = 0.016). It can be further concluded that the
availability of staff for IS security elicited statistically significant different in applying
technical measures in Malaysian academic libraries.
Table 5.19. Mann-Whitney U Test for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Technological Measure due to Availability of Information System
(IS) Security Staff.
No Variable U p Finding
1. Technological  measure 94.500 0.016 Significant
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Testing Hypothesis 1.6
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
technological measures due to availability of wireless connection.
The results in the table 5.20 shows that the significance of technical measures is above
0.05, (H(1)=1.484, p › 0.05), which illustrates that there are no differences between
Malaysian academic libraries in applying technical measures due to the availability of
wireless connection. This result denotes that the sub-hypothesis 1.6 is accepted and
therefore there is no difference in applying technical measures among academic
libraries in Malaysia that have wireless connection and academic libraries that do not
have wireless connection.
Table 5.20. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Technological Measure due to Availability of Wireless
Connection.
No Variable Chi-Square df P Finding
1. Technologicalmeasures 1.484 1 0.223 Not Significant
5.3 Differences in Applying the Organisational Measures by Selected
Demographic Variables
This section presents the result of hypotheses testing on the differences among
academic libraries in Malaysia in applying the organisational measures due to the type
of university, number of staff, years in ICT implementation, yearly information system
security budget, availability of information system (IS) security staff and availability of
wireless connection.
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5.3.1 Hypothesis 2
There are no differences denoting a statistical significance between academic libraries
in Malaysia in applying organisational measures by type of university, years in ICT
implementation, yearly ISec budget, availability of information system (IS) security
staff and availability of wireless connection.
Testing Hypothesis 2.1
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measure dues to type of university.
The statistical result of Kruskal-Wallis test shows no significant differences between
Malaysian academic libraries in applying organisational measures due to type of
university (H(2)=2.576, p › 0.05) (Table 5.21). Therefore, hypothesis 2.1 can be
accepted and it is concluded that there is no difference in applying organisational
measures among academic libraries in the public and private universities as well as
university colleges.
Table 5.21. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Organisational Measures due to Type of Universities.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. Organisational measures 2.576 2 0.276 Not Significant
Testing Hypothesis 2.2
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures due to number of staff.
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Kruskal-Wallis test result shows no significant difference between Malaysian academic
libraries in applying organisational measures due number of staff (H(2)=2.576, p ‹ 0.05)
(Table 5.22). Therefore, the following hypothesis could be accepted and it is concluded
that there is a difference in applying organisational measures between academic
libraries that have 101 staff with academic libraries that have between 10 and 15 staff.
Table 5.22. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Organisational Measures due to Number of Staff.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. Technological  measures 11.827 4 0.019 Significant
Testing Hypothesis 2.3
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures due to years in ICT implementation.
The results in the table 5.23 shows that the significance of organisational measures is
above 0.05, (H(3)=1.706, p › 0.05). This denotes that there are no differences between
academic libraries in Malaysia in applying organisational measures due to years in ICT
implementation. Therefore, sub-hypothesis 2.3 is accepted and it is concluded that there
is no difference in applying organisational measures among academic libraries that have
less than five years of ICT implementation with academic libraries that have 10 years or
more of ICT implementation.
Table 5.23. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Organisational Measures due to Years in ICT Implementation.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. 0rganisationalmeasures 1.706 3 0.636 Not Significant
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Testing Hypothesis 2.4
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures due to yearly information system security budget.
The results of Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 5.24) shows that the significance of
organisational measures is below 0.05 (H(3)=15.548, p ‹ 0.05), which implies that there
is a difference between Malaysian academic libraries in applying organisational
measures due to the library’s yearly information system security budget. According to
this result, sub-hypothesis 2.4 is rejected. It is concluded that there is a difference in
applying organisational measures among academic libraries in Malaysia that receive
more than 5% yearly IS security budget with academic libraries that receive less than
1% budget allocation for their annual IS security.
Table 5.24. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Organisational Measures due to Yearly Information System
Security Budget.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. Organisational measures 15.548 3 0.001 Significant
Testing Hypothesis 2.5
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures due to availability of information system (IS) security staff.
The results of the rank test (Table 5.25) shows that Malaysian academic libraries that
have designated staff for IS security had the highest score in applying organisational
measures.
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Table 5.25: Rank Test between Academic Libraries in Applying Organisational
Measures due to Availability of IS Security Staff.
Availability of IS
Security staff N Mean Rank Sum of Rank
Organisational
measures
No 16 15.00 240.00
Yes 22 22.77 501.00
Total 38
The Mann-Whitney U test reveals that there is a statistically significant difference
between academic libraries that have designated staff for IS security and academic
libraries that do not have staff responsible for IS security in applying organisational
measures (U = 104.000, P = 0.033) (Table 5.26). It can be further concluded that the
availability of staff for IS security elicited statistical significance in applying
organisational measures in Malaysian academic libraries than academic libraries that
have designated staff for IS security.
Table 5.26. Mann-Whitney U Test for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Organisational Measures due to Availability of Information
System (IS) Security Staff.
No Variable U p Finding
1. Organisational measures 104.000 0.033 Significant
n=38
Testing Hypothesis 2.6
There is no significant difference between academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
organisational measures due to availability of wireless connection.
The results in the table 5.27 shows that the significance of organisational measures is
above 0.05, (H(1)=3.390, p › 0.05), which illustrates that there are no differences
between Malaysian academic libraries in applying organisational measures due to the
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availability of wireless connection. This result denotes that sub-hypothesis 2.6 is
accepted. Thus, there is no difference in applying organisational measures among
Malaysian academic libraries that have wireless connection and academic libraries that
do not have wireless connection.
Table 5.27. Kruskal-Wallis Test  for Testing the Differences between Academic
Libraries in Applying Organisational Measures due to Availability of Wireless
Connection.
No Variable Chi-Square df p Finding
1. Organisational measures 3.390 1 0.066 Not Significant
5.4 Assessing the Status of Information Security Measures Implementation
Using Information Security Measures Assessment Tool
Not much is known about the actual scenario of ISec practices specifically in the library
setting. Thus, one could not assert whether libraries are lacking or adequate in
information security. As highlighted by Newby (2002), ISec is often under-appreciated
in libraries and this is surprising as information is the library’s main business.
Therefore, we attempt to propose an assessment tool for assessing the current ISec
practices deployed by Malaysian libraries in managing their information security. This
assessment tool is designed based on the proposed Library Information Security
Assessment Model (LISAM) to encourage academic libraries to adopt the best practices
for ISec measures. It represents a roadmap for the implementation, evaluation and
improvement of IS security practices for a library that adopts it.
189
5.4.1 Assessment and Scoring Instrument
A scoring tool is designed specifically to determine the overall score for ISec
safeguarding measures in a library as well as a total score for each component of ISec
measures. This tool is an adaptation of the Information Security Governance (ISG)
Assessment Tool for Higher Education (EDUCAUSE/Internet2 Security Task, 2004).
(a) Assessing the Overall Implementation Status of Technological Measures
As can be seen from Table 5.28, the status of technological measures in the sampled
academic libraries (73.7%) in Malaysia is high. This result reveals that these academic
libraries have implemented necessary technological security countermeasures to protect
their hardware, workstations, servers, software, data, network and its physical facilities.
Table 5.28 Status of Technological Measures by Types of Academic Libraries in
Malaysia
Status of
Technological
Measures
Type of University
Total
Public
university
Private
university
University
college
Very High Count 2 0 2 4
% within
column
14.3% .0% 16.7% 10.5%
High Count 10 10 8 28
% within
column
71.4% 83.3% 66.7% 73.7%
Medium Count 2 2 2 6
% within
column
14.3% 16.7% 16.7% 15.8%
Total Count 14 12 12 38
% within
column
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 5.29 shows that academic libraries in this study have high presence of
technological security controls for their hardware, software, workstations, servers, data,
networks and physical facilities.
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Table 5.29. Presence of Technological Measures in Malaysian Academic Libraries
Status of Technological Measures
Type of Academic Libraries at…
TotalPublic
University
Private
University
University
College
Hardware Security Medium 1 (7.1%) 6 (50.0%) 6 (50.0%) 13 (34.2%)
High 8 (57.1%) 4 (33.3%) 5 (41.7%) 17 (44.7%)
Very High 5 (35.7%) 2 (16.7%) 1 (8.3%) 8 (21.1%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%)
Software Security Medium 4 (28.6%) 6 (50.0%) 6 (50.0%) 16 (42.1%)
High 7 (50.0%) 5 (41.7%) 4 (33.3%) 16 (42.1%)
Very High 3 (21.4%) 1 (8.3%) 2 (16.7%) 6 (15.8%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%)
Workstation
Security
Medium 2 (14.3%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 6 (15.8%)
High 6 (42.9%) 8 (66.7%) 8 (66.7%) 23 (60.5%)
Very High 6 (42.9%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 9 (23.7%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%)
Network Security Medium 2 (14.3%) 3 (25.0%) 4 (33.3%) 9 (23.7%)
High 8 (57.1%) 6 (50.0%) 5 (41.7%) 19 (50.0%)
Very High 4 (28.6%) 3 (25.0%) 3 (25.0%) 10 (26.3%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%)
Server Security Medium 2 (14.3%) 1 (8.3%) 2 (16.7%) 5 (13.2%)
High 6 (42.9%) 8 (66.7%) 8 (66.7%) 22 (57.9%)
Very High 6 (42.9%) 3 (25.0%) 2 (16.7%) 11 (28.9%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%)
Data Security Medium 4 (28.6%) 4 (33.3%) 2 (16.7%) 10 (26.3%)
High 7 (50.0%) 7 (58.3%) 8 (66.7%) 22 (57.9%)
Very High 3 (21.4%) 1 (8.3%) 2 (16.7%) 6 (15.8%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%)
Physical Security Medium 3 (21.4%) 3 (25.0%) 5 (41.7%) 11 (28.9%)
High 10 (71.4%) 9 (75.0%) 5 (41.7%) 24 (63.2%)
Very High 1 (7.1%) 0 (.0%) 2 (16.7%) 3 (7.9%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%)
Only four (10.5%) academic libraries have ‘very high’ implementation level for
technological security controls. A cross tabulation between the status of technological
measures and percentage of IS security budget reveals that these four academic libraries
have received the highest percentage of budget allocation for IS security (Table 5.30).
The assessment also reveals that six (15.8%) academic libraries have a medium level of
technological security countermeasures. Unsurprisingly, two of these academic libraries
received less than 1% of financial support for IS security.
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Table 5.30 Status of Technological Measures by Percentage of Security Budget in
Malaysian Academic Libraries
Status of
Technological
Measures
Percentage of Security Budget
Total
Less than
1%
Between
1% to 3%
Between
4% to 5%
More than
5%
Medium Count 2 0 1 0 3
% within
column
25.0% .0% 11.1% .0% 9.4%
% of Total 6.3% .0% 3.1% .0% 9.4%
High Count 6 11 5 3 25
% within
column
75.0% 100.0% 55.6% 75.0% 78.1%
% of Total 18.8% 34.4% 15.6% 9.4% 78.1%
Very High Count 0 0 3 1 4
% within
column
.0% .0% 33.3% 25.0% 12.5%
% of Total .0% .0% 9.4% 3.1% 12.5%
Total Count 8 11 9 4 32
% within
column
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 25.0% 34.4% 28.1% 12.5% 100.0%
When comparing the status of technological countermeasures at three different types of
academic libraries (Figure 5.1), it is apparent that 71.4% (10) of academic libraries at
public universities, 83.3% (10) of academic libraries at private universities and 66.7%
academic libraries at university colleges have high technological measures.
Surprisingly, 16.7% (2) of academic libraries in university colleges and 14.3% (2) of
academic libraries in public universities have very high technological countermeasures.
In comparison, none of the academic libraries in private universities have very high
technological security protection. However, 14.3% (2) of academic libraries in public
universities, 16.7% (2) of academic libraries at private universities and 16.7% (2) of
academic libraries in university colleges indicated medium level of technological
countermeasures; thus pointing to the need of improvement to improve the situation.
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Figure 5.1 Status of Technological Measures by Type of Academic Library in Malaysia
(c) Assessing the Overall Implementation Status of Organisational Measures
In addition to the technological measures, this assessment tool also assesses
organisational measures that encompass elements and issues related to governance,
management and people. The second step is used to assess the presence of ISec policies
in a library. The third staircase refines the IS security procedures that should be in place
to develop appropriate security tools and methods. The fourth step assesses the presence
of administrative security routines in a library’s daily routine. The final step evaluates
the presence of ISec awareness activities in an academic library to strengthen the IS
security initiatives within its community. Results indicated in Table 5.31 reveal that a
majority of academic libraries (65.8%) in Malaysia require improvement on
organisational countermeasures, whereas 22.0% are considered poor at the
implementation of organisational security measures and a small number (13.2%) of
academic libraries have good practices for organisational security measures. This
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implies that academic libraries in Malaysia need to improve their security measures by
strengthening the elements related to governance, managerial and people.
Table 5.31. Status of Organisational Measures by Type of Academic Library
Status of
Organisational
Measures
Type of University
Total
Public
university
Private
university
University
college
Good Count 3 1 1 5
% within
column
21.4% 8.3% 8.3% 13.2%
Needs improvement Count 9 8 8 25
% within
column
64.3% 66.7% 66.7% 65.8%
Poor Count 2 3 3 8
% within
column
14.3% 25.0% 25.0% 21.1%
Total Count 14 12 12 38
% within
column
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 5.32 clearly reveals that most academic libraries in public universities (64.3%),
private universities (66.7%) and university colleges (66.7%) need to improve their
organisational security measures. Table 6.5 also reveals that a number of public
university libraries (14.3%), private university libraries (625.0%) and college university
libraries (25.0%) have poor security practices for organisational measures. However,
there are a small number of academic libraries in public universities (21.4%), private
universities (8.3%) and university colleges (8.3%) that have implemented good security
practices for organisational measures.
The results show an average emphasis on administrative tools and methods in the
sampled academic libraries (Table 5.32). However, the presence of ISec policies,
security procedures and controls and awareness creation activities is high among a
majority of the academic libraries in this study.
194
Table 5.32. Presence of Organisational Measures in Malaysian Academic Libraries
Status of Organisational Measures
Type of Academic Libraries at…
TotalPublic
University
Private
University
University
College
ISec Policy Medium 2 (14.3%) 4(33.3%) 2 (16.7%) 8 (21.1%)
High 9 (64.3%) 5 (41.7%) 8 (66.7%) 22 (57.9%)
Very High 3 (21.4%) 3 (25.0%) 2 (25.0%) 8 (21.1%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12
(100.0%)
12 (100.0%) 38
(100.0%)
Procedures and Controls Low 1 (7.1%) 1 (8.3%) 1 (8.3%) 3 (7.9%)
Medium 3 (21.4%) 3 (25.0%) 6 (50.0%) 12 (31.6%)
High 4 (28.6%) 6 (50.0%) 3 (25.0%) 13 (34.2%)
Very High 6 (42.9%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 10 (26.3%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12
(100.0%)
12 (100.0%) 38
(100.0%)
Administrative Tools
and Methods
Low 1 (7.1%) 0 (.0%) 1 (8.3%) 2 (5.3%)
Medium 5 (35.7%) 7 (58.3%) 7 (58.3%) 19 (50.0%)
High 6 (42.9%) 3 (25.0%) 3 (25.0%) 12 (31.6%)
Very High 2 (14.3%) 2 (16.7%) 1 (8.3%) 5 (13.2%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12
(100.0%)
12 (100.0%) 38
(100.0%)
Awareness Creation Low 2 (14.3%) 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 2 (5.3%)
Medium 5 (35.7%) 6 (50.0%) 3 (25.0%) 14 (36.8%)
High 4 (28.6%) 4 (33.3%) 7 (58.3%) 15 (39.5%)
Very High 3 (21.4%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 7 (18.4%)
Total 14 (100.0%) 12
(100.0%)
12 (100.0%) 38
(100.0%)
When comparing the status of organisational and technological measures, it is apparent
that a large number of academic libraries that have a high status of technological
measures do not necessarily have the best or good organisational measures. As can be
seen in Table 5.33, a majority of academic libraries that needs improvement (76.0%)
and have poor practices (62.5%) for organisational measures have high technological
security measures. This study has found that generally, many academic libraries in
Malaysia have been focusing on technological countermeasures rather than
organisational measures. Thus, it is necessary for these libraries to put organisational
measures in place to secure the libraries’ ISec which may require many approaches and
methods and cannot rely solely on technology alone.
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Table 5.33. Status of Organisational Measures by Status of Technological Measures
Status of
Organisational
Measures
Status of
Technological Measures
TotalMedium High Very High
Good Count 0 4 1 5
% within column .0% 14.3% 25.0% 13.2%
Needs improvement Count 3 19 3 25
% within column 50.0% 67.9% 75.0% 65.8%
Poor Count 3 5 0 8
% within column 50.0% 17.9% .0% 21.1%
Total Count 6 28 4 38
% within column 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(e) Assessing the Implementation Status of Information Security Measures
in Malaysian Academic Libraries
Table 5.34 shows the results of overall status of IS security measures in Malaysian
academic libraries. Findings indicate that approximately half of the academic libraries
(55.3%) surveyed have good practices of IS security measures but require improvement
on organisational measures. On the other hand, 21.1% of academic libraries have poor
practices and need immediate attention on organisational measures. Only a small
number of academic libraries (15.8%) have very good practices on IS security
measures. A minority of the participating academic libraries (7.9%) has average
practices but need improvement on organisational measures.
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Table 5.34. Overall Implementation Status of Information Security Measures in
Malaysian Academic Libraries
Overall Implementation Status of ISec
Measures
Type of Academic Libraries
at…
Total
Pu
bli
c
uni
ver
sity
Pri
vat
e
uni
ver
sity
Un
ive
rsit
y
col
leg
e
Very good Count 3 1 2 6
% within column 21.4% 8.3% 16.7% 15.8%
Good practices but needs improvement
on organisational measures
Count 9 7 5 21
% within column 64.3% 58.3% 41.7% 55.3%
Average practices but needs
improvement on Organisational
measures
Count 0 1 2 3
% within column .0% 8.3% 16.7% 7.9%
Poor practices needing immediate
attention on organisational measures
Count 2 3 3 8
% within column 14.3% 25.0% 25.0% 21.1%
Total Count 14 12 12 38
% within column 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
When comparing the three different types of academic libraries (see Table 5.34 and
Figure 5.2), the striking results that emerged from the data are as follows: 64.3% of
public university libraries, 58.3% of academic libraries in private universities and
41.7% of academic libraries in university colleges have good practices but need
improvement on organisational measures. In contrast, only 21.4% of public university
libraries, 8.3% of academic libraries in private universities and 16.7% of academic
libraries in university colleges have very good practices on securing their information
security. Only one (8.3%) academic library in public university and two (16.7%)
academic libraries in university colleges have average practices but need improvement
on organisational measures. The remaining 14.3% of the public university libraries,
25.0% of academic libraries at private universities and 25.0% of academic libraries in
university colleges have poor practices, thus require immediate action for organisational
measures.
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Figure 5.2 Overall Status of Information Security Practices in Malaysian Academic
Libraries
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented an Information Security Measures Assessment Tool (adapted
from Information Security Governance Assessment Tool for Higher Education) for
academic libraries which assess technological measures and organisational measures as
an attempt to determine the status of ISec measures in Malaysian academic libraries.
The chapter started with a discussion on a scoring tool or assessment tool specifically
designed to asses the status of technological measures and organisational measures as
well as the overall status of ISec measures in Malaysian academic libraries.
The summary of results from assessing the implementation level of security measures in
academic libraries in Malaysia has indicated the following:
(a) With regard to the level of implementation of hardware security measures, the
use of CCTV, visual camera, magnetic detection system and electronic anti-theft
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system at strategic places, public computer areas and server areas have the
highest mean with a statistical value of 3.29 and standard deviation of 1.063.
(b) With regard to the level of implementation of workstation security measures, use
of virus protection programs, configuration settings and security software
programs for web browsers and email programs carried the highest mean with a
statistical value of 3.87 and standard deviation of 0.78.
(c) In terms of network security controls, academic libraries in this study have
configured their antivirus software and desktop security software to receive
frequent updates (Mean=3.53, SD=0.86), used firewall (Mean=3.26, SD=1.20),
and used digital signatures to assure the authenticity of any electronic
documents sent via the library’s network (Mean=3.13, SD=1.12). However,
these network security controls have not been revised.
(d) Respondents believed that their academic libraries have restricted access to the
file system in a server by using the file or directory permissions (Mean=3.53,
SD=1.06), placed server(s) in a secure location (Mean=3.53, SD=1.18) and used
up-to-date anti-virus software on servers (Mean=3.39, SD=1.13).
(e) Academic libraries in this study have regularly backed up the libraries’ vital
business information or records (Mean=3.55, SD=0.95), properly recorded the
attributes for each removable media application and kept the media from any
unauthorised device (Mean=3.32, SD=1.12) and used a combination of
authentication systems to restrict access of library data and resources based on a
variety of access rights (Mean=3.21, SD=1.07) but these kinds of security
measures have not been reviewed regularly at their libraries.
(f) Administrative tools and methods had the lowest total mean score with a
statistical value of 2.52 and standard deviation of 1.11.
(g) In terms of presence of ISec procedures and controls, the academic libraries in
this study have implemented but never reviewed the controls and disciplinary
procedures such as verbal warning, written warning, suspension and dismissal in
case a library staff or patron breaches the IS security policies or rules
(Mean=3.16, SD=1.03).
(h) Respondents indicated that their academic libraries have regularly identified and
updated any threats that could harm and adversely affect critical operations of
the libraries’ IS security, but this stage has never been reviewed (Mean=3.05
SD=1.11).
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(i) There is a difference between Malaysian academic libraries in applying
technological measures due current budget allocated to the information system
security (H(3)=11.776, p ‹ 0.05).
(j) The availability of dedicated staff for IS security elicited statistical significance
in applying technical measures in Malaysian academic libraries than academic
libraries that do not have  dedicated staff for IS security (U = 94.500, P = 0.016).
(k) There is a difference between Malaysian academic libraries in applying
organisational measures due to the library’s yearly information system security
budget (H(3)=15.548, p ‹ 0.05).
(l) Results revealed that 73% of academic libraries are at high level of
implementation of technological measures, signifying that these academic
libraries have implemented the necessary technological security
countermeasures to protect their hardware, workstations, servers, software, data,
network and physical facilities.
(m)The assessment on organisational measures revealed that 65% of academic
libraries in Malaysia require improvement on organisational countermeasures.
(n) Findings revealed that 21% of the academic libraries are considered poor in
implementation of organisational security measures, thus they need to improve
their ISec measures by strengthening the elements related to governance,
managerial and people.
(o) The overall status of ISec measures in Malaysian academic libraries revealed
that less than 20% of academic libraries surveyed have very good practices of
ISecmeasures and 50% of academic libraries have good practice of ISec
measures but require improvement on organisational measures.
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Chapter Six ______________________________
Discussion and Conclusion
6.0 Introduction
It is claimed that a library, regardless of its size and type, might face the same security
challenges, thus it requires effective information security management (ISM) in order to
protect its critical library information systems (IS) services from interruptions and to
make them available to its end users. It is also argued that the actual status of
information security (ISec) practices within the library settings remains unclear as very
few empirical studies related to ISec has been conducted specifically in a library setting.
The rationale of this research was to conduct ISec assessment in academic libraries by
ascertaining the types of ISec threats faced and the level of implementation of security
measures deployed by these libraries to ensure the security of their IS. The research also
assessed the level of implementation of technical security measures (hardware,
workstations, servers, software, data, network and physical facilities) and organisational
security measures (security policy, procedures and controls, tools and methods, and
awareness measures) in these libraries. The research also determined the overall status
of ISec practices in these academic libraries.
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The first section of this chapter provides an overview of all the previous chapters. It also
summarises the main findings of the research. The next section discusses the
contributions of this research. The third section presents the limitation of the research
design and framework. The final section of this chapter closes with a suggestion on
further research areas.
6.1 Overview of the Thesis
A sound ISec practice depends on effective ISec solutions, which encompass technical
and non-technical safeguards to minimise vulnerabilities associated with a variety of
threats (Westby and Allen, 2007; Scarfone, et al., 2008, Gupta and Sharman, 2009).
This explains why many organisations have invested millions in securing their IT
infrastructures in various forms of physical, personnel and administrative defences to
reduce the frequency and severity of computer security-related losses (Guttman and
Roback, 1995). In the current library environment, IS are widely used to provide
digitally delivered services and collections to local and remote patrons. Connecting a
library to the outside world via the Internet has changed the risks associated and the
controls used to secure the IS. Therefore, it is necessary to be aware of IS security
because much of the value of a library’s main business or services is concentrated in the
value of its IS.
The literature review in chapter two demonstrated there was a gap between findings in
the library setting with other areas as many attempts have been made to understand the
ISec landscape in health industries, banking industries, public governments, public
offices and higher learning institutions, but very few research have paid attention to
libraries. Research focusing on ISec threats recognised that security threats can be
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found through natural disaster, technical error and human error (Bryson, 1999; Yeh and
Cheng, 2007; Samy, Rabiah and Zuraini, 2009). Therefore, there is an encouragement
to incorporate non IT-related countermeasures (some organisational and people issues)
in dealing with ISec threats rather than just relying on the traditional approaches
(technology-related countermeasures) (Dhillon, 2001; Calder and Watkins, 2003; Chan,
et al., 2005; Ma and Pearson, 2005; Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Suhazimah, 2007;
and Vaast, 2007). Chao (2005) described several methods, models, tools and packages
for assessing general ISec programmes. However, these available tools have different
target audiences and their coverage might not be suitable to the library characteristics
and environments. By combining technical and organisational approaches, a model of to
assess library ISec system was proposed and developed. The model was used as a basis
for the research framework in this empirical study.
The research methodology and design that has been deployed in the study was
presented in chapter three. It outlines the presentation of research design approach and
discussion of the instrument development and measures taken to verify the reliability
and validity of the instrument. Procedures for data collection are explained; the sample
collected was described and this was followed by the plans for the data analysis phase.
All these are associated with the research purposes and research questions in order to
show the manner by which data are to be collected and analysed. Subsequently,
collection of evidence and analysis through quantitative methods were performed in
order to understand the ISec landscape in Malaysian academic libraries.
The research results are presented in two parts; chapter four reported and discussed
findings related to research objectives 1 to 3, whereas the findings to objective 4 are
revealed in chapter five. Chapter five presented the descriptive findings of the most
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common perceived ISec threats experiences over six months in Malaysian academic
libraries, the frequency of occurrence of these incidents, the most common perceived
source of ISec threats and most importantly, the highlight on types and extent of
technological measures and organisational measures deployed by these libraries to
ensure the security of their information and resources. Chapter six reported the overall
security status of all technological measures and organisational measures in Malaysian
academic libraries, based on the proposed scoring tool and the Library Information
Security Assessment Model (LISAM).
6.2 Discussion
6.2.10 The General Background of IT Infrastructures in Malaysian Academic
Libraries
In this section, IT infrastructures refer to the number of PC  allocations, availability of
wireless connection, type of operating system used, years of Information
Communication Technology (ICT) adoption, percentage of IS security budget and
availability of IS security staff. Academic libraries in this study have demonstrated
appropriate years of experience in the development and implementation of ICT, as
approximately 46% of the libraries surveyed have five to 10 years experiences in using
the ICT. It is not surprising that a majority of academic libraries in Malaysia have
adopted wireless services. The mobility provided via wireless networks can better fulfill
the computing needs of students and faculty members than the traditional wired version
(Foster, 1996). Accordingly, a majority of these libraries (59.0%) provide less than 100
PCs for their patrons as patrons are allowed to use their own laptops in the library and
connect to the free wireless connection. This study also serves as an evidence that
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employees in academic libraries rely on PCs as their primary computing devices while
performing their work, thus it is likely that their PCs contain all of their critical personal
and business data. It is also apparent that many academic libraries in Malaysia,
especially the libraries in university colleges, received inadequate financial support for
IS security. This is parallel with Raymond (1990) who reported that smaller
organisations often suffer from a lack of human and financial resources. As the
implementation of security technologies can be costly, lack of financial support is likely
to be one of the critical factors of ineffective IS security. Breeding (2003) asserted that
libraries often do not have full-time systems administrators and security specialists to
take charge of IS security. Inconsistent with Breeding’s view, this study demonstrates
some positive progress and concerns regarding the availability of IS staff in the majority
of Malaysian academic libraries, even though some academic libraries in university
colleges are still lagging in this regard.
6.2.11 The Most Common Perceived Information Security Threats in Malaysian
Academic Libraries in Terms of Hardware, Software, Data, Network and
Human-Related Threats.
Parallel with existing research findings, hardware security threats, human-related threats
and physical threats were perceived as the most common security threats in Malaysian
academic libraries. However, there is hope that data security threat is perceived as the
least threatening to academic libraries. Since a library stores, processes and provides
access to vast amounts of data, it will definitely need to ensure the security of its data
against accidental loss, unauthorised modification and access by taking appropriate
measures. Maintenance error is viewed as the most prevalent threat to hardware and
software security in Malaysian academic libraries. On the other hand, IP spoofing
attacks, use of weak passwords and unauthorised access are revealed as the most
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ordinary network security threats faced by these libraries. Social engineering, loss of
patron data and malicious code attacks have caused considerable disturbance to these
academic libraries as dangerous to their vital data. It is possible that social engineering
attacks may became common in libraries, because reference inquiries made by a patron
about the IS resources available at a library may be used for nefarious purposes
(Thompson, 2006).
Intrusion or unauthorised access into the library building is seen as another dangerous
threat to academic libraries, which can lead to theft of valuable materials. This is why,
unauthorised access into the library building, theft and leaking are still ranked as the
popular threats to the academic libraries’ physical facilities. This finding is supported
by Lowes (2010) who reported that theft of computers and data storage devices account
for 56% of all the breaches in healthcare data security in the United States. Many
surveys and studies indicated that human errors are the most highly ranked security
threats (Loch et al., 1992; Whitman, 2003; Im and Baskerville, 2005). Thus, there is
little surprise that human error including data entry errors or carelessness, employee
misconduct and unfaithful patrons were found to be the most commonly perceived IS
security threats in Malaysian academic libraries. These erroneous actions by employees
or users can threaten the integrity, availability, confidentiality and reliability of data.
6.2.12 The Frequency of Occurrence of Hardware Security Threats, Software
Security Threats, Data Security Threats, Network Security Threats,
Physical Security Threats and Human-Related Threats in Malaysian
Academic Libraries.
It is interesting to discover the frequency of occurrence for hardware security threats,
software security threats, data security threats, network security threats, physical
security threats and human-related threats in these academic libraries. This survey
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suggests that there were slightly high frequencies of occurrence of hardware
maintenance errors, use of unauthorised hardware and malicious code attacks. Findings
also indicated that these libraries experienced software maintenance errors, system
errors and use of unauthorised software relatively frequently. In addition to
unauthorised access, data loss due to wrong procedures of updating or backup, loss of
patron data or privacy and phishing sometimes happened in these libraries. As for
network security threats, findings indicated that there were slightly high frequencies of
occurrence of IP spoofing attacks, use of weak password, spamming and malicious code
attacks. Results also highlighted failure of power supply, leaking, theft, vandalism and
unauthorised access into the library building occured relatively frequently in Malaysian
academic libraries. As for human-related threats, findings show that employee
misconduct, unfaithful staff, social engineering and unfaithful patrons sometimes posed
as threats in Malaysian academic libraries. The same scenario have been reported by
Deloitte Global TMT Security Survey 2009, where 41% of respondents in their survey
experienced at least one internal security breach due to employee misconduct or human
errors in the 12 months (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2009).
6.2.13 The Most Common Perceived Source of Information Security Threats in
Malaysian Academic Libraries.
Judging from the security incidents that occurred in Malaysian academic libraries, there
is a necessity to identify the main source of threats in these libraries. Findings revealed
that there are similarities between the main source of threats in this study and those
described by Bryson (1999). Bryson (1999) also reported that most of the security
threats can be found through human error, natural disasters and hardware or software
failures. A possible explanation for this might be that equipment failure and software
failure always happens accidentally and it is undeniably difficult to handle unknown
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and unpredictable failures, therefore, they can become a great source of threat to any
computer system. As explained by Pearson (2001), ‘many network failures have been
due to such unpredictability [and] making an apparently small adjustment to a network
can have devastating effects’. Another possible explanation for this is that ICT
infrastructures require proper temperature, dust and humid-free area and undeniably, the
environmental factors also play an important role to sustain these infrastructures.
However, natural disasters sometimes bring loss to human beings and properties. For
instance, the huge tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011 affected Japan's eastern
coast, killing 13,500 people and 17,000 people are still missing. This phenomenon has
affected the US Cable Network (JUCN) and Asia Pacific Cable Network 2 (APCN2)
cable networks that connect Malaysia to the United States of America (USA) and Hong
Kong (HK). As a result, Malaysian Internet users experienced some difficulty in
accessing international websites hosted in the USA, Europe and North Asia (Telekom
Malaysia Berhad, 2011).
6.2.14 Level of Implementation of Technological Measures in Malaysian Academic
Libraries.
Overall, the results suggest that Malaysia academic libraries have implemented several
technical security controls for hardware security, software security, workstation
security, network security, server security, data security and physical and environmental
security. 42% of respondents reported that their academic libraries have implemented
and regularly reviewed the use of close-circuit television (CCTV), visual camera,
magnetic detection system and electronic anti-theft system at strategic places, public
computer areas and server areas. Since security incidents may be caused by internal and
external users, the video surveillance and CCTV systems serve as an economical
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security tool to monitor work areas, identify visitors and employees, deter theft and
ensure safety of the library building and other facilities (Rajendran and
Rathinasabapathy, 2007). It is encouraging to find that almost half of respondents
confirmed that the use of anti spyware software to detect and remove spyware threats
was implemented and reviewed on regular basis in these libraries. It is probable that
many library employees and patrons are aware of Internet security threats, thus, libraries
should use anti-spyware software, spam filtering software, anti-phishing solutions and
web filtering software to prevent any spyware, spamming, phishing attacks and access
to inappropriate materials or sites (Ferrer and Mead, 2003; Ohaya, 2006; Ormes, 2001).
36% of respondents believed that their academic libraries have implemented and
regularly reviewed the use of user identification and authentication before logging into
the library’s workstations, library network or campus network. A possible explanation
for this might be that identification, authentication and authorisation are the most
common access controls used in most IS to protect against access by unauthorised users.
In a library, patrons must identify and authenticate themselves before gaining access to
the library computers, databases and servers. If attempts of identification and
authentication fail repeatedly, access is to be denied.
The current study also found that 47% of respondents agreed that their library’s vital
data and documents related to the server were regularly backed up and stored at an
offsite location and the action is regularly reviewed. This finding is in agreement with
Eisenberg and Lawthers (2005) suggested libraries to perform regular backups for the
data, installation software, hardware specifications and installation passwords as they
are vulnerable to viruses, hackers, fire or flood. 34% of respondents revealed that their
libraries did not implement any data security measures to control unethical activity and
disclosure of information. One of the possible reasons for this survey result is that
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subjects in this study are all academic libraries in higher education institutions. The
people in these organisations are students, academicians and staff; thus we can perceive
that they have less malevolent intentions than external hackers. Nonetheless, according
a survey report, the most common of internal IS security threats came from internal
users, including employees, due to their curiosity, recklessness, lack of time,
malevolence and ignorance (Vaast, 2007).
It is interesting to note that in this study, 71% of respondents agreed that their libraries
did not use flood detectors or earthquake early warning systems as an emergency
warning prior in case of flood and damaging ground movement. These findings are
rather disappointing as flooding is the most significant natural hazard in Malaysia in
terms of frequency and affected areas especially in East and West Malaysia. This result
may be explained by the fact that most of the construction technology of integrated
floating house system for flood-prone areas is still a new idea and approach in
Malaysia. Also, not much has been written on the actual loss of data or access denial to
computing resources due to floods in Malaysian libraries. Moreover, Malaysia is
fortunate in the sense that it is not directly affected by serious disasters like earthquakes
and volcanic eruptions. Therefore, there is no perceived need to consider the use of such
mitigating measures to ensure the safety of these libraries from floods and earthquake
threats.
6.2.15 Differences in Applying the Technical Measures due to Selected Academic
Libraries’ Demographic Profiles
It is reported that limitations of budget, time and staff to focus on security are seen as
barriers to good security measures in an organisations (CIO Magazine and
PriceWaterhouseCooper Worldwide Information Security Research Sudy, 2003). It is
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rational to expect that management support should bring positive and proactive
measures of ISec in libraries. This study found significant differences among academic
libraries in Malaysia in applying technological measures due to yearly information
system’s security budget and availability of IS security staff. The implementation of
security technologies can be costly. Therefore, it is likely true that high levels of
implementation of technological measures in Malaysian academic libraries are
associated with higher percentages of yearly IS security budget and availability of a
designated individual for IS security in these libraries. However, this study revealed no
significant differences among academic libraries in Malaysia in applying the
technological measures due to type of university, number of staff, years in ICT adoption
and availability of wireless connection in these libraries.
6.2.16 Level of Implementation of Organisational Measures in Malaysian
Academic Libraries.
Prior studies have noted the importance of non IT-related countermeasures including
some organisational and people issues in dealing with IS security threats (Backhouse
and Dhillon, 2001; Chan, et al., 2005; Ma and Pearson, 2005; Dhillon and Torkzadeh,
2006; Suhazimah, 2007; and Vaast, 2007). However, very little was found in the
literature on the types and implementation statuses of organisational measures such as
security policies, security procedures and controls, administrative methods and
awareness activities especially in libraries. The present study was designed to determine
the types and actual implementation levels of organisational measures in Malaysian
academic libraries. The results of this study show that 57% of respondents indicated that
their academic libraries have implemented and regularly reviewed policies on
acceptable use of wireless devices such as laptops, PDAs and hand phones. A possible
explanation for this might be that accessing the Internet through a wireless network is
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not always secure. Through this policy, patrons are alerted on the safety of their
devices or laptop configurations resulting from the library’s wireless connection and the
risks of data transmitted across its wireless network. There is a possibility that data sent
to or from an individual wireless device may be monitored, captured or altered by party
outside a library.
It is interesting to note that 34% of respondents in this study believed that their
academic libraries have implemented and regularly reviewed the controls and
disciplinary procedures if a library staff or patron breaches IS security policies or rules.
These findings further support the idea of ISACA (2009), which suggested that
organisations establish and consistently apply a formal disciplinary process in dealing
with those who commit security breaches such as employees and third parties. The
current study also found that 31% of respondents noted that their libraries did not
implement procedures for owner accountability to ensure protection of library IS assets.
A possible explanation for these results may be a lack of awareness on the importance
of creating guidelines and procedures in an organisation as one of the best tools in
defending against human-created security problems as well as establishing details on
the roles and responsibilities for security administrators and users to maintain the
security of the systems and networks (Conklin, et al., 2005). Only 36% of respondents
believed that their academic libraries have fully implemented procedures on handling,
reporting and responding to ISec events to affected parties such as individuals, law
enforcement and campus or parent organisations.
This study has been unable to demonstrate the importance of ISec awareness
programmes in Malaysian academic libraries. Findings revealed that 21% of
respondents noted that all staff and patrons at various levels did not receive appropriate
ISec training and education in their academic libraries. Thus, organisations, including
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libraries, are suggested to focus on educating personnel through a security programmes
that addresses user education, awareness and training on policies and procedures that
affect them (Merkow and Breithaupt, 2005). Many respondents (47%) indicated that
they received only some support and commitment from the top management to
coordinate the implementation of IS security controls in their libraries. This study
produced results that corroborate the findings of a great deal of the previous work in
this field. As highlighted by Hight (2005), top management must take an active
approach to the security of an organisation by supporting and following the policy
themselves. 41% of respondents also revealed that vulnerabilities related to their library
IS were not identified and regularly updated. This finding is somewhat discouraging as
properly designed and periodically updated ISec awareness policies within an
organisation is vital in order to make the end-users aware of IS security issues,
including the potential breaches to security and of the risks associated with these
breaches (Vaast, 2007).
6.2.17 Differences in Applying Organisational Measures due to Selected Academic
Libraries’ Demographic Profiles
This study found significant differences among academic libraries in Malaysia in
applying the organisational measures due to number of staff, yearly information system
security budget and availability of IS security staff. This study is parallel with findings
from Chang and Ho (2006), who also concluded that factors such as top management
support and organisation size are related to the implementation of security controls in
various organisations in Taiwan. It is possible that larger academic libraries could offer
more sophisticated security measures than small academic libraries. In ISec
management, it is more meaningful to use number of employees to measure the size of a
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firm because each employee is an independent variable in managing ISec (Kim and
Kbzullak, 2008).
It is also highlighted that a security education and awareness effort would benefit ISec
efforts more than lack of support from the management of an organisation (Hight,
2005). This implies that it is not easy to implement security controls when people do not
have enough orientation or education about the best ISec practices. Therefore, it is
evident that availability of designated staff IS security elicited statistical significance in
applying organisational measures in Malaysian academic libraries. However, this study
revealed no significant differences among academic libraries in Malaysia in applying
the organisational measures due to type of university, years in ICT adoption and
availability of wireless connection in these libraries.
6.2.18 The Overall Security Status of Technological Measures and Organisational
Measures in Malaysian Academic Libraries.
This study set out with the aim of assessing the overall security status of all
technological and organisational security measures in Malaysian academic libraries.
The most important finding was a general picture on the status of IS security measures
of academic libraries in Malaysia. The results revealed that these academic libraries
demonstrated a higher implementation of technological measures than organisational
measures in protecting each library’s IS security. As predicted earlier, results also
showed that technological and organisational security measures have been more widely
adopted in public university libraries as compared with other academic libraries in
private universities and the university colleges.
The current study also found that the presence of technological measures is high as
there was visible presence of technological security controls for the hardware, software,
workstations, servers, network and physical facilities in Malaysian academic libraries.
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This result may be explained by the fact that these academic libraries have been
focusing more on ‘visible’ prevention measures demonstrated by observable physical
aspects of monitoring tools such as security cameras, locks, warning signs and fences
that are more noticeable to library staff, users and outsiders as compared to less visible
security controls such as implementation of security policies, procedures and awareness
programmes for staff. This is undeniably true as some solutions to security challenges
have been technological (Volonino and Robinson, 2004).
In general, the presence of organisational security measures in most academic libraries
is average. Detailed analysis showed there was clear presence of ISec policies, security
procedures and awareness creation activities in Malaysian academic libraries. However,
there was a lack of emphasis on administrative tools and methods in Malaysian
academic libraries. Therefore, it is necessary to put organisational measures in place as
relying on technology alone will not solve the security problems (Conklin, et al., 2005).
Overall, half of the academic libraries (55.3%) surveyed have good practices of IS
security measures but require improvement on organisational measures. This
improperly secured situation could result in a variety of security issues as most of
today’s security challenges are related to human and organisational aspects (Anderson,
2007). This result corroborates the findings of a great deal of the previous work in other
fields. Many researchers has highlighted the importance of creating the policies,
standards, guidelines and procedures in an organisation as one of the best tools in
protecting against human-created security problems as well as establishing details on
the roles for security administrators and users to maintain the security of the systems
(Dhillon, 2001; Conklin, et al., 2005).
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6.4 Contributions
Information is the lifeblood of a library and obviously, there are risks involved in the
library environments as libraries are increasingly dependent on IS and Internet
connectivity to provide online resources and digitally delivered services to local and
remote patrons. With the rising number of security breaches and the complexities of
computer attacks, security managers everywhere are looking for new solutions and
approaches in ISec management. Only after knowing the current security threats and
assessing the implementation level of information security, can academic libraries
understand the clear picture of their security programmes. This research has aimed to
study the perceived ISec threats in Malaysian academic libraries and propose an
approach to assess ISec management in libraries.
6.4.1 Framework Contributions
The model put forth in this research contributes in several ways to the Library and
Information Science (LIS) research community. Firstly, this study interpreted and re-
contextualise the works of Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008) who developed the
Organisational Information Security Staircase Model to assess the implementation of
organisational ISec measures and the effectiveness of such measures in a selection of
Norwegian organisations (Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1. Organisational Information Security Staircase Model (Hagen, Albrechtsen
and Hovden, 2008).
This interpretation is adopted and adapted by the researcher to formulate and frame the
use of countermeasures to design an information security assessment instrument in the
library context. The framing should allow for more accurate classifications of existing
and future technological and organisational countermeasures. By classifying
countermeasures, their strengths, weaknesses as well as gaps could be identified more
clearly in terms of which countermeasures have been implemented and those which
have not. The new proposed instrument is named a Library Information Security
Assessment Model (LISAM) and was also developed as a research framework used as a
basis for data collection and subsequent analysis of the findings (Figure 6.2).
Tools and methods
- Asset classiﬁcation, risk analysis; internal and
external audits, KPIs, systems for reporting and
incident handling plans.
Procedures and control
- Security routines for hired staff and telecommuters; user
instructions; non-disclosure agreements and disciplinary processes.
Information security policy
- Information security policy
Technological security foundation
Increasing
implementation
Awareness creation
- Training/education; awareness
campaigns; user participation; top
management’s engagement and
involvement .
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Figure 6.2. Library Information Security Assessment Model (LISAM)
6.3.2 Methodological Contributions
This quantitative survey shows how to apply the framework developed with the type of
data required in assessing the status of ISec in academic libraries. The researcher has
proposed a library information security assessment model (LISAM) model that is used
for data collection. This framework can be used as an alternative model in the
organisational studies of ISec in libraries. Although it may not be sufficient to explain
the complexities of technological and organisational related security issues, this model
may be used by researchers of ISec as a frame of reference or a starting point to explore
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Procedures and Control
- Controls and disciplinary procedures
- Procedures for handling sensitive data
- Intellectual property rights
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Information Security Policy
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the dynamics of technological and organisational issues surrounding security in
libraries. This research can be replicated using the same research instrument and data
collection techniques when assessing the status of an ISec in other types of libraries or
organisations.
6.3.3 Assessment Instrument to Assess the Level of Information Security
Measures Implementation
It is highlighted that many organisations, including libraries, have put too much focus
on technological factors to secure their IS while neglecting the necessary and important
factors of organisational issues. This current study extends the constructs in the
Organisational Information Security Staircase Model by specifying the assessment of
technological as well as organisational measures, thus providing a more thorough
understanding of the status of all technological measures as well as organisational
measures in a library setting. The five constructs assessed in the instruments have been
validated with Cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficients above α = 0.70. The findings of
this research contributed to the ISec domain in the library field as knowledge in
understanding the types of security tools academic libraries have, their implementation
levels as well as their overall ISec statuses.
6.3.4 Practical Contributions
The results of the current study are also relevant to practitioners. Firstly, the proposed
information security assessment model consists of technical and organisational
approaches for IS security assessment in library. This is parallel with the current
evolving body of knowledge around the principles and practices of cyber security that
gives proper attention to the roles of people (i.e. organisational dimensions), process
(i.e.
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policies and procedures dimensions) and technology (i.e. technical dimensions) in order
to implement an effective digital security programmes (Volonino and Robinson, 2004).
Secondly, this study reveals that security is more than just a traditional technological
problem as has been generally perceived. This study offers insights into the people and
processes as issues affecting ISec in libraries; which may be helpful to researchers who
adopt research approaches that may have been based on an understanding of security
issues from social and technical standpoints. This infers that the knowledge of ISec
issues must be included in the training of future librarians and knowledge workers.
Academic institutions, particularly the libraries or information science faculties and the
National Library of Malaysia may want to include ISec in the syllabus of training
programme as the current library services and in the future will be very much globalised
and dependent on IS.
Thirdly, the model can provide more insight into understanding information security
management in a library. It can be used by system librarians as an assessment tool for
libraries by enabling them to compare their outfits to similar or different libraries in
terms of size and type. This approach would allow a library to compare specific types of
countermeasures in use by their own libraries and compare them to those of their
competitors, thus enabling them to gain insight into how effectively they are managing
there is security risks. The model could also be used by libraries to provide a guide on
security budget planning. Analysis based on this model provides libraries with insight
into their current status of IS security practices and use of various countermeasures.
Based on their own analyses, they could then target specific allocation of funds to
improve or add new additional security measures at any times based on their security
needs and requirements.
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Reviewing the literature related to library ISec threats reveals insufficiency of available
studies in that particular area of research. The study assesses current ISec threats in
Malaysian academic libraries and presents a potential categorisation of general ISec
threats in a library setting (Table 6.1). Based on the findings, the researcher has
attempted to develop an index of the most common perceived threats to ISec in
academic libraries, which are classified into hardware, software, network, data, physical
and human threats in Malaysian academic libraries. This is another important research
contribution to the ISec domain in the library field.
Table 6.1: Index of the Most Common Perceived Hardware, Software,
Network, Data, Physical and Human Threats in Malaysian Academic Libraries.
Threat Category The Most Common Perceived Threats
Hardware
Maintenance errorsFailure of communication equipmentsElectromagnetic interferenceMalware and malicious codeTheft, physical sabotage, vandalism of ICT hardware equipmentsInstallation/ use of unauthorised hardware
Software
Maintenance errorsSystem errors or failureInstallation/ Use of Unauthorised programmes or softwareAdware and SpywareHacking/Intrusion/ unauthorised access to system resourcesMalware and malicious code
Network
IP spoofing attacksMisrouting/re-routing of messagesWeak passwordHacking/ Intrusion/ unauthorised accessPacking sniffsTransmission errors
Data
Impersonation/ social engineeringLoss of patron data/privacy ideasPhishing/ pharmingExposure of patrons sensitive data through web attackMalware and malicious codeDestruction due to natural disaster
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Table 6.1: Continued.
Threat Category The Most Common Perceived Threats
Physical
Intrusion/unauthorised access into library buildingLeakingTheft, burglary, sabotage, vandalism or physical intrusionsNatural calamityHazardous material accidentPower supply failure
Human
(Other threats)
Human errorsEmployee  misconductUnfaithful patronsOnline extortionSocial engineeringUnfaithful staff
6.4 Limitations
This study is not without limitations. The main contribution of the research is the
assessment of implementation status of each technological measure as well as
organisational measure in Malaysian academic library setting. Due to the small sample
size, the findings may not be applicable to other types of libraries and organisations in
Malaysia.
Secondly, with respect to data collection, 66% of individuals sampled were in
managerial positions with responsibility for ISec in their respective academic libraries.
It is likely that they were all sensitive to ISec concerns. However, it is also possible that
some of the respondents may have little or no understanding of ISec issues. In that
sense, they may be detached from the realities of ISec issues. This is common when
using survey responses from the same source because a single respondent for each
survey can only yield one perspective. Others within the same organisation may
perceive conditions to be significantly different. However, adequate confidence can be
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placed in the findings of this research because of the diversity among participants,
which minimise the influence of bias. The majority (90%) of respondents were from the
management division, which include the librarians or library executives, heads of
automation unit, IT officers or IS officers, senior librarians, automation librarians and
chief librarians or deputy chief librarians.
Another possible limitation is the way threats are treated using the current research
design. For ease of analysis, threats of IS in academic libraries were treated holistically
based on six security threats components. This means that all threats were grouped
together and treated equally. Realistically, this is not likely to be the case. More likely,
some threats are more serious than others in terms of potential damage, costs and so on.
As a result, caution should be used when drawing conclusions from the results of this
study.
Fourthly, although the choice of a quantitative survey method in this research was
adequate in obtaining data to answer the research questions, future research may
employ qualitative research design involving case studies or observations.  Integrative
triangulation approach is another possible method that can be used by combining both
quantitative and qualitative design involving in-depth interviews with top-level
management. Interviews with the top-level management could shed light on key metrics
that could possibly be used to identify the number of stages present as well as key
characteristics of particular stage and the conditions necessary for moving from one
stage to the next.
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This research is a PhD requirement, thus it is a result of a learning process and a ‘one-
man show’ with no additional labour or aid. The limitations of fund, time and
manpower restricted researcher’s ability to further explore many other domains of ISec
management in other types of libraries. Also, due to time limitation, the scoring tool
proposed for assessing ISec measures for library was not validated.
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research
The knowledge gained from this research is not only important for researchers of
information security, but will also be useful for other researchers in the field of library
and information science (LIS) as there are other possible ISec areas to be explored. In
future investigations, it might be possible to use the proposed model in this research and
explore the relationship between the various countermeasures and library
characteristics. It is also possible to further refine or redesign the model for additional
important insights regarding issues affecting security in libraries. More research is also
needed to collate evidence from libraries in other developing countries. A comparative
study could be carried out to investigate the significant differences between developing
and developed countries regarding the IS security issues investigated.
There will always be new threats to safe Internet use and library IS security. Being
aware of the threats should always be the first step in establishing a sound security
policy and security control. This study had identified the common perceived IS security
threats in Malaysian academic libraries in terms of hardware, software, data, network
and human-related threats. Additional research should further explore the relationship
between these threats and library characteristics. Further research should also be
performed to investigate the impacts of these security threats in terms of potential
damage and costs to libraries.
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This study revealed that inadequate financial support for IS security was prevalent
among the academic libraries, especially those university colleges. It is interesting to
discover how these academic libraries adjust their security posture over time as well as
striking a balance between limited funds and implementation of necessary ISec
protection that best meet their security needs.
In this research, social engineering was found to be one of the most commonly
perceived ISec threats in Malaysian academic libraries. Another line of research that
could be extended from this current research is the exploration of issues related to social
engineering (i.e. the use of non-technical means to gain unauthorised access to
information or computer systems) through the reference interviews or when using the
real-time digital reference services.
One of the issues that emerged from this study is the actual status of IS security
readiness among librarians in Malaysian libraries. A further study could focus on
assessing the information security readiness, infrastructures, computer literacy and daily
security practices. There is also a need for a comprehensive assessment to better
understand the factors that may challenge security readiness of librarians in Malaysian
libraries.
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6.6      Conclusion
Security is not easy to describe. Information security (ISec) assessment is a step to
evaluate the status of an information system security. This study provides a quantitative
approach that investigated the implementation status of ISec measures through the
opinions of individuals responsible for IS and ICT in Malaysian academic libraries. It
makes a contribution by providing an insight into what extent ISec practices are being
implemented within these libraries. It was evident that the levels of implementation of
technological measures are high as there is clear presence of technological security
controls for the hardware, software, workstations, servers, network and physical
facilities in Malaysian academic libraries. This may be related to the years of
experiences in ICT or computerisation in each library. However, the implementation
levels of organisational measures in these academic libraries are considered average.
This may be due to the over-emphasis on technology as the sole solution to all security
problems and needs to be investigated further. The study pointed that if ISec is to be
effective, libraries need to incorporate technical measures as well as ISec policies,
security procedures and awareness creation activities in their security programmes. This
survey also revealed that hardware security threats, human-related threats and physical
threats were perceived as the most common security threats in Malaysian academic
libraries. As human-created security problems remain rampant, it is necessary to
strengthen ISec policies and security awareness initiatives in these academic libraries.
To conclude, evaluating ISec should not be a one-time exercise, rather the assessment
efforts need to be continuous to ensure that progress is made towards better ISec
environments.
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Ref. #/QIS/56
Questionnaire on Information Security Management in
Malaysian Academic Libraries
January 4, 2010
Dear Respondent,
I am a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Computer Science and Information
Technology, University of Malaya. Currently, I am conducting a study on
information security management in Malaysian academic libraries.
Through your participation, I eventually hope to understand the most
common information security incidents experienced by Malaysian
academic libraries as well as the types and extent of security measures
undertaken by these libraries to protect their information systems (IS).
Enclosed with this letter is a set of questionnaire (Part A, B & C) that asks
a variety of questions about your library, your library IS security threats
and your library IS security measures implementation.
I hope you will contribute your time to complete this questionnaire and
return it to me in the enclosed postage-paid envelope, preferably within two
weeks. The information collected in this survey will be used for research
purposes only and I assure you that your responses are completely
anonymous.
Any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire can be
directed to me at 4uroesnita@gmail.com.
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Roesnita
Roesnita Ismail
PhD candidate
Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technology
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.
Encl.
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Additional Information:
A) Targeted respondent to answer this questionnaire
An individual who is responsible for the library information systems (IS) and/or
Information Technology (IT) in your library such as follows:
- Head of IT/Systems Department, or
- IT/Systems Manager, or
- IT/ Librarian/Systems librarian, or
- IT//Systems Executive, or
- IT//Systems Officer, or
- Individual who is responsible for the IT and systems in your library.
B) Definitions of key terminologies
 Information Systems:
‘It refers to the entire infrastructure, organisation, personnel and components
for the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination,
and disposition of information’.
 Information Systems (IS) Security:
‘The protection of information systems against unauthorised access to or
modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or transit, and
against the denial-of service to authorised users or the provision of service to
unauthorised users, including those measures necessary to detect, document
and counter such threats’.
 Threat:
It represents any type of action, circumstance or event that may have some
negative impact to information systems (IS).
 Countermeasure:
Include all devices, techniques, policies, procedures, actions or processes
implemented to prevent the information systems (IS) threats.
 Oganisational security measures:
‘Include the security policy; procedures and control; non-technological tools
and methods; and creation and maintenance of security awareness to guard
the library information systems integrity, confidentiality, and availability’.
 Technological security measures:
‘Include the technical mechanisms that are put in place to protect, control
and monitor information access, or prevent unauthorised access to data that
is transmitted over a library systems’.
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Part A: Questions about your library and yourself.
Please tick (√) whichever appropriate
1) Please indicate your library
ownership:
[ ] Government
[       ] Public
[       ] Private
[       ] Non-profit
2) Total numbers of staff in your library:
[       ] Less than 10
[       ] Between 10 and 50
[       ] Between 51 and 100
[       ] Between 101 and 190
[       ] More than 191
3) Numbers of PC/work station with
Internet connection for staff in your
library:
[       ] Less than 10
[       ] Between 10 and 50
[       ] Between 51 and 100
[       ] Between 101 and 190
[ ] More than 191
4) Estimate numbers of total library
patrons:
[       ] Less than 500
[       ] Between 500 and 1000
[       ] Between 1001 and 5000
[       ] More than 5 000
5) Numbers of PC/work station with
Internet connection for patrons in your
library:
[       ] Less than 100
[       ] Between 101 and 200
[       ] Between 201 and 300
[       ] More than 300
6) Does your library have a wireless
connection to the Internet?
[       ] Yes
[       ] No
[       ] Currently piloting
[       ] Do not know
7) Operating system used in your
library.
You may tick (√) more than one
answers whichever appropriate.
[       ] Windows
[       ] Linux
[       ] Unix Variants
[       ] Novell
[       ] Mac OS X
[       ] Other: Please specify:
______________________
8) Please indicate information systems
used in your library. You may tick
(√) more than one answers
whichever appropriate.
[       ] E- books and E-journals
[       ] Integrated Library
systems (ILS)
[       ] Online databases
[       ] Web-based resources
[       ] Other: Please specify:
______________________
9) Percentage of information systems
security budget from the library
general budget.
[       ] Less than 1%
[       ] Between 1% to 3%
[       ] Between 4% to 5%
[       ] More than 5%
9) Does your library have dedicated
staff assigned for IS security
related job?
[       ] Yes
[       ] No
[       ] Not sure
11)       How long has your library been
involved in the ICT or
computerization implementation?
[       ] Less than 5 years
[       ] 5 years to 10 years
[       ] 10 years to 15 years
[       ] 15 years to 19 years
[       ] More than 19 years
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12)     Which statement best describes the
role of information systems in your
library?
[       ] Information systems are
critical to our library.
[       ] Information systems serve
an important role, but are
not critical to our library.
[       ] Information systems are
helpful, but do not serve an
important role in our library.
[       ] Information systems are not
important to our library.
[       ] Not sure
13) Your highest academic qualification:
[       ] Master.
(Please specify: ……………….....)
[       ] Bachelor
(Please specify:…………………..)
[       ] Diploma
(Please specify:…………………..)
[       ] Other:
(Please specify:…………………..)
14) Please indicate your current
designated post in your library:
……………………………………
……………………………………
15) Are you responsible for
information security and
information systems (IS) security in
your library?
[       ] Yes
[ ] No
(If No, please specify who is
responsible for information security
and information systems (IS)
security in your library:
……………………………………
……………………………………
……………….................................
16)      How many information security
seminar, conferences or knowledge
sharing sessions have you attended
in the past 24 months?
[       ] None
[       ] 1
[       ] 2
[       ] 3
[       ] 4 or more
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PART B: The following list is the most common Information Systems (IS) security
incidents experienced by organisations. With regard to question 17, please tick (√) in the box
to indicate frequency of occurrence in your library for the past six (6) months.
17. Presence of security threats in my library.
Frequency of
Occurrence
for the Past 6 Months
Do
n’t
 kn
ow
Ne
ver
Ve
ry 
 ra
rel
y
So
me
tim
es
Alw
ays
Hardware Security Threats 0 1 2 3 4
Example: Electromagnetic interference √
17.1 Electromagnetic interference
17.2 Failure of communication equipments
17.3 Hardware/ equipments failure
17.4 Installation/ use of unauthorised hardware
17.5 Maintenance errors
17.6 Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, trojan horse,
logic/time bombs, trapdoor) e.g. making it impossible to
boot the computer.
17.7 Theft, physical sabotage, vandalism of ICT hardware
equipments
Software Security Threats 0 1 2 3 4
17.8 Abuse of computer access control
17.9 Adware and spyware
17.10 Corruption by system, system errors, or failure of system
software
17.11 Cyber-terrorism
17.12 Hacking/Intrusion/unauthorised access to system resources
17.13 Installation/use of unauthorised programmes or software
17.14 Maintenance errors
17.15 Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan
horse, logic/time bombs, trapdoor) e.g. program crashes,
repeated error messages or periodically reboot your system.
17.16 Password attacks/sniffing/stealing
17.17 Software piracy
17.18 Unauthorised changes to software settings
17.19 Use of library Internet for illegal or illicit communications
or activities (e.g. surfing for pornography)
17.20 User abuse/fraud
17.21 Weak passwords
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17. Presence of security threats in my library.
Frequency of
Occurrence
for the Past 6 Months
Do
n’t
kno
w
Ne
ver
Ve
ry
rar
ely
So
me
tim
e
s Alw
ays
Network Security Threats 0 1 2 3 4
17.22 Denial of service attacks (DoS)
17.23 Eavesdroping/ wiretapping
17.24 E-mail attacks /spams/ fraud
17.25 Hacking/ Intrusion/ unauthorised access
17.26 IP spoofing attacks
17.27 Malware and malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan
horse, logic/time bombs, trapdoor) e.g. losses associated
with the network downtime or lowered network speed.
17.28 Misrouting/re-routing of messages
17.29 Packing sniffs
17.30 Password attacks/sniffing/stealing
17.31 Probes and scans or unauthorised access to computers, data,
services and applications
17.32 Session hijacking
17.33 Transmission errors
17.34 Weak password
17.35 Website defacement
17.36 Wireless network breach
17.37 Zombie networks
Data Security Threats 0 1 2 3 4
17.38 Data diddling (Changing data with malicious intent before
or during input into the system)
17.39 Data loss due to wrong procedures of
updating/storage/backup etc.
17.40 Data manipulation
17.41 Delay in updating/dissemination
17.42 Destruction due to natural disaster etc.
17.43 Exposure of patrons sensitive data through web attack
17.44 Impersonation/ social engineering
17.45 Loss of patron data/privacy ideas
17.46 Malware and Malicious code (e.g. virus, worm, Trojan
horse, logic/time bombs and trapdoor) e.g. destroy your data
or wipe your hard drives clean
17.47 Masquerading of user identity
17.48 Password attacks/sniffing/stealing
17.49 Phishing/ pharming
17.50 Theft of proprietary data
17.51 Unauthorised access
17.52 Unauthorised data copying
17.53 Unauthorised transfer of data
17.54 Unauthorised/accidental disclosure/modifications/alteration
of data
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17. Presence of security threats in my library.
Frequency of
Occurrence for the Past
6 Months
Do
n’t
 kn
ow
Ne
ver
Ve
ry 
 ra
rel
y
So
me
tim
es
Alw
ays
Physical facilities & Environmental Threats 0 1 2 3 4
17.55 Hazardous material accident
17.56 Intrusion/ unauthorised access into library building
17.57 Leaking
17.58 Natural calamity (e.g. fire, flood, storm, earthquakes or
lightning)
17.59 Power supply failure (e.g. electricity, air-conditioning, water
utility)
17.60 Theft, buglary, sabotage, vandalism or physical intrusions
Other Threats 0 1 2 3 4
17.61 Employee misconduct
17.62 Human errors (data entry errors or carelessness)
17.63 Online extortion
17.64 Social engineering
17.65 Unfaithful patrons
17.66 Unfaithful staff
18) In your opinion, the most common IS security threats sources in your library come from
(only ONE answer, please):
[       ] Hardware and software failures (e.g. power failure, equipment failure, network
failure or system malfunction)
[       ] Natural or environmental threats (e.g. fire, flood or earthquake)
[       ] People or human threats (e.g. intentional or unintentional acts by library staff or
library patrons)
[       ] Others (Please pecify:……………………………………………………………..)
[       ] Unknown
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PART C: The following is a list of Information Systems (IS) safeguarding measures. Please
tick (√) in the box to indicate the level of implementation in your library.
19. Presence of technological security in my library.
No
t im
ple
me
nte
d
On
ly 
som
e p
art
 ha
s b
een
im
ple
me
nte
d
Im
ple
me
nte
d b
ut 
has
 no
t
bee
n r
evi
ew
ed
Im
ple
me
nte
d a
nd
rev
iew
ed 
on 
reg
ula
r b
asi
s
Fu
lly
  im
ple
me
nte
d a
nd
rec
ogn
ise
d a
s g
ood
exa
mp
le f
or 
oth
er
lib
rar
ies
Hardware security 1 2 3 4 5
e.g. Periodical remote mirroring or file mirroring to backup disk drives.
√
19.1 CCTV, visual camera, magnetic detection system and
electronic anti theft system at strategic places, public
computer areas and server areas.
19.2 Emergency power sources and alternative
communication lines. (e.g. use of alternative
telephone lines or cables and generators)
19.3 Locks, security cables, locked cable trays, metal
cages or anchoring devices to improve the security of
hardware equipments.
19.4 Periodical remote mirroring or file mirroring to back
up disk drives.
Software Security 1 2 3 4 5
19.5 Anti spyware software to detect and remove any
spyware threats.
19.6 Anti-phishing solutions to prevent phishing attacks.
19.7 Cleanup software to erase files or settings left behind
by a user.
19.8 Desktop security software at application level and
operating level to monitor, restrict usage or disable
certain features of the workstations.
19.9 Distribution agents to automate the process of
installing an application or updates to workstations
on a network.
19.10 ID management software to automate administrative
tasks such as resetting user passwords and enabling
users to reset their own passwords.
19.11 Menu replacement software to replace the standard
windows desktop interfaces and provide control on
timeouts, logging and browsing activities.
19.12 Multi user operating systems and application
software to allow concurrent access by multiple users
of a computer.
19.13 Periodical automatic debugging and tests to remove
any defects from newly developed software or
hardware components.
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19. Presence of technological security in my library.
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Software security 1 2 3 4 5
19.14 Rollback software to keep track and record of any
changes made to the computers and allow the system to
be restored to its original starting point from any
chosen point in time.
19.15 Single sign on system for user authentication and
authorisation to access all computers and systems
without the need to enter multiple passwords.
19.16 Spam filtering software to automatically detect
unwanted spam emails from getting into a user's inbox.
19.17 Timer software to control the amount of time a patron
can use a workstation.
19.18 User entrance log to record and monitor user logs.
These logs are regularly analysed by a library staff.
19.19 Web filtering software to prevent access to
inappropriate materials or sites.
Workstation Security 1 2 3 4 5
19.20 All office productivity software and browsers for the
workstations/laptops are configured to receive updates
in a timely manner.
19.21 An application firewall is used for mobile laptops that
connect to the library external LANs.
19.22 The computer’s BIOS are secured in order to create a
secure public access computer.
19.17 User identification and authentication are required
before logging into the library’s workstations, laptops
screensavers, library network or campus network.
19.24 Virus protection programs, configuration settings and
security software programs are installed for web
browsers and email programs.
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Network Security 1 2 3 4 5
19.25 Antivirus software and desktop security software to
receive regular updates to protect the internal network
from any security breaches.
19.26 Digital signatures are used to assure the authenticity of
any electronic documents sent via the library’s
network.
(e.g. use of passwords, private key encryption, public
key encryption or digital certificates)
19.27 Firewall to protect the internal network from external
threats.
19.28 Firewall with virtual private network (VPN)
capabilities is installed for remote and wireless access
connections.
19.29 Limitation of connection time is performed via
configuration routines to control and restrict access for
the library’s high-risk applications or databases.
19.30 Public and staff’s local area networks (LANs) are
physically separated by means of separate cabling for
each network to provide alternative circuit.
19.31 Server segregation/perimeter network (DMZ) by using
firewalls and some other network access control
devices to separate systems that are at a relatively high
risk from unsecured network.
19.32 The network is segmented with a router to increases the
bandwidth available to each user and reduce the
congestions or collisions of the library’s network.
19.33 Wireless security products to secure the library
wireless network. (e.g. use of default passwords on
wireless access points, network ID, wireless intrusion
detection systems, wired equivalency protocol (WEP)
encryption, MAC address filtering or virtual private
networking (VPN))
Server Security 1 2 3 4 5
19.34 Anti-virus software on servers and anti-virus virus
definition files are kept up-to-date.
19.35 Authentication systems to prevent unauthorised access
to the library’s server.
19.36 Fault tolerance is implemented to make sure if one
system fails, then there is a backup system that
immediately takes over.
19.37 Firewalls to protect the library network from
unwarranted intrusion.
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Server Security 1 2 3 4 5
19.38 Intrusion detection software and host auditing software
are installed to monitor the servers or computers for
signs of intrusion.
19.39 Regular backups for the data, hard copy of server
hardware specifications, installation information,
installation software and passwords are regularly
performed and stored at an offsite location.
19.40 Server logs are reviewed periodically by using a log
file monitor utility to monitor any signs of intrusion or
security violations.
19.41 The file system in a server is restricted access to the
directory structure using file or directory permissions.
19.42 The library servers’ operating systems (OS) and
applications are hardened to protect from any
vulnerabilities.
19.43 The server is placed in a secure location, such as in a
lockable cage, a locked room and place it with
environmental controls.
Data Security 1 2 3 4 5
19.44 Attributes for each removable media applications in
your library are properly recorded and the media are
kept from any unauthorised devices from accessing,
running or transferring data to your library
workstations and network. (e.g. USB thumb drives,
tapes, CDs, DVDs, disks, drives, ect.).
19.45 Combination of authentication systems to restrict
access of library data and resources based on a variety
of access rights. (e.g. user identification, passwords or
biometrics system)
19.46 Disposable of unused media and sensitive media are
properly managed to maintain an audit trail.
19.47 Enforced path is created between a user terminal and
other library services that the user is authorised to
reduce the risk of unauthorised access.
19.48 Event logging or log management software to ensure
the library computer security records are stored in
sufficient detail for an appropriate period of time.
(e.g. records for security incidents, policy violations,
fraudulent activities and operational problems)
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Data Security 1 2 3 4 5
19.49 Fraud detection and prevention measures to
control fraudulent activity and disclosure of
information.
(e.g. use of address verification system/AVS,
proprietary encryption, internal intrusion
detection system, multiple login monitoring,
password verification on transactions or data
access controls)
19.50 Public key infrastructure (PKI) to secure the
exchange of personal data via the library network
and Internet. (e.g. use of public and  private
cryptography key pair).
19.51 RFID tags to manage and secure the library
collection as well as to track attendance and
prevent unauthorised access into the library
building.
19.52 Systematic approaches conducted in house or
outsourced to a service provider to address the
library vulnerabilities (e.g. managing on
vulnerability discovery, prioritisation,
remediation, dynamic protection, verification and
customisable reporting).
19.53 Use of cryptography techniques, hardware
tokens, software tokens and single sign on
systems to control data access for the library
internal and remote computer systems.
19.54 Use of password protection of user accounts, anti
virus software, firewalls, wireless network
protections, intrusion detection systems and
Internet Protocol Virtual Private Networks/IP
VPNs to ensure data insert and sent from one end
of a transaction arrives unaltered at the other end.
19.55 Llibrary’s vital business information or records
are regularly backed up.
(e.g. inventory records, patrons’ data, library
databases, production servers and critical
network components and backup media).
19.56 Web access management systems to manage and
validate user access to devices, applications and
library systems. (e.g. authentication
management, single sign-on convenience, audit
or reporting systems).
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Data security 1 2 3 4 5
19.57 Web content filtering/monitoring systems on
individual workstations or at a central point on
the network to prevent users from viewing
inappropriate web sites or content. (e.g. at the
proxy server or internet server).
19.58 Your library network and information systems
security services are properly managed in house
or outsourced to a service provider.
(e.g. Round-the-clock monitoring, management
of firewalls and intrusion detection systems,
management of patch management and upgrades,
performing security assessments, performing
security audits and responding to emergencies).
Physical and environmental security 1 2 3 4 5
19.59 Air conditionings to stabilise the air temperature
and humidity within the library building.
19.60 Earthquake early warning system to provide an
emergency warning to the library staff and
patrons prior to damaging ground shaking.
19.61 Flood detector to sense the presence of water to
provide an early warning of developing floods in
a library.
19.62 Lightning protectors and surge protectors to
protect any valuable machines or equipments
from lighting strikes, voltage spikes and surges.
19.63 Security guards to monitor people entering and
leaving the library buildings and sites.
19.64 Use of automatic sprinkler systems, smoke detectors,
fire extinguishers and fireproof installations in the
library buildings and areas adjacent to library’s key
assets to detect and prevent fires, toxic chemical spills
and explosions.
19.65 Use of magnetic stripe swipe cards, electronic lock,
proximity cards, bar code card or biometrics to
secure and control access to restricted library areas.
19.66 Warning signs, fencing, vehicle height-
restrictors, site lightings and trenches around the
library areas to provide initial layer of security
for a library building.
19.67 Wireless gates, biometrics or other user
identifications and authentication forms at the
library main entrances, exists and public access
areas to control access into the library building.
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20. Presence of information security policy in mylibrary.
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1 2 3 4 5
20.1 Back ups and off-site storage policies for your
library data, media or materials that contain
sensitive information.
20.2 Data classification, retention and destruction
policies for your library data, media or materials
that contain sensitive information.
20.3 Identity management policies for library
Information Systems user registration and
password management.
20.4 Job responsibility policy for individual employee
responsibilities related to the library IS security
practices.
20.5 Policies on access control, authentication and
authorisation practices for using the library
Information Systems.
20.6 Policies on protection of library IS assets to
protect your library’s hardware, software, data
and people.
20.7 Secure disposal policies to dispose library data,
media or materials that contain sensitive
information.
20.8 Polices on reporting, notification and response of
Information Systems security events to affected
parties such as individuals, law enforcement,
campus or parent organisations.
20.9 Policies on acceptable use of wireless devices in
your library such as laptops and hand phones.
20.10 Policies on acceptable use of workstations, e-
mails, databases, intranet and Internet in your
library.
20.11 Policies on managing privacy and confidentiality
issues, including breaches of personal
information.
20.12 Policies on sharing, storing and transmitting of
library data via ISPs, external networks or
contractors’ systems.
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1 2 3 4 5
21.1 Controls and disciplinary procedures if a library
staff or patrons breach the IS security polices or
rules. (e.g. verbal warning, written warning,
suspension and dismissal).
21.2 Procedures for handling library sensitive data
and personal data of library patrons to prevent
errors, unauthorised disclosure or misuse by
those who handle it.
21.3 Procedures for non-disclose agreement or
confidentiality agreement to all library staff and
patrons to protect any type of confidential and
proprietary information.
21.4 Procedures for update and review existing
information security policies.
21.5 Procedures on the intellectual property rights and
copyrights in controlling and protecting any
digital works or resources that are stored,
transmitted, accessed, copied or downloaded via
the library IS.
21.6 Procedures that list all requirements with regard
to outsourcing any library Information Systems
service or activities.
22. Presence of administrative tools and methodsin my library. 1 2 3 4 5
22.1 Procedure for owner accountability to ensure
appropriate protection is maintained for each
library IS asset.
(e.g. information assets, software assets, physical
assets and library services).
22.2 Procedures for the development and
implementation of risk analysis to protect your
library from all types of threats. (e.g.
Performance of assets analysis, threat analysis,
annual loss expectancy analysis, identification
and evaluation of security measures).
22.3 Procedures on handling, reporting, notification
and response of IS security events to affected
parties such as individuals, law enforcement,
campus or parent organisation.
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1 2 3 4 5
22.4 Procedures related to asset classification in order
to organise it according to its importance and
sensitivity to loss. (e.g. unclassified, confidential,
secret and top secret)
22.5 Regular internal and external audits programs
appropriate for your library’s Information
Systems size, complexity of activities, scope of
operations, risk profile and compliance with the
relevant standards.
23. Presence of awareness creation in mylibrary. 1 2 3 4 5
23.1 All staff and patrons at various levels are made aware
of their responsibilities with regard to protecting the
library’s Information Systems’ security and trained to
report any security breach incidences.
23.2 All staff and patrons at various levels receive
appropriate information security trainings and
education.
23.3 All staff and patrons at various levels receive regular
updates on your library Information Systems’ policies
and procedures.
23.4 Information security awareness trainings have become
mandatory to all staff and patrons at various levels.
23.5 Risk assessment approach exists and follows a defined
process that is documented.
23.6 Staff and patrons at various levels are trained to
monitor and handle the library’s Information Systems
on their own.
23.7 There are balanced set of key performance indicators
(KPIs) and metrics used to provide the real insight
into the effectiveness of security awareness programs.
23.8 There are positive supports and commitments from
the top management to coordinate the implementation
of Information Systems’ security controls in your
library. (e.g. via allocation of budget, strong interest
and active involvements).
23.9 Threats that could harm and adversely affect critical
operations of your library Information Systems’
security are identified and up dated regularly.
23.10 Vulnerabilities in your library information systems
and related processes are identified and up dated
regularly.
-End of Questionnaire-
………..Thank You……
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